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A PROPOSAL FOR PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS
ON HIRING PERMANENT STRIKER
REPLACEMENTS: "A FAR, FAR BETTER
THING" THAN THE WORKPLACE
FAIRNESS ACT
WILLIAM R. CoRBETr*
Since the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. in 1938, employers have been permitted to
hire permanent replacementsfor striking employees. The hiring
of permanent replacements deprives employees engaged in an
economic strike of their right to immediate reinstatement to their
jobs at the conclusion of the strike. Although, under the substantive law, the "Mackay doctrine" applies to economic strikes but
not unfair labor practice strikes, in practice employers permanently replace employees engaged in both types of strikes. This is
possible because the unfair laborpracticeproceedings,which determine the type of strike, occur long after employers hire permanent replacements.
In recent years the Mackay doctrine has come under increasing attack. Numerous proposals to modify or overturn the
doctrine have been made, including bills introduced in Congress
during the past six years. Indeed, in the 103d Congress, the
House of Representatives passed a bill that would overturn Mackay, and a companion bill awaits action on the Senate floor. In
this Article, Professor Corbett argues that, although the current
law regardingstriker replacement should be changed, some aspects of the law should be preserved-principally,the distinction
between economic strikes and unfair laborpractice strikes.
After consideringpriorproposals to reform the law, Professor Corbett advocates a new proposal that would use procedural
devices to limit permanent replacement in practice to economic
strikes. The proposal would require employers to notify the National Labor Relations Board of their intention to hire permanent
replacements. That notification would trigger an interim ban on
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on earlier drafts of this Article. I also thank Andr~e Matherne, Marylou Goode, and Heidi Howat
for their research assistance, and Gladys Dreher for her technical assistance. This Article was
written with the support of research grants from the Paul M. Hebert Law Center.
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such hiring until expedited proceedingsdetermined the characterization of the strike. Professor Corbett argues that this proposal
would reduce the uncertaintyfaced by all parties to a labor dispute and enable them to act based on knowledge of the applicable
replacementrights of the employer and reinstatement rights of the
striking employees.
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[A] union takes a bull by the horns when it determines the
cause of a strike. It may strike over what it thinks is an unfair
labor practice only to be told years later by the Board and the
courts that no violation occurred. Then strikers take potluck as
strikers who may be replaced. An employer's margin for error is
no wider.'
PROLOGUE: A TALE OF Two LABOR BArrLEs

"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times ....

-2

The year

was 1992, and for organized labor it was a time when two great battles were
fought against management in two cities. Notwithstanding great expectations of at least one victory, organized labor, after waging determined campaigns, lost both. But in those losses, labor may have set the stage for a
future victory-the demise of the much-maligned fifty-six-year-old doc1. Frank H. Stewart, Conversion of Strikes: Economic to Unfair Labor Practice,45 VA. L.
REv. 1322, 1326 (1959) (footnotes omitted).
2. CnARLEs DicKEms, A TALe OF Two Crris 2 (Silver Burdett 1982) (1859).
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trine from the Supreme Court decision NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph
Co.3

In October 1935, the union representing a unit of employees at Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company called a strike because the employer
would not agree to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. To

maintain operations during the strike, the employer moved employees from
its other offices to San Francisco. 4 The strike failed and the strikers requested that the employer allow them to return to work. The employer
agreed, subject to the promise it had made to eleven of the replacements

brought in from other offices that they could stay in the San Francisco office if they wished. Eventually, only five of the replacements wished to

remain in San Francisco. As a result, the employer reinstated all strikers
except five of the most active union supporters who had played prominent
roles in the strike.5 The employees who were not reinstated filed unfair
labor practice (ULP)6 charges with the National Labor Relations Board
3. 304 U.S. 333 (1938). According to Professor Weiler, "[Flew rules of American labor
law have been as heavily criticized as the legality of hiring permanent strike replacements." Paul
Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contractand the Prospectsfor Union Representation, 98 HARv. L. REv. 351, 393 (1984).
4. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 337.
5. Id. at 339.
6. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act establishes the basic rights of employees
covered by the Act: "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1988). The Act also provides that covered employees have the right to refrain from
engaging in the foregoing activities. Id. Section 8 of the Act creates the means for enforcing the
substantive rights created by § 7 by declaring specific types of conduct by employers and labor
organizations to be unfair labor practices. Id. § 158. 'The Act's unfair labor practice provisions
place certain restrictions on actions of employers and labor organizations in their relations with
employees, as well as with each other." 55 NLRB ANN. REP. 3 (1992) (covering fiscal year
1990).
Section 8(a) of the Act describes conduct of employers that constitutes ULPs. It is a violation of § 8(a)(1) to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988). An example of a § 8(a)(1) violation is an
employer's threatening to fire employees or take other retaliatory actions if the employees elect a
union as their collective bargaining representative. An employer violates § 8(a)(2) if it "dominate[s] or interfere[s] with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute[s] financial or other support to it." Id. § 158(a)(2). Examples of such a ULP include forming
a company union or forming and dominating employee participation committees. See, e.g., Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 998 (1992). Section 8(a)(3) prohibits employers from discriminating "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any other term or condition of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3)
(1988). This most commonly filed ULP charge, 55 NLRB ANN. REp., supra, at 137 tbl. 2, is
exemplified by an employer's discharging an employee because of the employee's engaging in
union support or activities. An employer violates § 8(a)(4) of the Act if it "discharge[s] or otherwise discriminate[s] against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under
[the Act]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4)(1988). Section 8(a)(5) prohibits an employer from "refus[ing]
to bargain collectively with the representatives of [its] employees." Id. § 158(a)(5). An em-
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(NLRB or "the Board"). The Board held that the employer had committed
ULPs by discriminating against the five employees because of their union
support and activities.7 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied enforcement of the Board's order,' and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the Board's finding was supported by the evidence.9 In addition to approving the Board's finding of discrimination, the Court stated as follows:
Nor was it an unfair labor practice to replace the striking employees with others in an effort to carry on the business. Although
§ 13 [of the National Labor Relations Act] provides, "nothing in
this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike," it does not follow that an
employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost the
right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left
vacant by strikers. And he is not bound to discharge those hired
to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume their employment, in order to create places for them. 10
With that statement" the Mackay doctrine was born. Under that
ployer engages in bad faith bargaining in violation of § 8(a)(5) if, for example, it refuses to meet
and bargain with the bargaining representatives, engages in surface bargaining (not directed toward reaching an agreement), or refuses to provide the bargaining representatives with relevant
information to which they are entitled upon request.
Section 8(b), added to the Act by the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136
(1947), establishes certain conduct by labor organizations to be ULPs. The number of annual
ULP charges alleging violations by unions is far smaller than the number of charges alleging
employer violations. 55 NLRB ANN. R'., supra, at 137 tbl. 2. Included among union ULPs are
the following types of conduct: "restrainfing] or coerc[ing]" employees in the exercise of their
§ 7 rights, or an employer in the selection of its collective bargaining representatives, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(1); generally, "caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of [§ 8(a)(3)]," id. § 158(b)(2); failing to satisfy the duty to bargain in
good faith, id. § 158(b)(3); engaging in secondary boycotts, id. § 158(b)(4); charging discriminatory or excessive initiation fees under a union shop agreement, id. § 158(b)(5); causing or attempting to cause an employer to pay for work that has neither been performed nor is to be performed,
id. § 158(b)(6); and engaging in recognitional picketing under specified circumstances, id.
§ 158(b)(7). Section 8(e) prohibits unions and employers from entering into "hot cargo" agreements, in which an employer agrees to refrain from dealing with the products of another employer.
Id. § 158(e).
7. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 201, 218 (1936).
8. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 92 F.2d 761,765, adhering on reh'g to 87 F.2d 611
(9th Cir. 1937).
9. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 346-47.
10. Id. at 345-46.
11. Numerous commentators have argued that the Supreme Court's statement in Mackay
regarding an employer's right to hire permanent replacements is merely dicta. E.g., JuLius G.
GEMAN & BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE BASIC PROCESSES, LAW AND PRACTICE 139 (1988); Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: Turn It Off, Tune It Out, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 295,
299-300 (1991); Note, Replacement of Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630, 631 (1966).
Although often repeated, this view is not unanimous. Professor Baird has argued that, since the
Wagner Act was silent on whether an employer could hire replacements for striking employees,
the Court found it necessary to make this determination before addressing the more specific ques-
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doctrine, employers may lawfully hire "permanent" 12 replacements for employees engaged in economic strikes. Thus, employers invoking the Mackay doctrine have been permitted to hire permanent replacements and deny
immediate reinstatement to economic strikers if their positions have been

filled. In the last decade the doctrine has become one of the most vehemently debated issues in labor law.' 3 The battles of 1992 threatened to
overthrow Mackay, and they presaged future conflicts.
dion of whether the selection of strikers for reinstatement was discriminatory. If the Court had
interpreted the Act as prohibiting the hiring of permanent replacements, then the more specific
question would have been moot. Charles W. Baird, On Strikers and Their Replacements, 12
GOV'T UNION REv., Summer 1991, at 1, 8; see also DANIEL V. YAGER, EMPLOYMENT POLICY
FOUNDATION, LOADING THE SCALES: Is THE BALANCE BETwEEN THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND THE
RIGHT TO OPERATE IN NEED OF REFoRMa? 40 (1993) (arguing that it was essential for the Court to
clarify rule regarding permanent replacement of strikers).
Regardless of whether the Mackay doctrine was dicta, the point is practically insignificant,
since the courts and the Board have repeatedly reaffirmed the doctrine. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Strikers andReplacements, 38 LAB. L.J. 287, 289 (1987) ("It is simply too late in the day
to reopen Mackay Radio."); George Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a
Misnomer- "Protected" ConcertedActivities, 47 Tax. L. REv.378, 385 (1969) (recognizing that
Mackay is uncontroverted doctrine). The Supreme Court's continued adherence to Mackay's permanent replacement doctrine is demonstrated by the Court's decision in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463
U.S. 491, 504-05 n.8 (1983) (recognizing that an employer's refusal to fire permanent replacements to reinstate returning strikers does not constitute a ULP). Moreover, Congress ratified the
doctrine by enacting that portion of the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat.
519 (1959), which gave employees "engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to reinstatement," 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1988), voting rights in NLRB elections held within 12 months
of the commencement of a strike. Estreicher, supra, at 289 (recognizing the 1959 amendment as
congressional ratification of the Mackay doctrine).
12. "Permanent," as used in this context, has a meaning quite different from the commonly
used definition. In short, permanent replacement means the employer does not intend to discharge
the replacement in order to reinstate a striking employee when the strike ends or when the striker
otherwise requests reinstatement. Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1293 (1993)
(Raudabaugh, Member, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that, in lexicon of labor
law, "permanent" means employer intends to retain replacement even after strike is over); DouoLAS E. RAY & EMERY W. BARTLE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: STRIKES, LOCKOUTS AND

BoYcorrs § 6.03, at 5 (1992) (explaining distinctions between temporary and permanent replacements); David Westfall, Striker Replacements and Employee Freedom of Choice, 7 LAB. LAW.
137, 143 (1991) (noting that permanent means employment term is not "explicitly limited" to
duration of strike); see also Burr E. Anderson, "Permanent" Replacements of Strikers After Belknap: The Employer's Quandary, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REv.321, 325-37 (1985) (discussing evolution of meaning of "permanent" replacement).
13. Introducing a roundtable discussion of the Mackay doctrine at a conference in 1990,
Professor Samuel Estreicher noted some of the proposals to abrogate the doctrine that have been
made in recent years:
[I]f there is to be change, what form should it take? A flat prohibition on permanent
replacements... ? A provision barring replacements during, say, the first ten weeks of
a strike... ? A provision requiring proof that the employer could not maintain operations with temporary replacements? A provision requiring an employer to offer to submit to interest arbitration and, only if that offer is spumed by the union, can the
employer resort to replacements?
Samuel Estreicher, Strikers and Replacements: Introductory Comments, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEw
YORK UNIVERSITY 43RD ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 17, 22 (Bruno Stein ed.,
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Rising Action

The first of the battles was fought in Congress. In Washington, D.C.,
labor and management engaged in one of the most important legislative
struggles of the 102d Congress. On July 17, 1991, the United States House
of Representatives passed H.R. 5,14 a bill to overturn Mackay; the bill
would have amended the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or "the
Act"),'5 making it a ULP for employers to hire or threaten to hire permanent replacements during strikes. 6 An almost identical bill, S. 55,17 was
18
soon under consideration in Senate committees.
As the battle continued in Washington, another conflict began in Peoria, Illinois where Caterpillar, Illinois's largest manufacturer, is based. Caterpillar is the world's largest manufacturer of heavy equipment and the
nation's second-leading net export manufacturer. 9 In recent times, however, it had suffered losses due, in part, to increased foreign competition.
Sales had dropped twenty percent since 1990, and in 1991 Caterpillar lost
$404 million." The United Auto Workers of America (UAW) is the powerful union, 900,000 members strong,2 1 which represented approximately
16,000 Caterpillar employees at plants in four states. 22 The collective bargaining agreement between the UAW and Caterpillar was to expire at midnight on September 30, 1991.23 As the expiration date drew near,
1990). For a discussion of legislation proposed in the last six years to overturn or modify the
doctrine, see infra note 74. For a sampling of books and articles written on the doctrine, see infra
notes 84-86.
14. H.R. 5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The margin of 247 to 182 indicated that the House
would not have been able to override a promised veto by President Bush. Striker Replacement
Bill Faces Uncertain Future in Senate, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 143, at A-17 (July 25, 1991).
15. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988).
16. 137 CONG. REc. H5518-90 (daily ed. July 17, 1991) (debate and passage of bill); Gail
McCallion, Strike Replacements, CRS Issun BPRmF (Cong. Res. Serv., Libr. of Cong., Wash.
D.C.), July 1, 1992, at CRS-3; John G. McDonald, Note, Leveling the Playing Field or Tipping
the Scales? Pending Strike Legislation: The Latest Battlefield Between Labor and Management-An Alternative Solution, 42 SYRAcusE L. REv. 971, 971-72 (1991).
17. S. 55, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
18. See McCallion, supra note 16, at CRS-3.
19. Philip Dine, Bitter Feelings on Labor War Engulf Peoria, ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATCH,
Apr. 10, 1992, at 12D.
20. Rally Backing CaterpillarStrikers Draws 20,000 Union Members to Peoria,Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 57, at A-7 (Mar. 24, 1992).
21. Strikers Disobey CaterpillarOrder to Report to Work, TIMES-PicAYUNE (New Orleans),
Apr. 7, 1992, at D-2.
22. Auto Workers Reach Tentative Agreement with Deere & Co., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
195, at A-9 (Oct. 8, 1991).
23. Negotiators Extend CaterpillarPact While Talks for New Contract Underway, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 190, at A-6 (Oct. 1, 1991).
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negotiators for the UAW and Caterpillar agreed to extend the contract indefinitely to avoid a strike.2 4
The UAW announced that Deere & Co. (Deere), Caterpillar's chief

domestic rival, had been selected as the target for establishing a pattern
collective bargaining agreement for the agricultural, construction, and
heavy equipment industry.' On October 5, 1991, the UAW reached a tentative agreement with Deere26 and turned its attention to Caterpillar. The

prospect for an agreement between the UAW and Caterpillar looked bleak
because Caterpillar, for the first time in the relationship between the union
and the employer, announced that it would not be a part of pattern
bargaining.2 7
On November 4, 1991, the UAW launched a limited strike against Caterpillar at two of its Illinois plants.2 8 On November 7, Caterpillar retaliated
by announcing a selective lockout of employees in specific departments of
its plants in Peoria, East Peoria, and Aurora, Illinois.2 9 Caterpillar moved
managerial and salaried employees into jobs vacated by strikers in order to
maintain production and meet customer demand2 0 On December 5, the
UAW filed a ULP charge against Caterpillar, alleging that the employer had
violated section 8(a)(5) 3 ' of the NLRA by refusing to provide the union

with information necessary to process a grievance and fulfill its duty as the
exclusive collective bargaining representative of the employees and section
8(a)(4) 32 by discriminating and retaliating against employees because they
24. Id. In their tumultuous bargaining history, there had been a 205-day strike in 1982-83.
Rally Backing CaterpillarStrikers Draws 20,000 Union Members to Peoria,supra note 20.
25. Negotiators Extend CaterpillarPact While Talks for New Contract Underway, supra
note 23. The announcement meant that the UAW would take a bargaining position that Caterpillar must agree to a contract like that which the UAW negotiated with Deere.
26. Auto Workers Reach Tentative Agreement with Deere & Co., supra note 22.
27. See UAW's Bieber Tells Locked-Out CaterpillarWorkers to Stay Home, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 29, at A-6 (Feb. 12, 1992). Caterpillar claimed that it could not remain globally
competitive if it agreed to a contract like that which existed between the UAW and Deere. See
About 300 CaterpillarStrikers Have Crossed Picket Lines, Company Says, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 67, at A-9 (Apr. 7, 1992) (reporting Caterpillar Group President Gerald Flaherty's
assertion that the company viewed pattern bargaining as outdated); Rally Backing Caterpillar
Strikers Draws 20,000 Union Members to Peoria, supra note 20. A UAW officer characterized
Caterpillar's resistance to pattern bargaining as "bottom line greed" and "a philosophical bent that
they want to take on the UAW and do what nobody else has been able to do, so they can be the
darlings of Wall Street." Rally Backing CaterpillarStrikers Draws 20,000 Union Members to
Peoria,supra note 20 (quoting UAW secretary-treasurer Bill Casstevens).
28. Auto Workers Launches Limited Strike at Two CaterpillarInc. Plants in Illinois, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 214, at A-3 (Nov. 5, 1991).
29. CaterpillarAnnounces Selective Lockout ofAbout 6,000 UAW-Represented Employees,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 217, at A-10 (Nov. 8, 1991).
30. Managers,SalariedEmployees Taking Up Slack at CaterpillarPlantsAffected By Strike,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 230, at A-1 (Nov. 29, 1991).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
32. Id. § 158(a)(4).
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had filed ULP charges against the employer. 3 In January 1992, Caterpillar
announced that it had suffered losses of $318 million for the fourth quarter
3
of 1991. 1
After sporadic negotiations between the union and the employer, Caterpillar announced on February 7, 1992, that it was ending the lockout of
employees at its East Peoria and Aurora plants and was asking that the
employees return to work by February 16 .3 The UAW responded by expanding the strike and instructing the employees who had been locked out
not to report to work without a collective bargaining agreement.3 6
Negotiations in February remained unavailing, as the union continued
to insist on a collective bargaining agreement patterned on the Deere contract. 7 On February 19, the UAW rejected what Caterpillar declared to be
its final offer.3 8 Two days after rejecting the offer, the union expanded the
strike to Caterpillar's Mossville, Illinois plant, adding 2,750 employees to
the 8,000 already on strike.3 9
On March 6, after the union had rejected three of its contract proposals, Caterpillar announced that the parties were at an impasse in their negotiations. 4 Negotiations resumed on March 25. 1 Two days later, the UAW
filed additional ULP charges against Caterpillar, alleging that the employer
had violated the Act by conducting surveillance of picketing employees,
conducting surveillance of union officials, stealing picket signs, physically
threatening picketing employees, and threatening them with discharge.42
With the collapse of negotiations and the filing of ULP charges, the UAW
33. Charge Against Employer, Case 33-CA-9624 (Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.) (filed Dec. 5,
1991).
34. CaterpillarAbsorbs $318 Million Loss, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at A-20 (Jan. 23,
1992).
35. CaterpillarTrying to Renew Talks With UAW, Says it Will End Lockout, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 28, at A-4 (Feb. 11, 1992).
36. UAW's Bieber Tells Locked-Out CaterpillarWorkers to Stay Home, supra note 27.
37. Id.; UAW Rejects New Contract Proposal That CaterpillarSays Is Final Offer, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at A-9 (Feb. 21, 1992).
38. UAW Rejects New Contract ProposalThat CaterpillarSays Is Final Offer, supra note
37.
39. UAW Expands Strike Against Caterpillar,Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at A-19 (Feb.
25, 1992).
40. CaterpillarDeclares Impasse in UAW Talks, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at A-16
(Mar. 9, 1992). The union invited Caterpillar to return to the bargaining table on March 17, but
the employer declined, claiming its negotiators were unavailable. UAW Wants Meeting With Caterpillar, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 54, at A-16 (Mar. 19, 1992).
41. Caterpillar-UAW Talks Resume, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 59, at A-16 (Mar. 26,
1992).
42. Charge Against Employer, Case 33-CA-9768 (Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.) (filed Mar. 27,
1992).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

declared that it considered the strike an unfair labor practice strike rather

43
than an economic strike.
As the conflict between Caterpillar and the UAW escalated, the relationship between the battles in Peoria and Washington, D.C. became increasingly clear. Both were battles about strikes and the balance between

the rights of employees and employers. After months of negotiations and
strategic maneuvers by one of the strongest unions and one of the most

powerful employers in the nation, the reason for the legislative confrontation in the nation's Capital was on the verge of graphic depiction in Peoria,

Illinois.
Climax
On April 1, 1992, Caterpillar deployed its ultimate weapon-the Mackay doctrine. After five months of a strike by its UAW-represented employees, Caterpillar announced that strikers who did not return to work by
April 6 might lose their positions to returning strikers, employees recalled
from layoff, or permanent replacements." Furthermore, the announcement
stated that Caterpillar would reduce its workforce by ten to fifteen percent.4 5 The UAW responded to the ultimatum by expanding the strike and
43. UAW Files ULP ChargesAgainst Caterpillar;ContractTalks Break Off Without Resolution, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 61, at A-12 (March 30, 1992). For discussion of the distinctions
between ULP strikes and economic strikes, see infra Part II.A and note 116.
44. CaterpillarTells Strikers to Return to Work; UAW Authorizes Strikes Against FourMore
Plants, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 64, at A-12 (Apr. 2, 1992); CaterpillarThreatens Strikers'
Jobs, ST. Lotus POST-DIsPATCH, Apr. 2, 1992, at 5B. The article in the Daily Labor Report

actually stated that Caterpillar "said it will fire workers who refuse [to return to work]." Caterpillar Tells Strikers to Return to Work; UAWAuthorizes Strikes Against FourMore Plants,supra. A
correction was published in the next day's issue: "[A] statement from Caterpillar warned that
strikers who choose not to return 'may lose their place in a reduced work force. They could be
replaced by a returning striker, an employee recalled from layoff, or a permanent new hire."'
Correction,Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 65, at 1 (Apr. 3, 1992). The difference between the two
reported announcements may seem insignificant; if Caterpillar had made the announcement as
first reported, however, it would have violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), and
perhaps converted what may have been an economic strike into a ULP strike, with drastic consequences to be described below. See, e.g., Trident Seafoods Corp., 244 N.L.R.B. 566, 570 (1979)
(holding that, by issuing discharge notices to employees engaged in economic strike, employer
committed ULP that converted strike from economic to ULP strike), enforced, 642 F.2d 1148 (9th
Cir. 1981); see also 2 AMEmucAN BAR Ass'N, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE
CouRTs, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr 1102 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW] (recognizing that employer's statements regarding

replacement or reinstatement of striking employees may be basis on which strike is characterized
as ULP or economic strike). That the Daily Labor Report would inadvertently substitute "fire" for
"permanently replace" is, in the view of many commentators, consistent with the fact that employees are likely to perceive no difference between permanent replacement and discharge. See infra
note 106.
45. Analysts Say UAW-CaterpillarDispute Could Have SignificantRamifications, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 65, at A-15 (Apr. 3, 1992). This announced reduction in force further jeopardized the striking employees' prospects for reinstatement. An employer that does not reinstate
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authorizing members to strike at four additional Illinois plants.46 On April
2, the UAW continued its counteroffensive by filing another set of ULP
charges against Caterpillar.4 7 The union subsequently filed additional ULP
charges, with at least one specifically alleging that the strike had been converted to a ULP strike.48
The employer, by announcing its decision to hire permanent replacements, transformed the employees' picket line into a moat between certain
jobs and uncertain reinstatement rights. The striking employees were confronted with the difficult decision of whether to cross that moat.49 As the
strikers considered their options and the prospect of losing their livelihoods,
observers speculated about the impact of the UAW-Caterpillar labor dispute
50
on the future of collective bargaining in the United States.
With the battle at its height in Peoria, the importance of the conflict
was not lost on politicians. 5 1 Proponents of the bills to ban the hiring of
economic strikers can avoid liability for a ULP if it can satisfy the burden of proving a "legitimate
and substantial business justification[ ]" for refusing to reinstate them. NLRB v. Fleetwood
Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967). Changes in operations such as downsizing, if not motivated by intent to discriminate against union activities, can satisfy the employer's burden. Id. at
379.
46. CaterpillarTells Strikersto Return to Work; UAW Authorizes Strikes AgainstFour More
Plants, supra note 44; CaterpillarThreatens Strikers' Jobs, supra note 44.
47. Charge Against Employer, Case 33-CA-9767 (Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.) (filed Apr. 2,
1992). The charge alleged various violations of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act: bad faith
bargaining by Caterpillar as evidenced by the implementation of its final contract offer without
reaching an impasse in bargaining; illegal surveillance of union activity; manipulation of employees' seniority and job retention rights; interference with the right of strikers to picket near plants'
gates; refusal to provide the union with information relevant to the fulfillment of its duties as
collective bargaining representative; bargaining to impasse on a nonmandatory bargaining subject;
and bad faith bargaining as evidenced by direct dealing with union members.
48. Charge Against Employer, Case 33-CA-9775 (Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.) (filed Apr. 8,
1992). The charge stated, in relevant part, that "[s]ince on or about April 1, 1992, the current
strike has been converted to an unfair labor practice strike by the Employer's announcement that it
intends to hire permanent replacements for bargaining unit employees who are engaged in the
lawful exercise of their Section 7 rights."
49. Strikers were receiving $100 per week from the UAW's $800 million strike fund. Rally
Backing CaterpillarStrikers Draws 20,000 Union Members to Peoria,supra note 20. Additionally, the UAW paid a $2,000 bonus to those who had been on strike since the beginning. Id.
50. Professor Harley Shaiken assessed Caterpillar's ultimatum as "redefining the rules" of
collective bargaining. He suggested that the resolution of the UAW-Caterpillar dispute could
shape labor relations for the 1990s. Analysts Say UAW-Caterpillar Dispute Could Have Significant Ramifications, supra note 45; see also For UAW, "A Question of Survival": Caterpillar's
"Hardball" Step Called a Gamble, CHi. TRm., Apr. 3, 1992, at C1 (quoting various analysts on
potential ramifications of the dispute).
51. On April 8, Governor Clinton, then the front-runner for the Democratic presidential nomination, visited the striking employees at the Peoria plant in a show of support, Cynthia Todd,
Clinton Backs Strikers' Rights, ST. Louis POST-DisPATCH, Apr. 9, 1992, at Al, and a group of

senators sent a letter to the Secretary of Labor encouraging her to intervene in the dispute, 15
Senators Urge Martin to Intervene in CaterpillarStrike, Appoint Mediator, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 69, at A-18 (Apr. 9, 1992).
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permanent replacements pointed to the dispute as a stark example of the

need for the legislation; conversely, opponents of the legislation argued that
the confrontation demonstrated why employers need the right to hire per-

manent replacements
when they have offered unions fair contracts that un52
ions reject.
FallingAction
On April 6, approximately 300 striking Caterpillar employees returned
to work.5 3 Caterpillar then raised the stakes by placing advertisements in
local newspapers seeking "permanent employees to replace non-returning
striking workers" and offering wages from $16.12 to $17.85 per hour with
"excellent benefits" and pensions.5 4 Caterpillar reported receiving an overwhelming response to the advertisements from people interested in the replacement positions. 5 Even striking employees who had not crossed the
picket lines with the "first wave" acknowledged both the increasing pressure to return in order to preserve their jobs5 6 and the frustration of feeling
that the battle and their livelihoods were slipping beyond their control.5 As
of April 13, an estimated 750 strikers had crossed the picket lines and returned to work. 8 As the "crossovers" drove through the picket line, their
coemployees shouted insults and filmed them so their names could be
posted at the union hall.5 9
52. See Lobbyists Weigh Impact of CaterpillarStrike on Bill to Ban Strike Replacements,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 74, at A-12 (Apr. 16, 1992).
53. About 300 CaterpillarStrikers Have Crossed Picket Lines, Company Says, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 67, at A-10 (Apr. 7, 1992).
54. Philip Dine, Job Seekers' Calls Flood Caterpillar,ST. Louis PosT-DisPATcH, Apr. 8,
1992, at Al; Stephen Franklin, Once Again, Strike Tears at Peoria, CHi. TmiB., Apr. 8, 1992, at

C-1.
55. Dine, supra note 54, at Al; Franklin, supra note 54, at C-1.
56. One Caterpillar employee expressed the tension many strikers felt:
"There's a lot of guys who can't make up their minds-you're caught between the union
and the company .... I can't say when, [but] at some point, something will snap and
I'll go in-no ifs, ands or buts. You've got to pay for the house, for the car and put food
on the table."
Michael Abramowitz, The Agony of Crossingthe Line-CaterpillarStrikers Tom Between Principles and Pocketbook, WASH. Post, Apr. 8, 1992, at C-i (quoting Caterpillar assembly line employee Bob Piper) (alteration in original).
57. "'The guys on top who made this decision, they do not have anything to bet .... We're
all angry. We're all afraid, and at this point, we are all going hour by hour."' Franklin, supra
note 54, at C-1 (quoting Rich Gilbert, a third-generation Caterpillar worker). "'It's like two kids
fighting over a candy bar sometimes, and who's caught in between? Us."' Michael Martinez,
For UAW, "A Question of Survival": Showdown Tightens the Squeeze on Strikers, Cm. TRIa.,
Apr. 3, 1992, at CI (quoting an unidentified striker).
58. Caterpillar, UAW Meet UnderAuspices of FMCS, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 72, at
A-16 (Apr. 14, 1992).
59. See Kevin Johnson & Andrea Stone, CaterpillarTests Striking UAW's Will, USA To.
DAY, Apr. 7, 1992, at Al. At the Aurora, Illinois plant, striking employees erected a mock gal-
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Caterpillar and UAW negotiators began meeting with the director of
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service on April 13 in an effort to
resolve the strike.6 0 On April 14, 1992, five months and ten days after the
strike had begun, the UAW called off the strike and advised its members to
return to work under the terms of Caterpillar's final offer-with the employer's agreement to end its efforts to hire replacements, but without a
collective bargaining agreement.6 1 The union pointed to the employer's
threat to hire permanent replacements and the resulting, as well as potential
further, striker crossover as reasons for terminating the strike.6 2
The confrontation did not end, however, with the strike "busted" and
the employees returning to work on the employer's terms. When employees reported for work on April 15, they were told to wait until they were
recalled by the company; Caterpillar suggested that due to modernization
during the lockout and strike, the company might not recall ten to fifteen
percent of the strikers. 63 Caterpillar decided, however, that despite its reduced need, it would recall all strikers as a gesture of good will.' The
battle in Peoria was finally over, and management had defeated the mighty
UAW-one of labor's strongest warriors.
In the aftermath of "one of the key labor combat fields of the decade,"65 labor leaders and advocates described the strike, generally regarded
as the ultimate weapon in labor's arsenal,6 6 as a "suicide mission 67 and
lows and noose to send crossovers a message. Id. One striker expressed the feelings of those
refusing to return for the crossovers: "'It makes me sick .... They are screwing my family and
they're screwing themselves. If we hold out another week, we can win this thing. This is the last
card that Caterpillar has to play."' Strikers Disobey CaterpillarOrder to Report to Work,
TnMs-PicA UN (New Orleans), Apr. 7, 1992, at D2 (quoting Bob Hughes, Caterpillar employee
for 24 years).
60. Caterpillar,UAW Meet Under Auspices of FMCS, supra note 58.
61. CaterpillarSays It Will Begin Recall of Strikers on April 20, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
75, at A-17 (Apr. 17, 1992); UAWAgrees to End Strike at Caterpillar,ST. Louis POsT-DIsPATCH,

Apr. 15, 1992, at IA.
62. Local 751 president Larry Solomon stated that although fewer than 1,000 strikers had
crossed over in response to Caterpillar's ultimatum, many more were on the verge of crossing
over. CaterpillarSays It Will Begin Recall of Strikers on April 20, supra note 61, at A-17.

63. Cynthia Todd, CaterpillarLocks Its Gates On UAW, ST. Louis POsT-DIsPATCH, Apr. 16,
1992, at 1C.
64. John Lippert, CaterpillarWill RecallAll Strikers,DEorr FREE Punss, Apr. 17, 1992, at
IE; CaterpillarSays It Will Begin Recall of Strikers on April 20, supra note 61. As a result of
Caterpillar's turning away employees reporting on April 15, some of those employees filed a class
action against the employer alleging breach of individual employment contracts. CaterpillarSued
Over Delayed Return, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 114, at A-14 (June 12, 1992).
65. Analysts Say UAW-CaterpillarDispute Could Have Signiflcant Ramfications,supra note
45.
66. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 1, at 1322.
67. More In-Plant Actions Expected In Wake of UAW's Failed Strike at Caterpillar,Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 90, at A-7 (May 8, 1992) (quoting Charles McDonald, executive assistant to
the secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO).
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suggested that unions would resort to other tactics, including in-plant activities (such as work slow downs), product boycotts, media campaigns, and

informational picketing.

8

Labor leaders also emphasized that Caterpillar's

successful use of the permanent replacement ultimatum demonstrated the
necessity of passing the pending legislation overturning Mackay.6 9

Labor lost the battle in Washington, D.C. as well, when S. 55 died in
the Senate. First, the Senate bill banning the hiring of permanent replace-

ments during economic strikes was killed by filibuster as a motion to invoke cloture failed.7 0 Then, Senator Packwood proposed an amended
version of the bill as a substitute, which would have prohibited the hiring of
permanent replacements by an employer if a union agreed both to submit
the labor dispute to a three-member fact-finding panel and to be bound by
the panel's recommendations.7 1 A cloture vote on the amended bill also
failed.72 With that vote, organized labor lost the second great battle of
1992. But the war was far from over.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The UAW-Caterpillar labor dispute was a remarkable display of the
weapons and strategies of labor and management-lockout, strike, posturing by union and employer, filing of ULP charges, threat to hire permanent
replacements, and consequent breaking of the strike. The dispute is also, as

both sides contend, a model of the issues involved in one of the most important debates in labor law: whether an employer should be allowed to hire
permanent replacements during a strike.7 3
68. Id.
69. Id.; Lippert, supra note 64, at 1E (quoting UAW Secretary-Treasurer Bill Casstevens
saying that the dispute would increase support for the legislation).
70. 138 CONG. REc. S7919-65 (daily ed. June 11, 1992) (debate and failure of cloture motion); McCallion, supra note 16, at CRS-3; Senate Fails to Invoke Clotureon Striker Replacement
Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 114, at A-10 (June 12, 1992).
71. 138 CONG. REc. S8056-89 (daily ed. June 11, 1992) (amendments 2047-94).
72. 138 CONO. REc. S8236-39 (daily ed. June 16, 1992) (debate and failure of cloture motion); McCallion, supra note 16, at CRS-3-4; Senate Vote Kills Bill to Restrict Use of Permanent
Striker Replacements, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 117, at A8 (June 17, 1992).
73. The most significant aspect of the hiring of permanent replacements is that it changes
(adversely from the strikers' perspective) the reinstatement rights of the striking employees if the
strike is an economic strike. See infra Part II.A. The hiring of permanent replacements and the
concomitant altering of strikers' reinstatement rights is one manifestation of perhaps the most
pervasive struggle in labor law-the struggle between an employer's right to manage its business
as it wishes and the employees' § 7 rights to organize and engage in concerted activities. Boe W.
Martin, The Rights of Economic Strikers to Reinstatement: A Searchfor Certainty, 1970 Wis. L.
Rev. 1062, 1062; cf. Deborah Eberts, Comment, The Mackay Doctrine: The Grand Dame of
Labor Law Clashes With the Current State of the Union, 57 J. Am L. & COM. 257, 258 (1991)
(stating that permanent replacement debate "'captures the essence of labor management relations,"' pitting rights of employers against rights of employees) (quoting Randall Sambom,
"Replacements" Spur Labor Action, NAT'L L.L, May 28, 1990, at 1, 28).
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During the UAW-Caterpillar clash, many observers focused on the implications of the dispute for the then-pending striker replacement legislation. The proposed legislation, like the strike, failed, and the Mackay
doctrine, in its fifty-fourth year, had vanquished its most recent challenger.74 At the time, it appeared there might be no further efforts to overturn Mackay legislatively for several years.75 With the election of 76a
Democratic President who had pledged his support for such legislation,
however, the striker replacement bills were resurrected in the 103d Congress. 77 The United States House of Representatives passed the Cesar Cha74. H.R. 5 and S. 55 were, at the time, the latest unsuccessful attempts to overrule Mackay
legislatively. The following bills, which would have abrogated the Mackay doctrine had they
been enacted, were introduced in Congress from 1988 through 1991: H.R. 2620, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991); S. 2112, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 3936, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990);
H.R. 2969, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1383, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); and H.R.
4552, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
In 1991, Representative Goodling introduced H.R. 2620 as a substitute amendment to H.R. 5.
The bill, which was introduced on June 12, 1991, would have made it a ULP for an employer to
hire permanent replacements during the first eight weeks of an economic strike. It also would
have amended § 9(c)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1988), by extending the period during
which economic strikers not entitled to reinstatement are entitled to vote in an NLRB election
from 12 months to 18 months (after the commencement of a strike). McCallion, supra note 16, at
CRS-7.
In 1990, S. 2112 and H.R. 3936 were introduced in the 101st Congress. These bills were the
substantive precursors of the bills introduced in the 102d and 103d Congresses; they would have
made it a ULP either to hire permanent replacements at any time during a strike or to give preference to strike crossovers. McCallion, supra, note 16, at CRS-4; McDonald, supra note 16, at 985.
In 1989, H.R. 2969 was introduced in the 101st Congress. This bill would have prohibited
the hiring of replacements who would prejudice the reinstatement status of legal strikers. McDonald, supra note 16, at 985. Also introduced in 1989 was H.R. 1383, first introduced in 1988 as
H.R. 4552, which would have made it a ULP to'hire permanent replacements during the first 10
weeks of a strike. McCallion, supra note 16, at CRS-4; McDonald, supra note 16, at 985.
For a succinct summary of the types of legislative proposals to limit or overturn Mackay, see
L. REv. 363,
Douglas E. Ray, Some Overlooked Aspects of the Strike ReplacerientIssue, 41 KMAN.
370-72 (1992).
75. Senate Vote Kills Bill to Restrict Use of PermanentStriker Replacements, supra note 72
(reporting union and business leaders' predictions that striker replacement legislation would not
be considered again by Congress while President Bush was in office).
76. Clinton Transition Aide Says Family Leave, Striker Replacement Bills Are Priorities,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at A-17 (Jan. 8, 1993).
77. The House bill was introduced by Representative Clay on January 5, 1993. H.R. 5, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The Senate bill was introduced by Senator Metzenbaum on January 21,
1993. S. 55, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Passage of the bills is organized labor's top priority in
the 103d Congress. See, e.g., Kirkland Lauds Clinton on Issues Vital to Labor, But Rejects
NAFTA, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 56, at A-1I (Mar. 25, 1993); Unions See StrikerReplacement
Bill as Beginning of Wider Labor Law Reform, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 221, at A-2 (Nov. 16,
1992). Labor's disdain for Mackay is matched by employers' affinity for it. E.g., Bill to Ban
StrikerReplacements Still Faces Tough Climb in Senate, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 71, at AA-1
(Apr. 15, 1993) (discussing business community's efforts to solidify cloture-proof block of votes
in the Senate to defeat S. 55); Employers Converge on Capitol to Oppose Senate Passage of
Striker Replacement Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 134, at A-11 (July 15, 1993) (discussing
business leaders' rally on July 14, 1993).
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vez Workplace Fairness Act7 8 on June 15, 1993.79 The bill, like its 1992
precursor, would amend the NLRA to make it a ULP for an employer to
hire or threaten to hire permanent replacements for striking employees."
The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee approved a similar
bill,8" which currently awaits action on the Senate floor.8 2 In view of the
passage of the bill in the House in 1991, the 1993 result there was never in
doubt. The battle will be won or lost in the Senate just as it was in 1992.
As of this writing, it appears that the Senate will debate the bill in late April
or early May 1994, but supporters 3appear to be a few votes short of the
8
sixty needed to defeat a filibuster.
Commentators have presented various arguments for and against the
Mackay doctrine and striker replacement legislation. Some conclude that
Mackay should be overturned and employers absolutely banned from hiring
permanent replacements as in the Workplace Fairness Act.8 4 Others con78. H.R. 5, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The House Education and Labor Committee
adopted an amendment that renamed the act in honor of the president of the United Farm Workers,
who died on April 23, 1993. Striker Replacement Bill ClearsHouse, Senate Panels, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 86, at AA-1 (May 6, 1993).
79. The House passed the bill by a vote of 239-190. 139 CoNo. REc. H3527-69 (daily ed.
June 15, 1993) (debate and passage of bill); House Approves Bill That Would Ban Permanent
Replacement of Economic Strikers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 114, at AA-1 (June 16, 1993).
80. H.R. REP. No. 116, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 2, 39 (1993). The prohibition on
hiring permanent replacements would protect employees who were in a bargaining unit if either of
two conditions existed: a labor organization was the certified or recognized bargaining representative of the bargaining unit; or at least 30 days prior to the dispute, a labor organization had filed
a petition, based on written authorization by a majority of the bargaining unit, for a representation
election. The bill similarly would amend the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1988).
The bill also would overrule the Supreme Court's decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989). H.R. REP. No. 116, supra, at 1,2, 39.
In that case, the Court held that an employer did not violate the Railway Labor Act by refusing, at
the conclusion of a strike, to replace (or "bump") junior crossover employees from their jobs with
more senior employees who did not cross over. Trans World Airlines, 489 U.S. at 432. Discussion of Trans World Airlines is beyond the scope of this Article. For an analysis of that decision,
see Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L.
REv. 547, 556-59.
81. S. 55, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The prohibition on hiring permanent replacements
in the Senate bill has potentially broader application than the House bill, in that it applies if a
union--on the basis of signed authorization cards by a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit-is seeking to be recognized or certified, even if the union has not filed a petition for an
election. Id.
82. Striker Replacement Bill Clears House, Senate Panels, supra note 78.
83. See David R. Sands, Unions Seek Senate Support to ProtestStrikers, WASH. TiMEs, Mar.
21, 1994, at A17 (reporting that Senator Mitchell promised to schedule the bill for debate in late
April or early May). Thus, earlier forecasts of the unlikelihood of the bill's passage appear to be
correct. See, e.g., Bill to Ban Striker Replacements Still Faces Tough Climb in Senate, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 71, at AA-1 (Apr. 15, 1993); Senate Ratio Changes with Hutchison Victory,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 108, at A-10 (June 8, 1993).
84. E.g., Walter Kamiat, Strikers and Replacements: A Labor Union Perspective, in PRoCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIvERsrrY 43Rt ANuAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, supra
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clude that the current law should be modified, but that employers should not
be banned under all circumstances from hiring permanent replacements.85
Finally, some conclude that Mackay should be left alone.8 6
note 13, at 23, 26-27, 51; Michael H. LeRoy, Changing Paradigmsin the PublicPolicy ofStriker
Replacements: Combination, Conspiracy, Concert, and Cartelization, 34 B.C. L. Rnv. 257,
306-07 (1993); Schatzki, supra note 11, at 392; Jack J. Canzoneri, Comment, Management's
Attitudes and the Need For The Workplace FairnessAct, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 243-44 (1993);
David Radtke, Comment, Banning the Use of PermanentReplacements: Slaying Its Opponent's
Trojan Horse, 1992 Dr. C.L. REv. 881, 901, 906-07; Jonathan Axelrod, Speech Delivered to the
ABA's Mid-Winter Meeting (Mar. 5, 1991), reprintedin Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at F-1
(Mar. 6, 1991)); cf.Finkin, supra note 80, at 574 (urging abrogation of Mackay). Professor Weiler's proposal calls for an absolute ban for a specified period. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING
rm WORKPLACE: TiE FtrruRE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 268 (1990). Professor Weiler
proposes amending the NLRA to provide that striking employees can return to their jobs within
six months of the commencement of the strike even if replacements have been hired. Id. This
proposal is modeled on the law of Ontario before it was amended in 1992. Id.; see R.S.O. ch. 228,
§ 73 (1980). It is not clear whether the change advocated by Professor Weler would permit
employers, after six months from the commencement of a strike, to retain replacements rather than
reinstating strikers offering to return even if the employer had no supporting business justification
for preferring to retain the replacements. Under the law of Ontario prior to 1992, the Ontario
Labour Board held that, even after the six-month period provided by § 73, retaining replacements
rather than reinstating strikers constituted a ULP, discrimination in violation of R.S.O. ch. 228
§ 66(a) (1980), if an employer could establish no justification for retaining the replacements in
preference to the strikers. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Shaw-Almex Indus., Ltd., O.L.R.B.
Rep. 1800, 1825 (1986), affd sub nom. Shaw Almex Indus., Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations
Board), 28 O.A.C. 71 (1988); see also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Legal Regulation of Economic
Weapons: A Comparative Perspective, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEw YORK UNrvERsrrY 43RD ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, supra note 13, at 79, 89-90 (discussing Ontario law
regarding replacement and the Shaw-Almex decision). In 1992, the Ontario law that appeared to
allow employers to retain replacements after six months was repealed. 1992 Canadian Labour
Law Reports (CCH) U 60,373-60,375. Bill 40, which was approved on November 5, 1992 and
became effective on January 1, 1993, makes it more difficult for employers to operate during
strikes; it prohibits employers from having strikers' work performed by permanent or temporary
replacements or by transferred employees except under specific circumstances. Act of Nov. 5th,
1992, ch. 21, 1992 S.O. 363.
85. E.g., Charles B. Craver, The NationalLabor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve
Industrial Democracy, 34 ARiz. L. REv. 397, 423 (1992); Ray, supra note 74, at 400; George S.
Roukis & Mamdouh I. Farid, An Alternative Approach to the Permanent Striker Replacement
Strategy, 44 LAB. L.J. 80, 89-91 (1993); Eberts, supra note 73, at 294-96; Hal K. Gillespie, Comment, The Mackay Doctrine and the Myth of Business Necessity, 50 TEx. L. REv. 782, 782-87
(1972); McDonald, supra note 16, at 991-94; Note, One Strike and You're Out? Creating an
Efficient PermanentReplacement Doctrine, 106 HARv. L. REv. 669, 669-70 (1993) [hereinafter
Note, One Strike]; Note, The Unfair Labor Practice Strike: A Critique and a Proposalfor
Change, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 988, 1009-11 (1971) [hereinafter Note, The Unfair Labor Practice
Strike]; Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Striker Replacements: A "Negotiations Approach,"
31-36 (Nov. 1993) (on file with the North CarolinaLaw Review).
86. YAGER, supra note 11, passim; Baird, supra note 11, at 1, 22-26; Brendan Dolan, MacKay Radio: If It Isn'tBroken, Don't Fix It, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 313 passim (1991); Peter G. Nash &
Jonathan R. Mook, Strike Replacement Legislation: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It, 16 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 317, 328 (1990-91); Westfall, supra note 12, at 158; William C. Zifchak, Strikers,
Replacements, and S. 2112: Full Employment Law for Organized Labor?, in PROCEEDINGS OF
NEw YORK UIvEmRY 43RD ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, supra note 13, at 53,
69-75 (favoring retaining Mackay as is, but discussing alternatives that are preferable to banning
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The Workplace Fairness Act should not become law; on the other
hand, the current law should not be left alone. It is not necessary to sweep
away the existing regime to remedy the most palpable injustice in labor law
manifested in the UAW-Caterpillar dispute and the many others like it-the
inability of the parties to know at the time that they must make important
decisions whether the employer lawfully may hire permanent replacements.
It is necessary, however, to implement procedural changes to address that
injustice. The current substantive law does not bestow upon employers an
unfettered right to hire permanent replacements for strikers. Under the
Mackay doctrine, employers are permitted to hire permanent replacements
only for economic strikers-not ULP strikers.8 7 This distinction between
economic and ULP strikes performs important functions by deterring employers from committing ULPs and providing a market check on the bargaining demands of unions and employers.8 8 Procedural reforms, however,
could both alleviate the uncertainty of the parties regarding the legality of
hiring permanent replacements and preserve the useful distinction between
economic and ULP strikes.
The UAW-Caterpillar showdown demonstrates the need for procedural
reform of the law on hiring permanent striker replacements. The UAW
filed several ULP charges against Caterpillar. 9 In one of those charges, the
union expressly alleged that the ULPs had converted the strike into a ULP
strike.90 If the strike was converted from an economic strike to a ULP
strike, the employer did not have the right to hire permanent replacements
from the time of conversion. Although it is beyond debate that Mackay is
so limited, 91 the limitation was of no practical use to the striking Caterpillar
employees faced with the guillotine of permanent replacement. They could
accept the UAW's assertion that the strike was a ULP strike and that Caterpillar could not lawfully hire permanent replacements. They could even
proclaim that message themselves by carrying picket signs declaring they
were striking in protest of ULPs. But the employees could not know
whether the union's characterization of the strike would be accepted by the
Board until it rendered a decision, which might occur two or more years
the hiring of permanent replacements); Matthew T. Golden, Student Article, On Replacing the
Replacement Worker Doctrine, 25 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 51, 85-90 (1991); cf. George M.
Cohen & Michael L. Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers: The Law and Economics Approach,
in PROCEEDINGS OF NEw YORK UNIVERSITY 43RD ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR,

supra note 13, at 109, 111, 117-19 (arguing that Mackay and other law regarding striker replacement promote efficient outcomes).
87. See infra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
88. See infra Part IV.
89. See supra notes 33, 42, 47 & 48.
90. See supra note 48.
91. See, e.g., Ray, supra note 74, at 368 (identifying the different reinstatement rights associated with the two types of strikers as the most important limitation on Mackay).
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from the filing of the charges. 2 Even then the Board's determination might
be reviewed by a United States Court of Appeals.9 3
Thus, under the current striker replacement law there is a gap between
what the substantive law allows and what the procedural framework for
effectuating that law permits. Delay in the decisional process results in
uncertainty at the times when strikers, unions, and employers must make
crucial decisions. That uncertainty regarding the characterization of the
strike and the associated reinstatement rights of the strikers creates
problems not only for the employees, but for all the parties in a labor dispute. Employers, unions, and potential striker replacements also must act in
ignorance and potentially face adverse consequences if their predictions regarding the nature of the strike subsequently prove incorrect. 94 Thus, the
moral of the UAW-Caterpillar story is that the law should make it possible
for all the parties in a labor dispute involving a strike and threat of permanent replacement to know, with the greatest degree of certainty possible, the
characterization of the strike and the accompanying reinstatement rights of
the strikers before an employer hires permanent replacements. Mackay, unbridled by procedural restraints, can be destructive. Properly controlled, it
would not be nearly so formidable, but it would continue to serve significant purposes.
This Article proposes a legislative amendment of the NLRA. Using
the current distinction between economic and ULP strikes, this proposal
would impose procedures designed to limit the doctrine to its intended area
of application-economic strikes. The amendment would require employers to notify the NLRB before they hire permanent replacements and temporarily prohibit employers from hiring them until expedited ULP
proceedings determine the nature of the strike. The parties to a labor dispute would then know whether the employer can hire permanent replacements at the critical moment when they must take actions likely to have
significant consequences.
Part II of this Article examines the distinctions between economic and
ULP strikes. Part I considers the perceived increase in use of permanent
92. The median time for a Board decision from the filing of a ULP charge was 688 days in
the fiscal year ending September 30, 1990. NLRB, supra note 6, at 196 tbl. 23. A 1991 General
Accounting Office report found that in 1989, 21% of the cases decided by the Board had been
pending for more than two years, and 10% had been pending for more than four years. See, e.g.,
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFPICE, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: ACTION NEEDED TO IMPROVE CAsE-PRocEssINo Turm AT HEADQUARTERS (Jan. 1991) (cited in 139 CONG. REC.
S3044-45 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1993) (statement of Sen. Durenberger in support of S. 598)).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (e) & (f) (1988) (establishing procedures for petitioning for enforcement
and review, respectively).
94. For discussion of the risks associated with the decisions of all the parties, see infra Part
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replacements and the declining number and effectiveness of strikes as an
argument for overturning Mackay. Part IV discusses why the principal distinction between the types of strikes should not be abrogated by categorically prohibiting employers from hiring permanent replacements. After
describing and evaluating prior proposals to modify the Mackay doctrine in
Part V, this Article sets forth the details of a new proposal in Part VI.
II. Tim DiSTINCrION BETWEEN ECONOMIC STRIKES AND UNFAIR LABOR
PRACnCE STRIKES

A.

The Different Reinstatement Rights and Voting Rights of Economic
Strikers and UnfairLabor Practice Strikers

The characterization of a strike as an economic strike or an unfair labor
practice strike determines the reinstatement rights and voting rights (in
NLRB elections) of striking employees. A ULP strike is initiated or prolonged either wholly or partially in protest of an employer's ULPs. 95 In
contrast, an economic strike is neither initially caused nor prolonged by an
employer's ULPs.96 Thus, economic strikes are lawful strikes that are not
in protest of an employer's ULPs.97 The objective of an economic strike is
usually, although not always, to force an employer to agree to a union's
economic demands, such as better wages, hours, health care benefits, or
other terms and conditions of employment. 98 A strike that begins as an
economic strike can be converted into a ULP strike if the employer commits ULPs that prolong the strike (or perhaps aggravate or expand the
strike). 99 Similarly, a strike that either begins as a ULP strike or is converted to a ULP strike can be converted or reconverted to an economic
°
strike.10
The primary significance of the distinction between economic and
ULP strikes is the different rights of employers to hire replacements and the
95. E.g., Northern Wire Corp. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 1313, 1319 (7th Cir. 1989) ("A strike that
is caused in whole or in part by an employer's unfair labor practices is an unfair labor practice
strike."); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at 1100; ROBERT A. GoRMAN, BAsic
TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNmomzArioNr AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 339 (1976); Martin, supra
note 73, at 1063. For a discussion of the types of practices or acts by an employer that may
constitute ULPs, see supra note 6.
96. 2 TmE DEv.oPNG LABOR LAW, supranote 44, at 1100; GomAN, supra note 95, at 339;
Martin, supra note 73, at 1063.
97. See Martin, supra note 73, at 1063.
98. See, e.g., 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at 1100 (noting that demand for
consent election also can be basis of economic strike); Martin, supra note 73, at 1063 (recognizing
that strikes for recognition of a bargaining representative and for consent election have been classified as economic).
99. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at 1102-03; GoRMAN, supra note 95, at
339; Martin, supra note 73, at 1063; see infra notes 292-95 and accompanying text.
100. RAY & BARTE, supra note 12, § 5.06, at 11-12.
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corresponding reinstatement rights of the strikers. As discussed above,
under the Mackay doctrine, employers may hire "permanent" replacements
for economic strikers;' 0 1 Mackay is limited, however, to economic
strikes.10 2 Employers are not permitted to hire permanent replacements for
employees engaged in a ULP strike; they may hire only temporary
replacements. 10 3
Based on the differing replacement rights of employers depending on
the characterization of the strike, there is a corresponding dichotomy of

reinstatement rights of striking employees. Economic strikers are entitled
to immediate reinstatement upon making an unconditional offer to return to
1 4
work, as long as the employer has not hired permanent replacements. 0 If
an employer exercises its Mackay right by permanently replacing economic
strikers, the strikers are only entitled to reinstatement to their jobs or sub-

stantially equivalent jobs, if and when vacancies occur.' 0 5 An employer is

101. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
102. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956).
103. See, e.g., Northern Wire Corp. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 1313, 1319 (7th Cir. 1989); JAMEs B.
ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 31 (1983) (stating that, if a strike

is deemed a ULP strike, all replacements are considered temporary) (citing NLRB v. Lightner
Publishing Co., 113 F.2d 621, 625-26 (7th Cir. 1940); C.G. Conn, Ltd. v NLRB, 108 F.2d 390,
401 (7th Cir. 1939); Jacob Hunkele, 7 N.L.R.B. 1276, 1288-89 (1938), modified sub nom.
Tri-State Towel Serv., 20 N.L.R.B. 123 (1940)); RAY & BARTLE, supra note 12, § 5.01, at 1
("[E]mployer may not hire permanent replacements during an unfair labor practice strike .... );
Martin, supra note 73, at 1064 (stating that ULP strikers have right to immediate reinstatement
and employer cannot hire permanent replacements).
104. Hansen Bros. Enters., 279 N.L.R.B. 741,741 (1986), review denied mem., 812 F.2d 1443
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 845 (1987); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at

1105. If it is determined that the replacements are temporary replacements (hired only for the
duration of the strike), the economic strikers have the right to immediate reinstatement, displacing
the temporary replacements. E.g., Hansen Bros. Enters., 279 N.L.R.B. at 741; RAY & BARTLE,
supra note 12, § 6.02, at 3. The burden is on the employer to establish that the replacements are
permanent replacements. Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1290 (1993); RAY & BARTLE, supra note 12, § 6.03, at 5. The employer can satisfy that burden by establishing that
replacements and employer had a "mutual understanding and commitment on the permanent nature of their employment" Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. at 1290; see also Hansen Bros.,
279 N.L.R.B. at 741 (holding that it is employer's burden to establish mutual understanding). For
discussion of cases in which employers failed to satisfy their burden of establishing permanent
replacement, see infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text.
105. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at 1104-05; GORmAN, supra note 95, at
341-42; Martin, supra note 73, at 1064. The Board and the courts recognize the employer's
continuing duty to reinstate economic strikers even if there are no vacancies at the time they make
unconditional requests for reinstatement. Because economic strikers remain employees, the employer has a continuing duty to reinstate them when vacancies occur, unless those employees have
obtained regular and substantially equivalent employment or the employer can prove a legitimate
and substantial business reason for refusing to reinstate them. Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366,
1369 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
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not permitted, however, to discharge economic strikers based on their participation in a strike.1" 6
In contrast, ULP strikers are entitled to immediate reinstatement upon

submission of an unconditional request to return to work. 10 7 The employer
has no right to hire permanent replacements; thus, if the employer hires
replacements, regardless of how it characterizes them, it must discharge
them if necessary to reinstate the returning ULP strikers.10 8 When a strike
is converted from an economic to a ULP strike, the strikers have the reinstatement rights of economic strikers prior to conversion and the rights of
ULP strikers after conversion."' Complementary principles apply to reinstatement rights when a ULP strike is converted to an economic strike.110
Thus, the keys to determining the reinstatement rights of any particular
striker during a converted strike are the moments when the strike is converted and when the employer hires a permanent replacement for that
striker.
A second major difference between ULP strikers and economic strik106. Many commentators question whether employees can understand and take comfort in the
distinction between permanent replacement and discharge. E.g., Schatzki, supra note 11, at 383
(describing the distinction as a "word game" that employees cannot understand and that is practically meaningless to employers as well as employees); see also Weiler, supra note 3, at 390
(observing that employee "may be excused for not perceiving a practical difference" between
discharge and permanent replacement). On the other hand, a number of commentators reject the
idea that permanent replacement is, in effect, the equivalent of termination. See, e.g., Baird, supra
note 11, at 12-13 (arguing that there is a significant difference between permanent replacement
and termination as evidenced by the rights of preferential reinstatement and continued voting in
NLRB elections within 12 months of commencement of strike); Estreicher, supra note 11, at 290
(recognizing that replaced strikers have a "not insignificant prospect" of reinstatement); Golden,
supra note 86, at 64-65 (stating that voting and reinstatement rights distinguish permanently replaced striker from fired individual).
In a recent article, Professor Ray acknowledges that permanent replacement differs from
discharge in that replaced economic strikers have reinstatement rights as well as voting rights (for
a limited period). Ray, supra note 74, at 381-82. He criticizes the Board, however, for restricting
the reinstatement rights of economic strikers. He argues that the Board, in recent decisions, has
reduced the reinstatement rights by liberally defining what constitutes hiring of permanent
replacements, limiting the range of positions to which strikers have reinstatement rights, and limiting the circumstances under which strikers have reinstatement rights when a striker replacement is
laid off. Id. at 384-98.
107. E.g., Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956); Northern Wire Corp. v.
NLRB, 887 F.2d 1313, 1319 (7th Cir. 1989).
108. See cases cited supra note 107.
109. E.g., SKS Die Casting & Mach., Inc. v. NLRB, 941 F.2d 984, 990, 993 (9th Cir. 1991);
see also GoimuA,, supra note 95, at 341-42 (stating that strikers replaced during period when
strike is considered ULP strike are entitled to immediate reinstatement); Martin, supra note 73, at
1064 (same); Brandon C. Janes, Comment, The Illusion of Permanencyfor Mackay Doctrine
Replacement Workers, 54 TEx. L. REv. 126, 128 (1975) (same).
110. Mohawk Liqueur Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1088 (1990) (holding that after ULP strike
converted to economic strike, employer could hire permanent replacements), enforced, General
Indus. Employees Union, Local 42 v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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ers is in voting rights. ULP strikers, who cannot be permanently replaced,
are entitled to vote in an NLRB election, such as a representation election to
determine whether employees wish to be represented in collective bargaining by a union, or, more significantly when a strike is in progress, a decertification election to determine whether an incumbent bargaining
representative retains that status."' Replacements for U]LP strikers are not
eligible to vote." 2 Economic strikers who are not entitled to immediate
reinstatement because they have been permanently replaced have the statutory right to vote in elections held within twelve months of the commencement of a strike. 11 3 Permanent replacements for economic strikers
generally also have the right to vote in an election." 4 This distinction between the voting rights of economic and ULP strikers has significant ramifications for the ability of the incumbent union to retain its status as the
certified collective bargaining representative of the bargaining unit, and
5
thus for the future of the collective bargaining relationship."
B. Bases for the Distinction Between UnfairLabor Practice Strikes and
Economic Strikes
It is settled law that ULP strikers are accorded more favorable treatment than economic strikers." 6 Although well established, that dichotomy
111. Kellburn Mfg. Co., 45 N.L.R.B. 322, 325 (1942); 1 THE DEvELOPING LABOR LAW, supra
note 44, at 424. This right stems from the fact that ULP strikers are entitled to immediate reinstatement upon unconditional request.
112. Larand Leisurelies, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 838, 838 (1976); Tampa Sand & Material Co.,
137 N.L.R.B. 1549, 1549 (1962).
113. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1988). The NLRA was amended in 1959 to provide economic
strikers with this limited voting right. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-257, sec. 702, § 9(c)(3), 73 Stat. 519, 542. Prior to that amendment, economic
strikers who had been permamently replaced did not have a right to vote. See generally Joan
Flynn, The Economic Strike Bar: Looking Beyond the "Union Sentiments" of Permanent
Replacements, 61 TEMPLE L. REv.691, 694-97 (1988) (tracing history of the NLRA's treatment of
the rights of economic strikers); Note, supra note 11, at 635 (outlining the development of the
permanent replacement rule). Economic strikers may lose their eligibility to vote under § 9(c)(3)
if they have accepted other permanent employment, they have been discharged for cause (such as
strike misconduct), or their jobs have been eliminated for economic reasons. W. Wilton Wood,
Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 1675, 1677 (1960).
114. Pacific Tile & Porcelain Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1360 (1962); Axelrod, supra note 84,
at n.30. Temporary replacements generally do not have a right to vote. William E. Locke, 137
N.L.R.B. 1610, 1612 (1962). For further discussion of the voting rights of strikers and replacements, see Janes, supra note 109, at 130-33 and Note, Voting Rights of Economic Strikers and
Replacements: The Impact of the Timing of the Strike, 24 RUTGERS L. R .171 passim (1969).
115. For discussion of the threat to a union's status posed by permanent replacement, see infra
Part I.C.2.
116. Superior reinstatement rights and voting rights are not the only distinctions between the
treatment of ULP and economic strikers. First, strikers protesting ULPs are not subject to the
"cooling off' period and other provisions of § 8(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C § 158(d) (1988), which
are designed to delay an economic strike in the hope that it can be averted. See, e.g., Mastro
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Two principal bases

exist for granting ULP strikers immediate reinstatement rights and back pay
from the date of their unconditional offers to return. First, the remedy ordered by the Board for the employer's ULP would be ineffective without
such protections for the ULP strikers. Second, the only express authorization in the Act for the Board to order reinstatement is in situations in which
an employer has committed a ULP."8 In the absence of such statutory
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288-89 (1956); Note, The UnfairLabor Practice Strike,
supra note 85, at 1001-02. Unlike economic strikers who violate the requirements of § 8(d), ULP
strikers do not lose their status as employees. Mastro Plastics, 350 U.S. at 284-89; Note, The
UnfairLabor PracticeStrike, supra note 85, at 1001-02. Second, a no-strike clause in a collective
bargaining agreement will render an economic strike unprotected activity; such a clause, however,
does not always render a ULP strike unprotected. If the ULP under protest is so serious that it is
"'destructive of the foundations on which collective bargaining must rest,"' then the strike is
protected activity notwithstanding the no-strike clause. Arlan's Dep't Store, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B.
802, 808 (1961) (quoting Mastro Plastics Corp., 350 U.S. at 281); see also Studio 44, Inc., 284
N.L.R.B. 597, 599 (1987) (applying the Arlan's standard); Note, The Unfair Labor Practice
Strike, supra note 85, at 999-1001 (discussing the distinction between the effect of contractual
restraints on ULP strikes and economic strikes). Finally, ULP strikers generally have been
granted more latitude in picket line misconduct without the loss of reinstatement rights than have
economic strikers. See Note, The UnfairLabor PracticeStrike, supra note 85, at 997-99. Under
the Thayer-Kohlerapproach (NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 756 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 883 (1954); Local 833, UAW v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699, 702-03 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Koher Co. v. International Union, UAW, 370 U.S. 911 (1962)), the severity of the employer's ULP is balanced against the employees' misconduct to determine whether the employees
should be deprived of their reinstatement rights. That distinction was rejected by a plurality of the
Board, however, in Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1047 (1984), enforced mem.,
765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986). Because a majority decision of
the Board has not rejected Thayer-Kohler, it is not clear whether the Board will apply it in the
future. See Mohawk Liqueur Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1075-76 n.3 (1990) (recognizing that Clear
Pine was not a holding of the Board on the continued applicability of Thayer-Kohler), enforced
and review deniedsub nom. General Indus. Employees Union, Local 42 v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1308
(D.C. Cir. 1991). For general discussion of the more favorable status accorded the ULP strike, see
Note, The Unfair Labor PracticeStrike, supra note 85, passim.
117. One writer observes that, although there is disagreement on the issue among commentators, "employees who are striking to protest unfair labor practices or whose strike has been prolonged by wrongful employer action arguably merit more protection than those who strike to
advance their own economic interests." Janes, supra note 109, at 127 (footnotes omitted) (citing,
inter alia, Stewart, supra note 1). Viewing the different protections from the employer's perspective, another writer asks why an employer that lawfully resists a union's demands and economic
strike should be subject to the same sanctions (prohibition on hiring of permanent replacements)
as an employer that violates the law (commits ULPs). Baird, supra note 11, at 25; see also
YAGER, supra note 11, at 81 (arguing that an employer guilty of ULP should not be allowed to
compound injury through hiring of permanent replacements, but an employer guilty of no unlawful conduct should not be prevented from defending its business against economic injury). On the
other hand, one commentator has argued that according more favorable status to ULP strikes has
the deleterious effect of encouraging employees to act as "little Boards" by striking as a self-help
remedy for ULPs. Note, The UnfairLabor PracticeStrike, supra note 85, at 988, 1002-03, 1011.
For an argument that the employees' acting as little Boards may be the most effective deterrent
against employers' committing ULPs, see Ray, supra note 74, at 365-66, 372-75. See also discusi
sion infra Part IW.A.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (c) (1988).
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authorization, the Board and courts follow the common law. Two court
decisions rendered soon after passage of the Wagner Act recognized these
reasons.
In Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 1 19 the union called a strike
over economic demands and the employer closed the plant. The employer
later reopened the plant with a smaller work force and the strike continued.
The employer refused to meet with the union or conciliators because, it
contended, the strikers had ceased to be employees. The Board found the
employer guilty of a refusal to bargain. In ordering a remedy for the employer's ULP, the Board recognized that it could achieve no effective remedy by merely ordering the employer to bargain with the union because the
employer, through its refusal to bargain, had obviated the possibility of the
strikers' returning to work with12a1 contract.' 2 ° The Fourth Circuit agreed
and affirmed the Board's order.
In Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. NLRB,122 the employer refused to bargain with the union after a strike commenced and then refused to reinstate
the strikers. The Board found a ULP and ordered the employer to reinstate,
with back pay, strikers replaced after the date on which the employer had
refused to bargain, even if it was necessary to dismiss replacements. 123 The
Second Circuit, relying on Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co., enforced the
Board's order. The court observed that only those employees who were
replaced after the employer committed a ULP were entitled to immediate
reinstatement because "[tihe act so far as reinstatement is concerned only
applies after there has been an unfair labor practice."' 2 As in Jeffery-De
119. 91 F.2d 134 (4th Cir.), enforcing Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co., I N.L.R.B. 618 (1936),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 731 (1937).
120. Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co., 1 N.L.R.B. at 626-27. The § 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain
ULP that causes or prolongs a strike best illustrates the ineffectiveness of a remedy in the absence
of reinstatement:
But if the employer need not reinstate the strikers, with whom is he to bargain? Certainly not with the strikebreakers whom the strikers' union does not represent; nor with
the strikers if they are to be barred from rehiring. It is manifest that an employer could
provoke strikes with impunity by means of this unfair labor practice, in the absence of
his duty to reinstate strikers.
Leonard B. Boudin, The Rights of Strikers, 35 ILL. L. REv. 817, 819 (1941). In theory, a union
does represent the "strikebreakers," Louis Natt, 44 N.L.R.B. 1099, 1107 (1942), but in practice its
principal concern is usually achieving their discharge and reinstatement of the union's striking
members. For discussion of this tension inherent in a union's duty to represent a bargaining unit,
see infra text accompanying notes 173-82.
121. Jeffery-De Witt InsulatorCo., 91 F.2d at 140.
122. 94 F.2d 875 (2d Cir.), enforcing Black Diamond S.S. Corp, 3 N.L.R.B. 84 (1937), cert.
denied, 304 U.S. 579 (1938).
123. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 3 N.L.R.B. at 93.
124. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 94 F.2d at 879; see also NLRB v. Lightner Publishing Corp.,
113 F.2d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 1940) (holding that employer's right to hire employees was "unqualified" until it committed a ULP).
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Witt Insulator Co., ordering reinstatement was necessary to maintain the
1 25
status quo as it existed at the time of the ULP.

Although section 10(c) of the Act authorizes reinstatement when a
ULP has been committed, in the absence of a ULP, the Board and courts
have resorted to the common-law rule that employers are not required to
rehire employees who have stopped work.1 2 1 Indeed, the Board has explained reinstatement rights of ULP strikers in terms of an employer's right
to replace strikers and control its jobs as becoming "vulnerable and defeasible" when the employer commits a ULP. 127
The NLRA does not include any reference to a right of an employer to
replace striking employees permanently, but Mackay and subsequent Board
and court decisions refer to such a right. 12 Given this approach to employers' rights vis-h-vis employees' statutory rights under the Act, Professor
Atleson posits that the Mackay doctrine is based on "deep-seated" com-

mon-law notions that predate the NLRA.129 In short, these beliefs are that
employers have the right to maintain their businesses and productivity and
the right to hire whomever they wish because the business is the property of
the employer. Accordingly, management's prerogative to continue operations, hierarchical
control, and property rights survive the enactment of the
3o

NLRA.1

125. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 94 F.2d at 879.
126. Janes, supra note 109, at 127 n.ll (citing Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)).
127. Boudin, supra note 120, at 818-19 (citing 4 NLRB ANN. RaP. (1940)); see also Black
Diamond S.S. Corp., 94 F.2d at 879 (explaining that because of employer's ULP, "its ordinary
right to select its employees became vulnerable"); Manville Jenckes Corp., 30 N.L.R.B. 382, 413
(1941) (holding that employer's "normal right" to select employees became "vulnerable" when
strike converted into ULP strike).
128. See supra text accompanying note 10.
129. ATLESON, supra note 103, at 32.
130. Id at 32-33; see also Nicholas Unkovic & James Q. Harty, Management's Legal
Problems in Continuing Plant OperationsDuring an Economic Strike Under Federal and Pennsylvania Law, 67 DICK. L. Rav. 63, 63 (1962) (footnotes omitted):
Management has the right to attempt to continue the operation of its business when
subjected to an economic strike. While the Mackay court did not develop the origin of
this right, it clearly flows from the "right of property" guaranteed under both federal and
state constitutions. This is a well settled and basic rule of law.
Atleson argues that courts often use these property rights to overcome employees' assertion
of their rights conferred by the NLRA. ATaLsoN, supra note 103, at 91-94. He discusses, as
illustrative of judicial propagation of pre-Act property values, the Supreme Court's decision limiting nonemployee union organizers' access to an employer's property for organizational purposes.
Id. at 93 (discussing NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956)). Certainly, Atleson
would find the Court's recent interpretation of Babcock & Wilcox an even more striking example
of the vitality of a judicially recognized employer right emanating from these amorphous property/
hierarchical control values. In its 1992 decision in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841
(1992), the Court held that an employer did not violate § 8(a)(1) of the Act by denying union
organizers access to its parking lots for the purpose of organizing the employer's employees. The
Court rejected the Board's test from Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988), in which the Board
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Thus, one of the bases for the distinction between reinstatement rights
of ULP strikers and economic strikers is practical: enhanced reinstatement
determined whether an employer must grant access to its property by balancing the § 7 rights of
the employees against the private property rights of the employer. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct at 848.
The Court held that, when the persons seeking access are not employees of the employer, the
balancing test is not performed unless there is no reasonable alternative means of access. Id. at
849. Further, it limited that exception to the general no-access rule to situations in which the
employees live on the employer's premises. Id.
The Court's holding in Lechmere seems at odds with the policy of the NLRA favoring organization of employees. The Court, nevertheless, couched its rationale in terms of rights under the
Act, explaining that employees, not nonemployee union organizers, have rights under § 7 of the
Act. That characterization, however, cannot withstand scrutiny. As the dissent notes, employees
have a right to learn from others about organization. Id. at 851 (White, J., dissenting). What
appears to be the driving force behind this decision, one at odds with the policies of the NLRA, is
the Court's deference to the property and control rights of the employer. Consider the numerous
references in the majority opinion to the employer's property and the union organizers' trespass
on the employer's property. lad
at 845-50. For recent criticism of the Lechnere Court's expansive conception of employers' property rights and restrictive conception of employees' § 7 rights,
see Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Propertyand Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN.L. Rnv. 305
(1994).
Thus, notwithstanding enactment of the NLRA, there remains a realm of employer rights
emanating from values of ownership and concomitant control and prerogative regarding operations. Among the rights the Supreme Court has found to emanate from those values are the rights
to expel nonemployee union organizers from the employer's private property (in most circumstances) and to hire permanent replacement employees for economic strikers. Cf. Martin, supra
note 73, at 1062 ("Mhe controversy over the reinstatement rights of economic strikers is but one
facet of the continuing struggle which permeates the field of labor relations between the employer's right to manage his business and the employee's right to organize and participate in
concerted activities.").
The debate over the correct relationship between the Act and the earlier common law on
issues of employees' and employers' rights has generated a body of scholarship. Some commentators are critical of the role of the common-law decisions and values regarding employers' property rights in modem labor law, viewing them as inimical to the NLRA and its purposes. E.g.,
ATLEsON,supra note 103, at 171 ("The employment relationship is viewed by courts through a set
of assumptions, involving status and class views, and the NLRA is treated as if it overlaps, but
barely alters, this presumed relationship. Indeed, the statute is often used to enforce those aspects
of the contractual relationship that courts create.'). Others point out, however, that neither the
NLRA nor its legislative history indicate that it repealed common-law jurisprudence permitting
the hiring of permanent replacements. LeRoy, supra note 84, at 290-91; see also YAGER, supra
note 11, at 56 (arguing that NLRA said nothing about restrictions on employers' responses to
employees' concerted action when such action is wielded as an economic weapon). Still others
are critical of the intrusions that the NLRA has made on common-law concepts of property rights.
E.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New DealLabor
Legislation, 92 YALE L. J. 1357, 1388-89 (1983) (criticizing balancing tests for determining
whether an employer has violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act as "cut[ting] back upon the absolute power
to exclude that is the hallmark of any system of private property"). Professor Fried challenges
Epstein's analysis for its failure to explain why the original Wagner Act did not represent society's redefinition of the social convention of common-law property rights. Charles Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law and
Its Prospects,in LABOR LAW AND THE EMPLOYMENT MARKET: FoUNDATIONS AND APPLIcAIONS
68, 72 (Richard A. Epstein & Jeffrey Paul eds., 1985); see also Estlund, supra, at 310 (arguing
that "the NLRA should be interpreted to abrogate property rights ... to the extent that their
enforcement interferes with or inhibits conduct protected by the Act.").
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rights are necessary to an effective remedy when there is a ULP strike. The
second basis is largely theoretical, stemming from the interaction of the
NLRA and the common law: the Act authorizes reinstatement only when
an employer commits a ULP, and the common law prior to the Act, which
retains vitality in the absence of express legislative abrogation, recognizes
an employer's right to control its business as it chooses.
C. Importance of the Distinction
It would be difficult to overstate the importance to all parties to a labor
dispute-striking employees, employers, unions, and replacement employees-of the characterization of a strike as a ULP strike or an economic
strike when an employer hirespermanent replacements or announces that it
will do so. For employees, the characterization determines whether they are
entitled to immediate reinstatement to their jobs,1 3 ' and perhaps whether
they have the right to vote in an NLRB election (if the election is held more
than twelve months after the commencement of the strike). 132 For a union,
the characterization ultimately may determine whether the union retains its
status as the collective bargaining representative for the bargaining unit.
For an employer, the characterization determines whether it committed a
ULP by hiring permanent replacements and denying strikers reinstatement,
and consequently whether the employer is liable for back pay. For replacements, characterization of the strike is one of the factors determining
whether they retain their jobs. 133 Thus, all parties to a labor dispute face
risks associated with the characterization of a strike as an economic or ULP
strike.
1. What Are the Risks to the Striking Employees?
As discussed above, the reinstatement rights of ULP strikers are supe134
rior to those of economic strikers who have been permanently replaced.
Although permanently replaced economic strikers remain employees and
have reinstatement rights, as a practical matter they are without jobs and
will not reacquire their jobs until vacancies occur in those or substantially
131. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
133. Even permanent replacements may be, as Professor Atleson words it, "depermanentize[d]." ATLEsoN, supra note 103, at 31. If a strike is characterized as an economic strike and
the employer offers the replacements "permanent" employment, the employer and the union subsequently may agree that a condition of settling the strike is reinstatement of the strikers at the
expense of the replacements.

For example, see the discussion of the United Steelwork-

ers-Ravenswood Aluminum dispute infra at notes 216-26 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
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equivalent jobs. 3 ' A recent example of economic strikers' long-term loss
of their jobs is the strike by the United Paperworkers at International Paper

Company's mill in Jay, Maine. Employees began striking at the Jay mill
and two others in June 1987.136 The employer hired permanent replacements for the strikers, and the employees unconditionally ended their strike
in October 1988, sixteen months after it began. 137 Because the strike was
an economic strike when the permanent replacements were hired, the striking employees who had been replaced were placed on preferential hiring
lists. As of July 1992, almost four years after the strike ended, 500 former
38
strikers were still on the lists awaiting reinstatement.'
Moreover, although employees who embark on a strike are affected by
the characterization of the strike if the employer hires permanent replacements, the importance of the characterization is greater to some than others.
The effect of replacement is potentially greatest on small workforces, unskilled workers, and junior employees. When an employer has a small
workforce and the entire workforce goes on strike, it will often be easier for
the employer to replace employees more quickly than for an employer with
a large workforce. 3 9 For example, in Hot Shoppes, Inc.,'4 ° the Teamsters
represented a bargaining unit of twenty-two employees. The union called a
strike when bargaining was unavailing; three days later the employer replaced the entire workforce. Obviously the employer's advantage is even
further enhanced when the striking employees are relatively unskilled such
that replacements can be hired and put to work quickly with little
training.

14 1

135. E.g., Rose Printing Co., 304 N.L.R.B. 1076, 1076 (1991). Professor Ray criticizes the
Board for limiting replaced economic strikers' chances for reinstatement by not extending reinstatement rights to vacancies in other positions for which those employees are qualified. See Ray,
supra note 74, at 384-92.
136. Paperworkers Woo Striker Replacements to Keep Maine Paper Mill Unionized, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 130, at A-1 (July 7, 1992).
137. Id.
138. Id. In July 1992, the workforce at the Jay mill consisted of 707 replacements, 53 employees who crossed the picket line, and 315 strikers who had been recalled. Id. For a discussion
of the effect on the union of hiring permanent replacements at the Jay mill, see infra notes 156-58
and accompanying text.
139. Weiler, supra note 3, at 394. On the other hand, a union may be able to maintain a strike
for a longer period in a small unit than in a large unit because the union's strike fund will not be as
quickly depleted. The UAW strike at Caterpillar involved such a large number of employees that
it would have been difficult to maintain but for the UAW's $800 million strike fund. See Robert
L. Rose, Caterpillar'sSuccess in Ending Strike May Curtail Unions' Use of Walkouts, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 20, 1992, at A3.
140. 146 N.L.R.B. 802, 802-03 (1964).
141. Weiler, supra note 3, at 394. The size and skill level of the workforce are characteristics
of the employees that affect the employer's ability to hire replacements. A number of factors
beyond the employees themselves can affect an employer's ability to utilize replacements, such as
the level of unemployment in the region and the community's attitudes toward unions'or strikes.
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In addition, employees with relatively little seniority are more likely
than senior employees to be adversely affected by economic strikes when
permanent replacements are hired. First, if an employer hires and retains
permanent replacements for less than all of the employees on strike, the
more junior employees are most likely to be denied reinstatement at the
conclusion of the strike.' 4 2 Second, for strikers placed on a preferential
hiring list, the junior employees are generally subordinated to senior
employees. 143
Some of the heightened risk to junior employees appeared to be alleviated by the Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent
Federation of Flight Attendants,"' in which the Court held that an employer is not required to "bump" junior strike crossovers to make room for
more senior striking employees requesting reinstatement. However, the decision does not help junior employees who wish to remain on strike. In
fact, it places a premium on junior employees' abandoning the strike to
obtain jobs over their seniors. Thus, the decision actually increased employers' leverage over striking junior employees. Indeed, the decision is
seen as so divisive to strike efforts that both the House and Senate versions
1 45
of the Workplace Fairness Act would legislatively overrule it.
2. What Are the Risks to the Union?
If it is true that replacements generally oppose the incumbent union
(perhaps for no reason other than unions usually seek to have the replacements discharged in order to effect reinstatement of the striking union members), 1 46 then hiring permanent replacements for economic strikers can be
the first step by the employer toward ending the collective bargaining relationship with the union through decertification. 4 7 An employer may even
attempt to ensure the anti-union sentiments of the replacements by carefully
ATLEsON, supra note 103, at 28 (listing union's strength and ability to hurt the employer, norms

and nature of surrounding community, tightness of labor market, and strikers' skill levels as relevant factors).
142. See Robert W. Schupp, Legal Status of Incentivesfor Replacement and Striking Workers,
41 LAB. L.J. 311, 312 (1990).
143. Id. at 317-18. In the absence of either a provision in a collective bargaining agreement or
an established past practice, it is not necessarily a ULP for an employer to order recall on some
other basis; seniority is, however, the usual basis for ordering recall. RAY & BARtL, supra note
12, § 6.07, at 13.
144. 489 U.S. 426, 432 (1989).
145. H.R. 5, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993); S. 55, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
146. E.g., Flynn, supra note 113, at 704 ("Another and more powerful reason for replacements
to oppose the union is the desire for economic survival, pure and simple; if the union successfully
settles the strike, the replacements will themselves be replaced to make room for the returning
strikers.").
147. ATLESON, supra note 103, at 27; Weiler, supra note 3, at 390; Note, supra note 11, at
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screening the replacements it hires, 4 ' although such a practice is fraught
with potential for the filing of ULP charges and liability. 4 9 An employer's
potential use of permanent replacements to terminate the bargaining relationship is, for its critics, one of the most objectionable facets of the Mackay doctrine. 150
Even though economic strikers who have been permanently replaced
retain voting rights for twelve months from the commencement of a
strike, 151 an employer may create a situation in which the union will be

decertified within that year by hiring enough anti-union permanent replacements to outnumber the striking employees.'5 2 Alternatively, the employer
may achieve the same result, regardless of whether the replacements outnumber the strikers, if the election is not held until the statutory voting
rights of the economic strikers have expired.' 5 3 Thus, Professor Finkin
characterizes an employer's power to hire permanent replacements as making a strike "a fight to the death, rather than a periodic test of wills." '5 4
The numerous examples of such decertifications alleviate the need to
speculate whether decertification is a possibility when an employer hires
permanent replacements.'
On July 17, 1992, the employees at the Jay,
148. Axelrod, supra note 84; see also Janes, supra note 109, at 132 ("An employer in the
Mackay situation has the unique opportunity to hand-pick many of the voters in the upcoming
representation election.").
149. A refusal to hire an applicant because of the applicant's union sympathies is a clear
violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) & (a)(3) (1988).
150. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 11, at 291-92. Professor Estreicher views the battle between labor and management, in which each brings its economic weapons to bear, as a "bounded
conflict." Id. at 288. The warfare should be limited by rules that prevent the battle from becoming a life-and-death struggle with the future of the collective bargaining relationship at stake. Id.
at 291-94.
151. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1988). As discussed supra note 113, the NLRA was amended in
1959 by the Landrum-Griffin Act to give permanently replaced economic strikers this voting
right. Prior to the amendment, economic strikers had no right to vote in elections if they had been
permanently replaced. Consequently, unions were in immediate danger of decertification upon
the hiring of permanent replacements. For example, in United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic
Workers, 121 N.L.R.B. 1439 (1958), the employer hired permanent replacements, and the replacements alone voted in a decertification election less than a year after the commencement of the
strike; the economic strikers were not entitled to vote. Id. at 1442. The union lost the election
288-5. Id. Lest it appear that all danger of decertification was removed by the 1959 amendment,
consider the decertifications that occurred notwithstanding the limited voting rights of the striking
employees discussed in the text below. See infra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
152. ATLEsoN, supra note 103, at 27 n.25.
153. Id.; see also Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 674 (recognizing that if employer can
"sweat [the union] out" for a year, it can probably get the union decertified).
154. Finkin, supra note 80, at 568 n.141; cf. Estreicher, supra note 11, at 288 (arguing that
strike-and-replacement situation should not provide opportunity to terminate bargaining
relationship).
155. See, e.g., David B. Stephens & John P. Kohl, The Replacement Worker Phenomenon in
the Southwest: Two Years After Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 37 LAB. L.J. 41, 48 (1986) (studying five
major strikes in the Southwest in the early 1980s, the authors note that the use of permanent
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Maine International Paper Company mill voted to decertify United
Paperworkers Local 14 and Firemen and Oilers Local 246.156 More than

two-thirds of the bargaining unit voting in the decertification election consisted of replacements who were hired after the union called an unsuccessful sixteen-month strike in 1987.'1 7 The margin of the vote was 616 to 361
with 94 challenged ballots; thus, almost
two-thirds of the unchallenged bal58
union.1
the
against
cast
lots were

In another of the most publicized permanent replacement cases in the
last decade, Diamond Walnut, the largest walnut producer cooperative in
the United States, permanently replaced more than 500 workers who went
on strike in September 1991.'59 Prior to the one-year anniversary of the
strike, the Teamsters local filed a petition for a certification election as a
"preemptive move" to avoid decertification when the strikers' voting rights
expired. 160 The Board ordered a bifurcated election in which about 450
strikers voted in one session and approximately 725 permanent replacements voted in the second.' 6 ' Despite its efforts to avert decertification by

the preemptive petition, the union lost by a vote of 592 to 366, with a
number of challenged ballots.' 6
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court and the Board have made it

more difficult for employers to rid themselves of unions by hiring striker
replacements was followed in some strikes by ousting the unions). The article states that Continental Airlines achieved nonunion status in bankruptcy proceedings. Subsequent to the bankruptcy court's approval of Continental's repudiation of its collective bargaining agreement, the
union and Continental reached a settlement. The agreement was allegedly so bad for the former
strikers that some brought an unsuccessful class action against the union for breach of its duty of
fair representation. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 81 (1991).
156. Maine PaperMill Workers Vote to Decertify Unions, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 139, at
A-1 (July 20, 1992).
157. The employees eligible to vote included 760 replacements and 315 recalled former strikers, with about 500 ineligible former strikers on a recall list. Id.
158. Id.
159. Resolution of Ballots at Diamond Walnut Shows Apparent Loss for Teamsters Local,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 67, at A-9 (Apr. 9, 1993).
160. House Field Hearing Scheduled to Examine Strike at Diamond Walnut, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 164, at A-1 (Aug. 24, 1992).
161. Resolution of Ballots at Diamond Walnut Shows Apparent Loss for Teamsters Local,
supra note 159, at A-9.
162. Id. The union filed objections to the election. Sandy Kleffman, Labor Official Visits
Struck Plant: Stockton Workers, Diamond Walnut Officials Give Versions of Dispute, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 7, 1993, at B5. The NLRB ruled that the employer's conduct tainted the results of
the bifurcated election. Second Vote at Diamond Walnut Is Inconclusive Due to Challenges,Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 197, at A-5 (Oct. 14, 1993). Consequently, the Board ordered a second
election. Id. The results of that election indicated 310 for representation by the union and 195
against. Id. The ultimate result is still very much in doubt, however, because another 635 ballots
were challenged and have not yet been opened. Id.
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replacements. In NLRB v. CurtinMatheson Scientific, Inc.,'6 3 the Supreme
Court approved the Board's position that, for purposes of challenges to an
incumbent union's majority status, it should adopt no presumption regarding the pro- or anti-union sympathies of striker replacements." The decision is significant because an employer violates section 8(a)(5) if it
withdraws recognition without either proof that the union has lost majority
status in the bargaining unit or a good faith doubt based on objective
facts.16 5 The Board's decision in Phoenix Pipe & Tube, L.P.166
' appears to
collapse this two-part defense into one by requiring that, in order to show
good faith doubt, the employer, must establish that a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit unequivocally repudiated the union.' 6 7 The
Board has made it even more difficult to satisfy this standard by declaring it
a ULP for an employer to conduct a poll of its employees to establish a
good faith doubt unless the employer can satisfy the good faith doubt standard before conducting the poll.' 68 Moreover, an employer risks committing a ULP if it initiates or participates in employees' efforts to decertify a
union.

169

163. 494 U.S. 775 (1990). For a more extensive discussion of Curtin Matheson and its implications for employers' withdrawing recognition from unions, see Douglas E. Ray, Withdrawal of
Recognition After Curtin Matheson: A House Built Upon Sand, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 265 passim
(1991).
164. Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 796. The Board's no-presumption approach means that an
employer cannot lawfully withdraw recognition from a union, alleging that the union no longer
has majority support, based on the mere fact that a majority of the bargaining unit consists of
permanent replacements who probably would not vote for the union. Professors Cohen and
Wachter argue that Mackay and the other rules governing striker replacement promote econonic
efficiency. See Cohen & Wachter, supranote 86, at 111. They posit that Board and court rulings
in labor law can increase the likelihood of efficient outcomes in labor disputes by deterring opportunistic behavior by the parties. Id. at 117. The authors view Curtin Matheson as a case involving
intervention by the Board and the Court to prevent opportunistic behavior by an employer that
treats the dispute as an opportunity to oust the union. Id. at 122-24.
165. E.g., Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1340 (1987), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 891 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 925 (1990).
166. 302 N.L.R.B. 122, enforced, 955 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1991).
167. Id. at 122. The Board's apparent merging of good faith doubt with actual loss of majority
status is consistent with Professor Ray's recommendation that the good faith doubt standard be
eliminated. See Ray, supra note 163, at 290-91.
168. Texas Petrochemicals Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 1057, 1059 (1989), modified and remanded
by 923 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1991). In his concurring opinion in Curtin Matheson, Chief Justice
Rehnquist criticized this Board doctrine, which limits the employer's ability to challenge the majority status of a union. Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 797 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun also expressed his concern with the Board's decision. Id. at 799 & n.3 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Professor Ray argues that "[tihe problem is not with the policy behind Texas Petrochemicals"-to prevent the undermining of a union's majority status-but is the good faith doubt
standard itself. Ray, supra note 163, at 286-87.
169. See, e.g., Warehouse Mkt., Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. 216, 216 (1975) (holding that employer
who "aided and abetted employee decertification activity" committed a ULP). Even if an employer does not commit a ULP, it may be prohibited from relying on an employee petition as a
basis for a good faith doubt of the union's majority status because of its actions or statements
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In addition to the Board and courts erecting barriers against employers' use of permanent replacement as a device to terminate the collective
bargaining relationship, the distinction between economic and ULP strikes

itself provides a check. If an employer resists union demands in an attempt
to provoke an economic strike-so that it can hire permanent replacements
and decertify a union-the employer may commit ULPs; indeed, a bargaining strategy of provoking a strike is rife with potential ULPs. 170 If the employer is found to have committed a ULP, the strike may be deemed a ULP
strike either at its inception or later under the conversion doctrine. 1 71 If that
occurs, the replacements hired after the strike becomes a ULP strike are
temporary and have no voting rights, 1 72 which thwarts efforts to oust the
union.
A second potential problem for a union whose members have been
permanently replaced during an economic strike arises when the union negotiates for a strike settlement with the condition that the employer reinstate
the strikers. It is standard practice for a union to require this condition-if
necessary, at the expense of the permanent replacements. 173 Indeed, a dramatic example of a union's successful efforts to save its members' jobs by
having the employer summarily dispatch its "permanent" replacements occurred in June 1992. A nineteen-month strike (following a lockout) by
members of the United Steelworkers against Ravenswood Aluminum was
settled after the Ravenswood board ousted the company's chairperson and
chief executive officer. The strike ended with the execution of a new collective bargaining agreement that called for the reinstatement of the strikers
and the termination of 1,100 permanent replacements hired by the comregarding the petition. See Laverdiere's Enters., 297 N.L.R.B. 826, 826 (1990) (holding that
decertification petition could not be used to support good faith doubt when employer's vice president incorrectly advised employees that the only purpose for which the petition could be used was
to support holding a decertification election), enforcement granted on relevant grounds,denied on
other grounds, 933 F.2d 1045 (1st Cir. 1991).
170. See Ray, supra note 74, at 375-81 (recognizing that there is no bright line between good
faith and bad faith bargaining).
171. Baird, supra note 11, at 11-12; Ray, supra note 74, at 368, 372-73; Westfall, supra note
12, at 66-67.
172. E.g., Larand Leisurelies, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 838, 838 (1976); Tampa Sand & Material
Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1549, 1549 (1962).
173. See, e.g., Return ofStriking Workers Top Issue in Daily News Strike, Union Adviser Says,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 239, at A-13 (Dec. 12, 1990) (reporting that union spokesman discussing strike settlement negotiations said union "'hope[d] ... that the end result will be that all
our members will get their jobs back, and that the permanent replacements will no longer be
permanent"'); cf. Leader of Greyhound Strike Tells Congress Permanent Replacements Have
Blocked Settlement, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 115, at A-12 (June 14, 1990) (reporting that the
union president, testifying before Senate committee on H.R. 3936 to ban the hiring of permanent
replacements, stated that Greyhound had "frozen itself into a position" blocking settlement by
hiring and retaining permanent replacements).
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pany.' 74 The question thus arises whether permanent replacements who are
discharged at a union's insistence could prevail if they filed ULP charges

against the union, alleging violations of sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of
the NLRA. 75 A related question is whether such permanent replacements
could prevail if they brought an action in federal or state court for breach of
the duty of fair representation against the union that sought their
discharge.

176

At first blush, both means of recourse seem viable. Replacements are
employees as that term is defined in the Act, 177 and they are members of the
bargaining unit represented by the union because they occupy job classifications included in the unit. 178 However, there are no reported Board decisions in which replacements have prevailed on such ULP charges and no
reported court decisions in which they have prevailed on breach of duty of
representation cases. 179 The Board, although never deciding the issue, has

made statements in its decisions indicating its recognition that unions routinely seek the discharge of replacements and its belief that the practice is a
necessary incident of a union's duty to represent the strikers. 80 Although
there is little law on this issue, apparently unions would be able to defend
successfully both the ULP charges and the civil actions on the ground that
they sought to have employees placed in the jobs on the basis of seniority

174. Steelworkers Ratify PactEnding Ravenswood Dispute, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 115,
at A-11 (June 15, 1992). For further discussion of the Steelworkers-Ravenswood dispute, see
infra notes 216-26 and accompanying text.
175. Section 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1988), is the union analogue to the employer's ULP under § 8(a)(1). Section 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits the union from "restrain[ing] or
coere[ing]" employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights, which include the right to refrain from
engaging in union activity. Section 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1988), is a more specific
provision that makes it a ULP for a union to "cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee" for the purpose of "encourag[ing] or discourag[ing] membership in
any labor organization," which would constitute a violation of § 8(a)(3).
176. Cf.Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 190 (1967) (defining the duty of fair representation
and articulating the standard for breach of that duty).
177. Mooremack Gulf Lines, Inc., 28 N.L.R.B. 869, 880-81 (1941).
178. See Leveld Wholesale, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1350 (1975); Louis Natt, 44 N.L.R.B.
1099, 1107 (1942).
179. See generally Estreicher, supra note 11, at 294-95 (considering the rights of discharged
replacement workers); Flynn, supranote 113, at 704-05 (recognizing the possibility that bumping
agreements may violate the duty of fair representation); Janes, supra note 109, at 141-45 (discussing rights of discharged replacement workers).
180. Goldsmith Motors Corp., 310 N.L.R.B. 1279, 1279 (1993) ("[A]s a practical matter, a
union is not expected simultaneously to represent the interests of the replacements as it would the
interests of the strikers.'); see also Leveld Wholesale, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1350 (1975) ("It
would be asking a great deal of any union to require it to negotiate in the best interests of strike
replacements during the pendency of a strike, where the strikers are on the picket line." (quoting
from the administrative law judge's opinion that was adopted by the Board)).
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Regardless of the articulated rationale for

not holding a union liable under these circumstances, Professor Estreicher
suggests that the result actually goes back to an idea expressed by Judge
Learned Hand soon after the enactment of the NLRA: "It is of course true
that the consequences are harsh to those who have taken the strikers'
places; ....it is probably true today that most men taking jobs so made

vacant, realize from the outset how tenuous is their hold." 's Thus, the
potential liability for unions that seek the discharge of permanent replacements and the reinstatement of striking union members, although theoretically viable, appears to be realistically nonexistent.
3.

What Are the Risks to the Employer?

When an employer hires permanent replacements for its striking em181. See sources cited supra note 179. Regarding the ULP charges, a General Counsel advice
memorandum states as follows:
It is well established that a union may not discriminate against employees who exercise
their Section 7 right not to join a strike. However, a union may lawfully seek to parcel
out a limited number of jobs between strikers and permanent replacements on a nondiscriminatory basis, such as seniority and/or job qualifications.
United Steelworkers of Am., Local 8560, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1238, 1239 (Nat'l Labor Relations
Bd.) (Dec. 31, 1979) (Advice Mem., Datz) (footnotes omitted), quoted in Estreicher, supra note
11, at 294; Flynn, supra note 113, at 705 n.99.
As for the civil action for breach of the duty of fair representation, the principal obstacle is
that the Supreme Court applies a difficult standard for plaintiffs to satisfy: "A breach of the
statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the
collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 190 (1967). Supreme Court decisions regarding discharge based on seniority suggest that a
union's use of seniority to give preference for placement in jobs does not run afoul of the Vaca
standard for breach of the union's duty. See Janes, supra note 109, at 144-45 (discussing Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) and Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964)). The
Supreme Court's decision in Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 111 S.Ct. 1127 (1991),
appears to make a successful action by replacements against a union, on a breach of the duty of
fair representation claim, even more unlikely if the union can articulate some basis other than
union affiliation for the allocation of positions. A class of striking pilots represented by the Air
Line Pilots Association brought an action against the union, asserting, in part, that the agreement
negotiated by the union and the employer, Continental Airlines, Inc., "arbitrarily discriminated
against striking pilots." Id. at 1132. The Court held that the duty of fair representation does apply
to a union in its negotiations, and not just in its administration of a contract. Id. at 1135. However, it also held that, when conducting a substantive examination of a union's performance in
negotiations, a court must be "highly deferential, recognizing the wide latitude that negotiators
need for the effective performance of their bargaining responsibilities." Id. Thus, a product of
bargaining, such as a contract, is evidence of breach of the duty of fair representation only if "it
can be fairly characterized as so far outside a 'wide range of reasonableness' that it is wholly
'irrational' or 'arbitrary."' Id. at 1136 (quoting Huffinan, 345 U.S. at 338) (citation omitted). The
Court further held that the alleged discrimination between strikers and pilots who continued working did not constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation. Because the agreement was a
compromise on the rights of the two groups, some system of allocation of jobs was inevitable, Id.
at 1137.
182. NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 871 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576,
and cert. denied, 304 U.S. 585 (1938), quoted in Estreicher, supra note 11, at 294.
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ployees, the employer is gambling, predicting that, if the union or employees file ULP charges, the Board will determine that the strike was an
economic strike at its inception and continued to be so at the time the
replacements were hired. If the employer's prediction is wrong-and the
Board determining either that the strike began as a ULP strike or that it was
converted to a ULP strike-the employer loses the gamble and must payand perhaps pay a considerable sum. 183 As discussed above, ULP strikers
have a right to immediate reinstatement to their jobs or substantially

equivalent jobs upon making unconditional offers to return to work.' 84 If
the employer unjustifiably refuses to reinstate ULP strikers, then it is liable
for back pay and for making the strikers whole from the date of the refusal
to reinstate. 8 5 The usual delay between the filing of a ULP charge and a
decision by the NLRB' 86 greatly increases the potential liability of an employer because the back pay and other make-whole liability of the employer
continues to accrue pending a decision by the Board. This may impose an
enormous liability on the
employer that denies reinstatement to a large
1 87
number of ULP strikers.
A recent example portrays the staggering liability incurred by an em-

ployer that gambles and loses regarding the characterization of a strike.
The highly publicized strike of Greyhound Lines, Inc. by the Amalgamated
183. UAW International President Owen Bieber, testifying before a House subcommittee on
H.R. 3936 in 1990, acknowledged the plight of an employer as it contemplates hiring permanent
replacements:
[Tihe employer has no way of knowing with any real certainty whether a strike will be
an economic strike or an unfair labor practice strike at the time the decision is made to
hire replacements on a temporary or permanent basis. If the employer guesses wrong,
the strike then becomes a purely legal contest with an enormous potential backpay
liability.
Hearings on H.R. 3936 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 229 (1990) (statement of Owen Bieber,
UAW Int'l President); see also Schatzki, supra note 11, at 387 (recognizing that employer, if it is
wrong about characterization of the strike, can be subject to "enormous backpay sanctions").
184. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
185. See, e.g., Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1292 (1993) (ordering employer to
reinstate ULP strikers and make them whole, including interest); see also Baird, supra note 11, at
12 (stating that employer is liable for back pay from time of offer to return to work); Ray, supra
note 74, at 373-75 (noting that remedy ordered by the Board to make ULP strikers whole may
include not only lost wages, but also benefits and health insurance, interim raises, interest, etc.).
186. See supra note 92.
187. As Professor Ray observes, "It will often take at least two years before the Board issues a
decision in a contested case. An employer who improperly fails to reinstate one hundred strikers
after they request reinstatement can easily be exposed to millions of dollars in liability." Ray,
supra note 74, at 375 (footnotes omitted); see also Dolan, supra note 86, at 317-19 (discussing
several cases in which Board and courts determined, several years after permanent replacements
were hired, that strikers were ULP strikers and ordered back pay and make-whole relief); Golden,
supra note 86, at 75-76 (recognizing that the long delay in NLRB proceedings can result in "harsh
liability").
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Transit Union began on March 2, 1990. Greyhound hired more than 2,000
permanent replacements."18 After several months of a violent strike, Greyhound filed for bankruptcy in June 1990.189 The union and strikers had
filed over 200 ULP charges against Greyhound.19 The bankruptcy court
confirmed a reorganization plan for Greyhound, which capped the company's back pay liability at $31.25 million in the event the NLRB imposed
liability. 191 Some observers estimated that Greyhound could have owed the
strikers as much as $125 million absent the cap. 192 The union and Grey-

hound negotiated a settlement, eventually approved by the union's members, providing for the recall of many of the strikers without the termination
of the replacements and payment of $22 million in back pay to the strikers,
who numbered more than 6,000.193
A second potential problem for employers who predict the Board's

characterization of the strike and hire permanent replacements is civil liability to the replacements. Such liability can arise if an employer must discharge replacements to reinstate ULP strikers under a Board order or if it
discharges them to settle a strike. In 1983, the Supreme Court addressed

the question of whether such civil actions are preempted by federal labor
law in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale. 94 In that case, the employer hired permanent
188. Proposed Greyhound Settlement Includes $22 Million In Back Pay, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 75, at C-I (Apr. 21, 1993); see STPHEN R. SLEiGH ET AL., AFL-CIO, THE COST OF
AGGRESSION 2-3 (1992); Amalgamated Transit Union Members Narrowly Approve Greyhound
Settlement, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 88, at A-8 (May 10, 1993).
189. Greyhound's Reorganization Plan Confirmed; Ceiling Set On Back Pay Liability to
Strikers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 170, at A-9 (Sept. 3, 1991).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Amalgamated Transit Union Members Narrowly Approve Greyhound Settlement, supra
note 188. The Greyhound strike and hiring of permanent replacements is by no means an isolated
case in which an employer was hit with an enormous make-whole liability. When Colt Industries,
a gun manufacturer, was struck, the employer hired permanent replacements. UAW Strike Against
Colt EntersFourth Week; Company in Three-Year Pactwith Sister Local, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 41, at A-2 (March 3, 1986). Three years later, an administrative law judge determined that
the strike was a ULP strike and ordered the employer to make offers of reinstatement and pay
back pay with interest from September 1986 until valid offers of reinstatement were made. NLRB
Administrative Law Judge Finds Colt Strike Caused by Unfair Practices,Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 177, at A-1I (Sept. 14, 1989). As a result, the employer settled the case for $13 million ($10
million in back pay and $3 million for related matters), terminated the replacements, offered reinstatement to the strikers, and sold its firearms division to a newly formed company partially
owned by the employees. Four-Year Colt Strike Concludes With Sale of Company, $13 Million
Settlement, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 57, at A-13 (Mar. 23, 1990); see also Michael H. LeRoy,
The Mackay Radio Doctrine of Permanent Striker Replacements and the Minnesota Picket Line
Peace Act: Questions of Preemption, 77 MIN. L. REv. 843, 852 n.58 (1993) (discussing Colt
strike and administrative law judge's ruling); Golden, supra note 86, at 75 n.148 (discussing
conversion of strike and settlement).
194. 463 U.S. 491 (1983). For articles focusing on Belknap, see Anderson, supra note 12;
Janet L. Braun, Case Comment, Belknap, Inc. v. Hale-Problemswith Preemption and the Rights
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replacements for its striking employees. The employer repeatedly emphasized that the replacements were permanent. 195 Indeed, the employer
went to great lengths to ensure the permanent status of the replacements,
having them sign a statement acknowledging their permanent status
as they were hired' 96 and thereafter reasserting their permanent status in
writing.' 9 7 The employer's plan began to unravel when the union filed a
ULP charge against the employer, alleging that its unilateral implementa-

tion of a wage increase violated sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), and 8(a)(5) of the
Act. "9' 8 The regional director thereafter issued a complaint, further undermining the employer's plan. 19 9 Faced with the prospect of liability for
ULPs and a ULP strike, the employer agreed to a settlement of the ULP
charges that required it to recall all of the striking workers.2 00 After being
laid off to make room for recalled strikers, Hale and other replacements
brought an action against Belknap in state court, asserting misrepresentation

and breach of contract claims.2 ' The employer raised as a defense preemption of the state causes of action. The Supreme Court held that the replacements' state causes of action were20 not
preempted.20 2 Accordingly, the case
3
was remanded to the state court.
Many observers believed that Belknap would make employers either
reluctant to hire permanent replacements in the first instance or, if an employer chose to hire them, reluctant to agree to a strike settlement requiring
discharge of replacements because of the potential liability to the replacements.' 4 Notwithstanding the logic of those predictions, neither appears to
of Economic Strikers, 46 OHIO ST. LJ. 381 (1985); Stephanie L. Stromire, Recent Development,
The National Labor Relations Act Does Not Preempt a Discharged Permanent Replacement
Worker's State Cause of Action, 37 VAMD. L. Rav. 1205 (1984).
195. Belknap, 463 U.S. at 494-96.
196. The statement read as follows:
I, the undersigned, acknowledge and agree that I as of this date have been employed by
Belknap, Inc. at its Louisville, Kentucky, facility as a regularfull time permanent replacement to permanently replace
- in the job classification of _
.
Id. at 494-95 (emphasis added). The employer's apparent objective in clearly proclaiming the
permanent status of the replacements was to satisfy the Board's test for lawfully retaining the
replacements rather than reinstating the strikers. Id. at 537 n. 11(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("More
than likely, it was the need to carry this burden that caused [the employer] to have [the replacements] sign the statements involved in this case.").
197. Id. at 495-96.
198. Id. at 495. For a general explanation of these types of ULPs, see supra note 6.
199. Belknap, 463 U.S. at 495.
200. Id. at 496.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 512.
203. The Supreme Court's decision in Belknap did not address the merits of the replacement
employees' state causes of action. Finkin, supra note 80, at 553; McDonald, supra note 16, at
983.
204. Stephens & Kohl, supra note 155, at 43-44 (discussing early assessments of implications
of Belknap); McDonald, supra note 16, at 983 (predicting decision would make employers reluc-
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be accurate.2 "5 While Belknap preserves the permanent replacements' state

causes of action, it also purports to instruct an employer how to insulate
itself from liability through use of the correct language in the offer of permanent employment. 20 6 Some courts have held that Belknap-type agreements do insulate employers from liability.20 7 Still, the easiest way out of
such cases for employers, summary judgment on the basis of preemption,
has been removed by Belknap, 08 and discharged permanent replacements
have recovered in some post-Belknap cases. 20 9

Belknap raises an additional problem for employers. Out of concern
tant to guarantee permanent positions); cf. Anderson, supra note 12, at 322 (stating that, after
Belknap, employers are faced with "perhaps the most significant challenge to [their] use of replacement workers"); Finkin, supra note 80, at 555-56 (noting that settling claims of discharged
permanent replacements may cost employer or union-if the union has entered into an indemnity
agreement with the employer-tens of thousands of dollars per replacement).
205. Professors Stephens and Kohl observe that, in four out of the five strikes they studied, the
employers "aggressively and publically proclaimed" the permanent status of the replacements.
Stephens & Kohl, supranote 155, at 47. In the fifth, the Nevada resorts strike, the employers first
hired temporary replacements, but changed their status to permanent when it appeared that there
would be no quick settlement. Id. at 48. These commentators suggest that, despite these results,
Belknap has not necessarily made employers more likely to hire permanent replacements. They
note that, in the Greyhound strike and at a majority of the resorts, the settlements resulted in the
dismissal of the permanent replacements and the reinstatement of the strikers. Id. Rather, the
authors conclude that financially healthy employers will consider the potential for liability to
discharged "permanent" replacements, while "financially distressed" employers will hire permanent replacements despite the potential liability. Id. at 48-49.
206. The majority recommended that employers indicate to "permanent" replacements that
they may not really be permanent if the strike is deemed a ULP strike or if the employer agrees to
a settlement with the union that requires the reinstatement of the strikers. Belknap, 463 U.S. at
503. This "conditionally permanent" replacement language has been criticized as creating an even
more confusing situation for the employer. Anderson, supra note 12, at 336. It is likely that this
language creates even greater confusion for replacements. See infra note 232.
207. E.g., Walker v. Teledyne Continental Motors, No. 91-0128-T-S, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18089, at *7-*10 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 10, 1991), affd mem., 969 F.2d 1048 (11th Cir. 1992). Even
absent the "Belknap waiver," the employment-at-will doctrine, which retains much of its strength
in many states, makes recovery by a discharged "permanent" replacement unlikely. See, e.g.,
Jacobs v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 323 S.E.2d 238, 239 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that oral
promises of permanent employment and advertisements for permanent replacements do not give
rise to cause of action because employment relationship is terminable at will). But see Finkin,
supra note 80, at 552 ("Belknap, Inc. v. Hale takes on importance because of a fundamental shift
in the state law of individual employment.").
208. E.g., Varnum v. Nu-Car Carriers, Inc., 804 F.2d 638, 640 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1049 (1987); Anderson v. Ford Motor Co., 803 F.2d 953, 958-59 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1011 (1987); Bubbel v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc., 682 P.2d 374, 380 (Alaska 1984).
209. Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Bubbel, 723 P.2d 627, 629-30 (Alaska 1986). After the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the replacement's breach of employment contract action was not preempted in Bubbel 1, 682 P.2d at 380, the trial court entered summary judgment for the replacement, and the supreme court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Bubbel l!, 723
P.2d at 629-30; see also Verway v. Blincoe Packing Co., 698 P.2d 377, 379 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985)
(allowing replacements to recover in wrongful discharge action). Arguably, the results would
have been different in both of those cases if the employers had used the Belknap waiver language
and discharged the permanent replacements as a result of an NLRB order or a strike settlement.
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for potential civil liability to replacements in the event the employers
agreed, or were ordered, to reinstate the strikers, some employers made offers of employment to replacements using ambiguous language regarding
permanent status. Relying on their assumption that the replacements would
be deemed permanent, the employers refused to reinstate economic strikers
when the strikers unconditionally offered to return to work. As illustrated
by Hansen Bros. Enterprises,2 1 ° however, the Board has determined that
ambiguous offers do not constitute offers of permanent replacement status
and accordingly has held the employer liable for ULPs. In Hansen, the
company's president told the replacements that he "wanted" to consider
them as permanent employees and "wanted" them to consider themselves as
permanent employees. 2 1 1 The employer also sent letters to striking employees informing them that they "may" lose their reemployment rights if
replacements were hired.21 2 Because the employer thought it had hired permanent replacements, it denied the striking employees reinstatement when
they offered to return. The Board held, however, that the employer could
not satisfy its burden of proving that there was a mutual understanding between the employer and replacements that they were permanent.21 3 The
Board explained that "vague statements" regarding the employer's intent do
not satisfy the employer's burden and that Belknap does not require a contrary result.2 14 The consequence to the employer was a Board order requiring the employer to make offers of reinstatement and to pay two-and-a-half

In Bubbel, the employer told the replacements that they were permanent employees and that
the only things that could change that status were legal actions by some governmental body, either
the courts or the United States Government. Bubbel, 723 P.2d at 629. The employer eventually
discharged the replacements in compliance with the nonbinding recommendation of the Presidential Emergency Board. The court held that, because the recommendation was not "mandatory, or
at least, highly coercive," the employer was not excused from its contractual duty. Id. at 629. It
appears that discharge pursuant to an NLRB order would have produced a different result, but
discharge under a strike settlement would not.
In Verway, the discharged replacements testified that the employer promised not to fire them
if the strike was settled. Verway, 698 P.2d at 378. Thus, it appears that the employer did not use
the "conditionally permanent" language recommended in Belknap.
210. 279 N.L.R.B. 741 (1986), review denied mer., 812 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 845 (1987).
211. Id. at 741.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. & n.6. Chairman Dotson, dissenting, found the language used by the employer to be
based upon Belknap and sufficient to satisfy the employer's burden. Id. at 742-44 (Dotson, Chairman, dissenting). The Chairman found the majority's approach to "reflect[ ] an undue taste for
verbal analysis rather than a recognition of the real world facts." Id. at 742 (Dotson, Chairman,
dissenting).
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years of back pay and other benefits to the strikers who were denied
215

reinstatement.
The labor dispute between the United Steelworkers of America and
Ravenswood Aluminum Corporation in West Virginia is perhaps the quin-

tessential Belknap strike-and-replacement scenario. After negotiations to
reach a new collective bargaining agreement proved unsuccessful, the company declared an impasse, locked out employees, and immediately had temporary replacements, who had been recruited before the lockout, begin
work. 1 6 The employer subsequently implemented an offer it had made to
the union, informed the union that the locked out employees could return to
work, and changed the status of the temporary replacements to permanent
replacements. 217 The union filed ULP charges alleging, among other

things, that the company had unlawfully locked out its employees.21 8 After
investigating the charges, the NLRB issued a complaint charging Ravenswood with bad faith bargaining and an unlawful lockout. 21 9 ULP hearings
were conducted, but the administrative law judge agreed to withhold his
ruling for a period of time to give Ravenswood and the Steelworkers an
opportunity to settle the case. 220 The union also engaged in a corporate
campaign, 22121 which included efforts to persuade beverage companies to discontinue their business with Ravenswood and to bring pressure to bear on
215. Id. at 742, 744 (Dotson, Chairman, dissenting). For a recent Board decision holding that
an employer failed to satisfy its burden regarding permanent status of replacements, see Gibson
Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1290-91 (1993) (involving employer that announced to
replacements that they were "full-time associates").
216. Brief of Counsel for the General Counsel to the Administrative Law Judge at 53-54,
Ravenswood Aluminum Corp., Case 9-CA-28235.
217. Brief of Charging Party to the Administrative Law Judge at 133, Case No. 9-CA-28235;
Ravenswood Aluminum Corporation's Post-Hearing Brief at 94-95, Case No. 9-CA-28235. Recognizing the ramifications of Belknap, the company had the replacements sign a form, when it
changed their status to permanent, which read, in pertinent part:
I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT RAVENSWOOD ALUMINUM CORPORATION MADE ME A PERMANENT EMPLOYEE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY
DECEMBER 3, 1990. I UNDERSTAND THAT MY PERMANENT EMPLOYEE
STATUS IS SUBJECT TO A SETTLEMENT WITH THE UNION, A SETTLEMENT
WITH THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, OR AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DIRECTING THAT RAVENSWOOD ALUMINUM CORPORATION REINSTATE STRIKERS ....
Brief of Charging Party to the Administrative Law Judge, supra, at 133 (alteration in original).
This permanent replacement form is unmistakably based on the language suggested by the
Supreme Court in Belknap. See supra note 206.
218. Steelworkers Ratify Pact Ending Ravenswood Dispute, supra note 174.
219. NLRB to Issue Complaint Charging Ravenswood With Unlawful Lockout, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 140, at A-6 (July 22, 1991); Steelworkers-Ravenswood Talks Go Nowhere, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 147, at A-14 (July 31, 1991).
220. Proposed Ravenswood Agreement Would Restore Steelworkers' Jobs, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 106, at A-4 (June 2, 1992).
221. "Corporate campaign" may be defined as "a campaign utilizing boycotts and other
nonworkplace-centered forms of pressure." James G. Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and
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the international interests of the person who allegedly controlled
Ravenswood.2 22
Under the mounting pressure of NLRB proceedings and the union's
corporate campaign, the company's board of directors ousted the chairperson and chief executive officer. 2 Thereafter the company agreed to a settlement that called for the discharge of 1,100 permanent replacements and
the reinstatement of the strikers.224 The company agreed to this settlement
despite the specter of potential civil liability to the replacements. 22 5 The
Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 Tax. L. REV.
889, 895 n.38 (1991).
222. Steelworkers Wage Corporate Campaign at Ravenswood with Aid From AFL-CIO, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 76, at A-9 (Apr. 20, 1992). The campaign was directed at pressuring "metals trader and financier" Marc Rich, who fled the United States in 1983 after indictment on "racketeering, tax fraud, and tax evasion charges.' Id. The corporate campaign waged against
Ravenswood by the workers and the union, with the assistance of t&e AFL-CIO, was multifaceted.
Among the tactics in the campaign were the following: filing of complaints with the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) that led to inspections and fines at the company's
facilities; hiring environmental consultants to determine whether the company complied with environmental regulations; financing a lawsuit by local residents against Ravenswood for discharging pollutants into the Ohio River without permits; and holding local "stakeholders meetings" to
present the union's position to citizens with a stake in the dispute. Id.
Although an extensive examination of corporate campaigns is beyond the scope of this Article, there is a growing body of literature examining this approach to labor-management disputes.
See generally CHARLES R. PEmY, UNIoN COmORATE CAMPAIGNS (1987) (analyzing corporate
campaigns); Pope, supra note 221, at 895 n.38 (same). Recognizing the declining number and
potency of strikes, some labor leaders have suggested that corporate campaigns should be used to
supplement strikes. Some have even suggested that corporate campaigns should supplant strikes
as the primary weapon of labor. See id. Professor Pope discusses the effectiveness of labor-community boycotts, which have as an objective turning public opinion against the target
employer. Id. at 905-08 (detailing campaigns against J.P. Stevens and Coors).
When Ron Carey took office in 1992 as president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, he created a new office to assist locals in developing corporate campaigns. Corporate Campaigns: Teamsters Use New Strategies to Build Bargaining Table Pressure, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 117, at C-1 (June 21, 1993). That office assisted in a campaign against Ryder System,
Inc., which resulted in an agreement ending a dispute that had lasted almost a year. Id.
223. Steelworkers Ratify Pact Ending Ravenswood Dispute, supra note 174.
224. Id.
225. Although, under Belknap, state law claims made by the replacements would not be preempted, Ravenswood had some protection from liability in that the replacements signed the Belknap-type waiver. Tobin v. Ravenswood Aluminum Corp., No. CIVA.6:92-0906, 1993 WL
485552, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 15, 1993). Additionally, Ravenswood offered a severance package including placement on a preferential hiring list, one month's pay, accumulated vacation, and
the company contribution of medical insurance for three months. Id. at *2. The consideration for
preferential hiring and continuation of medical coverage was conditioned on the replacements'
signing forms releasing all claims against Ravenswood. Id. Many of the replacements accepted
the full severance package and signed the releases. Id.
A group of 905 of the discharged replacements later filed suit against Ravenswood, alleging
in part, that the employer promised them permanent employment and job security. Id. The federal court granted Ravenswood's motion for summary judgment with respect to the claims of 721
of the replacements who accepted the packages and signed releases. Id. at *4.However, the court
did not dismiss all the claims of the 184 plaintiffs who did not sign the releases. Id. at *8. The
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lesson from the Steelworkers-Ravenswood dispute regarding Belknap, then,
is that employers probably are more concerned with potential back pay liability under an NLRB order" 6 than they are with potential civil liability to
discharged permanent replacements.
4.

What Are the Risks to the Replacement Workers?

Replacements face the risk of job loss in two scenarios: one, the NLRB
determines that there was a ULP strike and orders their discharge if necessary to accommodate reinstatement of the strikers; or two, the employer
settles the dispute with the union and agrees to discharge the replacements.
Consider, for example, the Steelworkers-Ravenswood dispute2 2" in which
the strike settlement required discharge of 1,100 "conditionally permanent" 228 replacements. Notwithstanding such incidents, the risks encountered by strike replacements are often overlooked in the Mackay debate.2 29
A principal reason that the risks to replacements are not often raised
may be that they are not viewed as sympathetic characters in most permanent replacement situations. The most disdainful treatment of replacements
appears to rest on the rationale that striker replacements are stealing the
jobs-the property-of the regular employees; therefore, the risk of loss
they face is no more than they deserve. They are considered nothing more
than "scabs.1 23 ° A less virulent view of replacements, but one that also
court noted that the remaining plaintiffs must satisfy high standards to prevail. Id. at *4-*5.
Under West Virginia law, the employment-at-will doctrine is still the rule subject to limited exceptions. Although West Virginia law will enforce a contract for a term other than at will, the
burden is on the party claiming such a contract to establish it by clear and convincing evidence,
and the promises must be "very definite." Id. (citing Adkins v. Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc., 417 S.E.2d
910, 916 (W. Va. 1992); Suter v. Harsco, Corp., 403 S.E.2d 751,754 (W. Va. 1991)). In addition,
employers can avoid such contracts by explicit disclaimer. Suter, 403 S.E.2d at 754.
226. Regarding the potential for enormous back pay liability if the Board determines that an
employer has denied ULP strikers reinstatement, see supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
The settlement between Ravenswood and the union also provided that each striker receive $2000
and established a "progress sharing" formula. Steelworkers Ratify PactEnding Ravenswood Dispute, supra note 174. Thus, the total amount paid by Ravenswood in back pay was estimated at
$3.4 million. Proposed Ravenswood Agreement Would Restore Steelworkers' Jobs, supra note
220. The make-whole remedy sought in the complaint was estimated as exceeding $80 million.
Id.
227. See supra notes 216-26 and accompanying text.
228. As discussed above, when the replacements were converted from temporary to permanent
by Ravenswood, they signed Belknap-type waivers. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
229. See Baird, supra note 11, at 6-7 (arguing that those concerned with the rights of strikers
ignore the rights of those who choose not to strike). This Article does not suggest that replacements have been wholly ignored. See infra note 232.
230. Jack London penned the often-quoted description of the genesis of "scabs": "After God
had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, He had some awful substance left with
which He made a scab." Jack London, The Scab, reprintedin CARRmR's CORNER, June 1970

(monthly newsletter of Old Dominion Branch No. 496 of National Ass'n of Letter Carriers),
quoted in Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 268 (1974).
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perceives no reason to protect their interests, regards them as having knowingly assumed the risks associated with such jobs.2 3'
Regardless of whether one considers striker replacements "scabs," believes that replacement workers are people with job rights equal to other
workers,2 3 2 or holds a view somewhere in between,23 3 the point is that they,
like striking employees, are subject to uncertainties regarding the duration
of their employment." 4 For replacements who, prior to accepting the reIt is not surprising that striker replacements have not been well received on the picket lines.
It appears, however, that they have not fared much better in Congress. The hearings on H.R. 3936
included an exchange in which Representative Fawell objected to use of the word "scabs" during
the hearings to refer to replacement workers. Representative Ford responded, in part, that the
word is a "descriptive term of art" describing one "who steals another person's job," but that it
was not being used "to be provocative" or "to offend anybody." Hearings on H.R. 3936 Before
the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 60-61 (1990).
231. See quotation of Judge Learned Hand, supra text accompanying note 182.
232. Baird, supra note 11, at 25-26. Others have seen permanent replacements as victims of
the battles between employers and unions. E.g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)
("It is one thing to hold that the federal law intended to leave the employer and the union free to
use their economic weapons against one another, but it is quite another to hold that either the
employer or the union is also free to injure innocent third parties without regard to the normal
rules of law governing those relationships."). Despite the Court's sympathetic depiction of striker
replacements in Belknap, it seems that the Court's decision, on the whole, is more harmful than
beneficial to these "innocent third parties." See infra note 234. One commentator views permanent replacements as "unwitting victims" of the Mackay doctrine. Janes, supra note 109, at 126.
He sees the "permanent" label as deceiving replacements regarding their job security and legal
rights. Id. at 149. Still, these observations were pre-Belknap, and the deceptiveness of a bare
designation of "permanent" may be ameliorated by the conditional language suggested by the
Court in Belknap. See supra note 206. That proposition assumes, however, some conditions that
actually may not exist. First, it assumes that employers are using the Belknap language, although,
as discussed above, employers sometimes use variations. See supra notes 210-15 and accompanying text. Second, it assumes that replacements understand the conditional language in a Belknap-type replacement offer.
233. Cf. THE RIvER (Universal City Studios, Inc. 1984) (telling the story of a farmer experiencing financial difficulties who, without knowing that he was replacing strikers, takes a job in a
steel plant in order to save his farm).
234. In Belknap, 463 U.S. at 512, the Supreme Court purported to protect replacements from
injury that might befall them in the war between unions and employers by holding that their state
actions stemming from their discharge are not preempted by federal labor law. See supra notes
194-203 and accompanying text. By also instructing employers how to word offers to create a
"conditionally permanent" status, see supra note 206, however, the Court may have created a
much worse situation for replacements. For replacements unfamiliar with the law and strategies
of the parties in labor disputes, the Court's suggested language may provide little indication of
their potentially temporary status. See, e.g., Estreicher, supranote 11, at 289 (asserting that "permanency" is illusory because of employment at will, potential for layoffs, and possibilities of
Board's finding of ULP strike or settlement with union requiring reinstatement). What the
Supreme Court's suggested hybrid replacement status probably does for replacements is deprive
them of a viable state action against the employer for misrepresentation or breach of contract.
Finkin, supra note 80, at 553 ("In the name of solicitude for the rights of 'innocent third parties,'
the Court would ask the states to strip them of their common law rights."); A.J. Harper II, Speech
to the ABA's Mid-Winter Meeting (Mar. 5, 1991) reprintedin Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at
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placement positions, have no jobs or perhaps substantially less remunerative jobs than the replacement positions, the risk may not be substantial.
Still, for those who have fairly secure jobs, though perhaps less remunerative than the replacement positions, the risk of loss is greater.
"IT. INCREASED RESORT TO PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS AND THE

DECLINE OF THE STRIKE-AN ARGUMENT FOR
OVERTURNING MAC KAY?

The Workplace Fairness Act, like some of its precursors, would eliminate the most significant distinction between economic and ULP strikes by
prohibiting employers from hiring or threatening to hire permanent replacements during economic strikes, thus overturning Mackay."3 Why has legislation repeatedly been proposed since 1988 to overrule a doctrine that has
been established law since 1938? As one commentator posed the question,
"[W]hat is different in 1993 than in 1938 that would warrant reconsidera'36
tion of a principle that for 55 years went without questioning[?]"'
If the Caterpillar dispute were the only major strike in recent times
involving the threat of hiring or hiring of permanent replacements, one
might easily dismiss as unwarranted the tempest of calls for legislative reform of the labor laws. Employers, for their part, argue that they hire permanent replacements only as a last resort. 3 7 According to many analysts,
however, the Caterpillar incident is only the latest and most publicized example of a recent trend among employers, 38 which exacerbates the risks
faced by striking employees and unions, renders impotent the right to engage in an economic strike, and facilitates the continuing decline in the
percentage of the workforce in the United States represented by unions.
Numerous commentators have noted that, for much of its life, the Mackay doctrine rarely was summoned into battle by employers. 239 There is a
E-I (Mar. 6, 1991)) ("Belknap ... holds that to avoid civil liability to the replacements should

they be replaced pursuant to a Board order or a settlement agreement providing for reinstatement
of the strikers, the employer may promise the replacements permanent employment subject to
such conditions subsequent.").
235. See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
236. See YAGER, supra note 11, at 113.
237. See, e.g., Hearingson S. 2112 Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990) (statement of James P. Melican, Senior
Vice President of International Paper Co., which permanently replaced employees at its Jay,
Maine plant during a strike in 1987-88).
238. See, e.g., LeRoy, supra note 84, at 262-63 (listing the following post-1981 strikes in
which employers either hired or threatened to hire permanent replacements: Eastern Airlines,
United Airlines, Continental Airlines, Trans World Airlines, International Paper Co., Greyhound,
Hormel, Ravenswood, New York Daily News, Chicago Tribune, Major League Baseball, and the
National Football League).
239. E.g., Estreicher, supra note 11, at 287 (stating that in the modem era most employers
with established bargaining relationships continued operations without resorting to permanent
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perception among labor leaders,m ° some commentators on labor law,"4 and
some government officials2 42 that in recent years employers' traditional reluctance to hire permanent replacements has subsided, and it has now become common procedure for employers to threaten to hire them. They
believe the Mackay doctrine, dormant for most of its life, recently was
awakened by employers, who use it to run roughshod over unions and

employees .243

The opposing camps on Mackay simply do not agree on whether there
is, in fact, an increasing resort to the threat of hiring, or the actual hiring, of
permanent replacements. A recent episode at a meeting of the National
Association of Manufacturers demonstrates the disagreement and implicates
the studies most often cited by each side. At the meeting, Secretary of
Labor Robert Reich delivered an address in which he stated that employers'

use of permanent replacements rose in the 1980s.244 During a question-and-answer session, John Irving, a former General Counsel of the
NLRB and now an attorney in private practice, challenged the Secretary's
replacements); Finkin, supra note 80, at 548 (asserting that the Mackay rule was not utilized by
large, nationally based unionized companies for much of its history); Eberts, supra note 73, at 260
(explaining that, due to deference to unions, industry did not often resort to permanent replacements until recently); Axelrod, supra note 84 (asserting that employers were reluctant to permanently replace strikers until the early 1980s).
240. E.g., Hearings on H.R. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-ManagementRelations of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1991) (statement of Lane
Kirkland, President, AFL-CIO), reprintedin Selected Statements on Striker Replacement Legislation (H.R.5) Delivered Before House Education and Labor Subcommittee on Labor-Management
Relations, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at D-1 (Mar. 7, 1991) (stating that there has been a
"quantum increase" in the hiring of permanent replacements).
241. See, e.g., GmmAN & PoreBm, supra note 11, at 140 (stating that the right to permanently replace was not widely used until "quite recently"); Estreicher, supra note 11, at 287 (citing
use of permanent replacements at Hormel, TWA, and AT&T); Finkin, supra note 80, at 548-49
n.12 (providing statistics indicating that, as use of strikes has decreased in recent years, use of
permanent replacements has increased); Stephens & Kohl, supra note 155, at 44-45 (noting "considerable replacement worker activity" in recent years); Eberts, supra note 73, at 290 (asserting
that the "full force" of Mackay was not felt until the last decade).
242. E.g., Hearings on H.R. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-ManagementRelations of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1993) (statement of Robert B.
Reich, Secretary of Labor), reprinted in Selected Testimony from House, Education, and Labor
Committee Hearing on HR 5, Workplace FairnessAct of 1993, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 60, at
D-I (Mar. 31, 1993) (stating that hiring permanent replacements "became a prominent feature of
American labor relations only in the last dozen years").
243. "What was a loaded pistol waiting to be fired in 1938, and thereafter for a number of
years, is now used with a vengeance, and the victims are the promises of the NLRA." Pollitt,
supra note 11, at 311.
244. Reich Challenged On Claim of Rise in Use of Permanent Striker Replacements, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 53, at AA-1 (Mar. 22, 1993). Earlier that week, Secretary Reich had addressed a UAW political and legislative conference. In that address the Secretary stated, "Before
1981 no manager would have thought about replacing striking workers. No manager would have
even contemplated replacing striking workers.' Reich Tells Auto Workers' Conference Workplace
Reform Is Crucial to Future, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at A-12 (Mar. 17, 1993).
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assertion. Irving disagreed with the Secretary, stating that in his experience
it was not true that employers never considered hiring permanent replace-

ments before 1981. In support of his position, he cited a 1991 study by
Daniel Yager.24 5 Irving also asked the Secretary if he had any empirical
evidence to support his statements.24 6 Although the Secretary did not have

empirical evidence at the meeting, he thereafter wrote Irving, 247 citing a
1990 study by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO)24 8 and a

study by Professor Cynthia Gramm

49

Both proponents and opponents of the movement to abrogate Mackay
argue that the GAO study supports their position." ° The study considered
strikes reported to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in 1985
and 1989.11 The study estimates that employers announced that they

would hire permanent replacements in a slightly higher percentage of
strikes in 1989 than in 1985 (thirty-five percent and thirty-one percent, re-

spectively); 252 that the percentage of strikes in which employers actually
25 3
hired permanent replacements in both years was about seventeen percent;
and that about the same percentage of employees was replaced in 1989 and

245. DANIEL V. YAGER, EMPLOYMENT POLICY FOUNDATION, LOADING THE SCALES: THE PROPOSAL TO OVERTURN THE MAcKAY DocTRINE 92 (1991) [hereinafter YAGER 1991]. The results
of Yager's study are also in YAGER, supra note 11, at 109-23.
246. Reich Challenged On Claim of Rise in Use of PermanentStriker Replacements, supra
note 244.
247. Id.
248. Id. The survey was updated by the GAO in 1991. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTINO OFCE,
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: STRIKES AND THE USE OF PERMANENT STRIKE REPLACEMENTS
INTHE 1970s AND 1980s 18-19 (1991) [hereinafter GAO].

249. Reich Challenged on Claim of Rise in Use of Permanent Striker Replacements, supra
note 244 (citing Cynthia L. Gramm, EmpiricalEvidence on PoliticalArguments Relating to Replacement Worker Legislation, 42 LAB. LJ. 491 (1991)).
250. McCallion, supra note 16, at CRS-1. Compare Axelrod, supra note 84, at F-I (citing the
GAO study to support the proposition that "[tihe threat of permanent replacement now hangs like
a Sword of Damocles partially paralyzing the labor movement") with Baird, supra note 11, at 16
(citing GAO study in support of proposition that threat of permanent replacements rarely made,
even more rarely implemented, and when implemented, most often only after strikes have lasted a
long time).
251. GAO, supra note 248, at 9.
252. Id. at 13.
253. Id. at 15. The Bureau of National Affairs conducted surveys of work stoppages as reported in the popular and labor presses for the years 1989, 1990, and 1991. The survey showed
that replacements, either temporary or permanent, were hired in 78 of 444 work stoppages in 1989
(17.6%), 72 of 407 work stoppages in 1990 (17.7%), and 47 of 322 work stoppages in 1991
(14.6%). BNA DataShow Most Work Stoppages Occurred in Units of Fewer Than 200 Workers,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 75, at A-1 (Apr. 17, 1992) (discussing THE BUREAU OF NAT'L A&FAIRS, INC., REPLACEMENT WORKERS: EVIDENCE FROM THE POPULAR AND LABOR PRESS: 1989
AND 1990 (1991)); YAGER, supranote 11, at 108. Because those data include both temporary and
permanent replacements, the BNA survey suggests that permanent replacements may be hired
somewhat less frequently than is estimated by the GAO study.
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1985 (three percent and four percent, respectively). 4 No comparable data
were available for the 1970s to determine whether threats and replacement
increased from the 1970s to the 1980s.1 5 To compare the incidence of
replacement in the 1980s with that in the 1970s, the GAO asked union representatives and employers involved in the 1985 and 1989 strikes to compare use of replacements for those periods. The GAO estimates that
seventy-seven percent of the union representatives and forty-five percent of
the employers surveyed thought that permanent replacements were used
more in the period between 1985-90 than between 1975-80.16 The study
thus suggests that, regardless of whether the use of permanent replacements
is in fact more common now, there is at least a perception among one of the
relevant groups that this is true.
The more significant question would seem to be whether employees
perceive employers as now commonly and quickly resorting to the hiring of
permanent replacements. If they do, then that perception might dissuade
employees from engaging in strikes or perhaps even voting for representation by a labor organization, for fear that such a vote ultimately will lead to
their being asked to strike and thus jeopardize their jobs.25 7 It is likely that
the high visibility of the Caterpillar strike and threat of permanent replacement, as well as similar scenarios at Greyhound," 8 The New York Daily
News,2 9 and others,26 has produced such a perception among employees.

254. GAO, supra note 248, at 17. These figures have been cited by some opponents of abrogating Mackay as indicating that even if there is an increasing resort to use of permanent replacements, the number of strikers who are actually being replaced has not increased because there are
fewer strikes and union membership is decreasing. Dolan, supra note 86, at 320. This argument
does not counter the anti-Mackay arguments very well; part and parcel of the increased-use-of-Mackay argument is the contention that the practice is decimating the strike and
contributing to the decline of unions.
255. GAO, supra note 248, at 2 (1985 was earliest year for which automated data were
available).
256. Id. at 18. Yager argues that this opinion survey is of questionable value. YAGER, supra
note 11, at 96 (explaining that GAO study also indicates that 50% of the union representatives
surveyed believed permanent replacements were hired in 50% or more of the strikes in late
1980s-far more than study's estimate of 17%).
257. E.g., Hearingson S. 2112 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 112-13 (1990) (statement of Julius Getman, Professor, Univ. of Texas Law School) (stating that, in virtually every union organizing campaign, employer announces that, if union is elected, employer will bargain tough, and if strike is called, it
will not hesitate to hire permanent replacements); Kamiat, supra note 84, at 34-35 (contending
that it is "virtually universal" among employers resisting union organizing to tell employees that
union victory will eventually result in strike and employer's use of permanent replacements).
258. See Eberts, supra note 73, at 257.
259. Id. at 258-59.
260. See supra note 238.
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Moreover, the high-profile incidents of hiring, or threatening to hire, permanent replacements probably have bred emulation by other employers.2 61
The study by Professor Gramm analyzes use of permanent replace-

ments in thirty-two strikes during the period from 1984 to 1988 in a national sample and twenty-one strikes during the same period in a New York
sample.2 62 Professor Gramm found that permanent replacements were
hired in 15.63% of the strikes in the national sample and 23.81% of the

strikes in the New York sample.263 Her findings suggest that employers
hire permanent replacements "in a substantial minority of [work]
stoppages. ' 26

Finally, the study by Daniel Yager surveys the number of NLRB decisions citing Mackay from 1935 to 1989.265 He determined that, of those
cases, 251 involved employers hiring permanent replacements. 26 6 Of those
251 cases, only 22 involved labor disputes that began in 1981 or later.2 67

Mr. Yager recently assessed the implications of the study: although it does
not show that there has been no increase in the use of permanent replace261. See LeRoy, supra note 84, at 263-64 (describing the "me-too" effect on small employers
of large employers' use of permanent replacements). For example, approximately three months
after Caterpillar issued its ultimatum and ended the strike in Peoria, Peterbilt, a "big rig" tractor
manufacturer, ended a three-month strike at a plant in Nashville, Tennessee by threatening to hire
replacements. Peterbilt Strike Ends, BATON ROUGE SUNDAY ADVOCATE (La.), Aug. 2, 1992, at
2A. The striking employees, members of the UAW, approved a contract by a margin of more than
3-1 that they had rejected a week earlier. One might reasonably infer that the factor which produced such a drastically different result in the course of a week was the employer's threat to hire
permanent replacements. The president of the UAW local described the contract as "the worst
contract that's ever been negotiated in so far as the differences between the old contract and the
new contract." Id.
262. See Gramm, supra note 249, at 491-92.
263. Id. at 492.
264. Id. at 495. Professor Gramm interprets other findings of the study as suggesting the
following: hiring permanent replacements may prolong strikes; hiring permanent replacements
may decrease the likelihood that unions will retain their status as collective bargaining representatives; most employers can continue operating without hiring permanent replacements; and temporary replacements are at least as effective as permanent replacements in continuing operations. Id.
Professor Gramm concludes, in part, that, because of size limitations in her study's samples, further research is needed to determine the effects of hiring permanent replacements on both the
unions' survival as the collective bargaining representatives and the employers' ability to operate.
Id.
265. YAGER 1991, supra note 245, at 98. The year used to date the decisions is the year the
labor dispute began, rather than the date of the NLRB decision. Id. at 97. This explains why
decisions designated as 1935-37 could cite the 1938 Mackay decision.
266. Id. at 98; see also id. at 100-02 (providing charts showing data for each year).
267. Id. at 102. The year 1981 is significant because that was the year of the PATCO firings.
See infra note 269 and accompanying text. The high year was 1948, with 12 such cases, and the
low year was 1957, with none. YAGER 1991, supra note 245, at 98. All years except 1957 had
one or more cases. Id.
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ments since 1981, it does disprove the assertion that employers did not hire
permanent replacements before 1981.268
Commentators have speculated on the reasons for an increase in the
use of permanent replacements. One of the most commonly repeated theories is that President Reagan set the tone for a new aggressive approach by
employers when, in 1981, he fired over 11,000 air traffic controllers who
were represented by the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization
(PATCO) and who were participating in an illegal strike.2 69 If, assuming
arguendo, the 1980s witnessed an increase in private sector employers' engaging in hard bargaining and hiring permanent replacements, or threatening to do so, singling out President Reagan's action as the cause is too
simplistic. In fact, few of the commentators who highlight that event view
it as the principal cause of increased resort to the Mackay doctrine. There
are many other factors that may have contributed to an increase in employers' use of permanent replacements. Some that have been suggested include the following: the wave of mergers and acquisitions in the 1980s,
which resulted in an oversupply of personnel, followed by downsizing,
which left a pool of workers willing to work for less than union wages; 2 70
deregulation; 2 7 1 global competition; 272 technology;27 3 slow economic
growth;2 74 and unreasonable labor contracts and demands.27 5
268. Reich Challenged on Claim of Rise in Use of Permanent Striker Replacements, supra
note 244.
269. E.g., Craver, supra note 85, at 421; Estreicher, supra note 11, at 287; Pollitt, supra note
11, at 307; Axelrod, supra note 84. AFL-CIO secretary-treasurer Thomas Donahue stated that
employers "'interpreted this as a declaration of open season on unions and went all-out to block,
weaken or be rid of them."' Janice Castro, Labor Draws an Empty Gun, TM, Mar. 26, 1990, at
56. But see Baird, supra note 11, at 11 (describing this explanation as a fairy tale).
For a detailed account of the PATCO strike, see Herbert R. Northrup, The Rise and Demise
of PATCO, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. Rav. 167 passim (1984). President Reagan fired the air traffic
controllers who did not return to work within 48 hours of his announcement and ordered federal
agencies not to re-employ them. Id. at 178. On August 12, 1993, the Clinton Administration
announced that the President had issued an order authorizing the Federal Aviation Administration
to hire the former strikers. Clinton Gives FAA Clearanceto Hire Fired PATCO Members, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 155, at AA-1 (Aug. 13, 1993).
270. Roukis & Farid, supra note 85, at 84-85.
271. Id.
272. Id.; Randall Sambom, "Replacements" Spur Labor Action, NAT'L L.J., May 28, 1990, at
1, 29 (explaining opinion of Joel Kaplan, attorney who represents management).
273. Roukis & Farid, supra note 85, at 84.
274. Id.
275. Eberts, supra note 73, at 260-61; cf. Richard Freeman, Is Declining Unionization of the
U.S. Good, Bad, or Irrelevant?, in UrnoNs AND ECONOMIC CoMParvNss 143 (Lawrence
Mishel & Paula B..Voos eds., 1992). In his recent essay, Professor Freeman elucidates that, when
United States companies had technological and productivity leads over companies in the rest of
the world, they had potential "monopoly rents.' Freeman, supra, at 165-66. Unions could bargain for the employees' share of those rents, and employers could agree without hurting the companies' investment. Id. at 166. With the "oil shock," the loss of the United States's productivity
advantage, and deregulation, the monopoly rents no longer existed, and unions were slow to real-
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Proponents of overturning Mackay argue that employers' increasing
resort to permanent replacements has effected a decline in the number and
effectiveness of strikes, once labor's most powerful weapon.2 76 One cannot
dispute that the number of strikes has decreased in recent years.2 77 As to
the effectiveness of strikes, there is no empirical data establishing that
strikes have become ineffective economic weapons. Nevertheless, one

could infer from the decrease in the number of strikes that unions and employees resort to strikes less often because they perceive them as ineffective.278 Even before the UAW-Caterpillar dispute, labor law commentators
279
suggested that the right to strike had become a "blunt instrument.

No empirical evidence conclusively establishes a causal connection
between an increased use of permanent replacements and the decline in
the number and effectiveness of strikes.28 0 Commentators have recognized
ize that the bargaining strategies of the 1950s and 1960s would not work in the 1970s and 1980s.
IL; cf Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further "Reflections on the Distinctive Characterof
American Labor Laws," 1990 Wis. L. Rsv. 1, 106-09 (recognizing the role of U.S. industries'
monopoly rents and the loss of those rents in both the changing relationship between U.S. employers and organized labor and the precipitous decline in union density in traditional union
"strongholds").
276. E.g., Kamiat, supra note 84, at 40 (contending that under Mackay a strike is not necessarily something an employer wishes to avoid because it provides opportunity to oust union);
Michael H. LeRoy, The Mackay Radio Doctrine of PermanentStriker Replacements and the Minnesota Picket Line Peace Act: Questions of Preemption,77 MwN. L. Rv. 843, 850-51 (1993)
(recognizing that no study establishes relationship between increased replacement and decreased
strikes, but stating that impact on union decision making suggests such a correlation); Pollitt,
supra note 11, at 300 (asserting that Mackay "makes a mockery of the supposed right to strike");
Axelrod, supra note 84 (declaring that "[tihe threat of permanent replacement now hangs like a
Sword of Damocles, partially paralyzing the labor movement"). Some opponents of legislation to
overturn Mackay argue that a decrease in the number of strikes is not a malady that needs to be
remedied, but is one of the principal objectives of the NLRA. See YAGER, supra note 11, at
49-51; Zifchak, supra note 86, at 57.
277. The Bureau of Labor Statistics has compiled figures on major work stoppages since
1947. The Bureau defines a "major work stoppage" as including both strikes and lockouts. In
1991, the number of major work stoppages dropped to a record-tying low of 40, the same level as
in 1988. Work Stoppages: Major Strikes and Lockouts Last Year Tied Record Low, Labor Department Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at B-I (Feb. 5, 1992). In 1992, the number fell to
a new record low of 35. Work Stoppages: BLS Report Record Low Number of Major Strikes
During 1992, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at B-7 (Feb. 4, 1993).
278. One measure of the effectiveness of a strike is the extent to which the union can impede
the employer's operations during the strike. See, e.g., Weiler, supranote 3, at 389 (explaining that
if employer continues operations despite strike, employees lose paychecks, but employer suffers
little loss in revenues). One way a union can effectively disrupt an employer's operation is to
prevent the employer from obtaining a sufficient quantity of qualified workers. John G. Kilgour,
Can Unions Strike Anymore? The Impact ofRecent Supreme CourtDecisions,41 LAB. L.J. 259,
259 (1990).
279. See, e.g., Combination of Many FactorsSeen Contributing to Decline in Strikes, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No 62, at C-I (Apr. 3, 1989).
280. LeRoy, supra note 276, at 850-51 (recognizing that no study establishes relationship
between employers' growing willingness to employ permanent replacements and the declining
strike rate).
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that the decreasing effectiveness of strikes can be attributed to a number of causes, including increased capital mobility, automated technology, deregulation, declining union membership, and increased international competition. 281 It is likely, however, that a perceived increase in
the use of permanent replacements is at least a cause of the decline of
strikes.

28 2

The alleged increase in use of permanent replacements and the decline
of the strike are not, however, the only reasons that the Mackay doctrine has
come under escalating attack in the last few years. Organized labor has
been declining as a percentage of the workforce in the United States since
1954.283 The decline has been most pronounced in the private sector.28 4 It
is widely recognized that a number of factors have contributed to the decline of organized labor,2 5 and Mackay is no more than one of those fac281. LeRoy, supra note 84, at 301-03 (recognizing that increased job mobility, declining
unionization, and broader deregulation have undermined right to strike); Pope, supra note 221, at
894 n.35 (stating that economists connect the declining power of strikes with "structural features
of the emerging postindustrial order such as capital mobility and automated process technology");
Combination of Many FactorsSeen Contributingto Decline in Strikes, supra note 279 (reporting
that labor experts cite the following reasons for the decline in strikes: declining power of unions
as they lose members, changes in structure of corporate America, increased foreign competition,
and use of permanent replacements).
282. LeRoy, supra note 276, at 850-51 (stating that employers' increased willingness to hire
replacements has affected union decision making).
283. See, e.g., MicHAEL GOLDFrELD, Tim DEcMMNE op ORGANIZED LABO N Tim UNITED
STATES passim (1987). According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the high point of union
membership was approximately 1945, when about 35.5% of all nonagricultural workers were
members. Id. at 10 tbl. 1; Union Membership: Proportionof Union Members Declines to Low of
15.8 Percent, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at B-1 (Feb. 9, 1993). From that high point, the
percentage decreased in the period between 1946-1952, when it reached 32.5%. GOLDFIELD,
supra, at 10 tbl.1. Union density increased in 1954 to 34.7%, but thereafter has steadily declined.
Id. During 1990 and 1991, the decline leveled off at 16.1%, but it resumed in 1992 as the percentage fell to 15.8%. Union Membership: Proportion of Union Members Declines to Low of 15.8
Percent, supra.
284. See Union Coverage of U.S. Private Workforce Predicted to Fall Below 5 Percent by
2000, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 241, at A-1 (Dec. 18, 1989) (discussing paper by Professors
Stephen Bronars and Donald Deere examining the declining percentage of unionized labor in the
private sector between 1973 and 1988). From 1973 to 1988, union representation in the private
sector fell from 25% to 12%. Id. Bronars and Deere predict that, if current trends continue, the
percentage will decrease to below 5% by the year 2000. Id.
285. Freeman, supranote 275, at 164-66 (citing employers' opposition to organization, deregulation of trucking and airlines, and U.S.'s loss of productivity advantage); William B. Gould, IV,
Some Reflections on Fifty Years of the NationalLabor Relations Act: The Need for Labor Board
and Labor Law Reform, 38 STAN. L. REv. 937, 942 (1986) (citing foreign competition from Japan,
Brazil, Korea, and other countries, deregulation, increased use of permanent replacements, and
unions' failure to organize in developing industries); LeRoy, supra note 276, at 853 (addressing
the declining union numbers in particular industries and increased intemationai wage competition); see also YAGER, supranote 11, at 63-65 (describing a shift from manufacturing to service,
shift of manufacturing to Sunbelt where unions are less popular, growth of white collar jobs,
reports of violent and corrupt union activities, increased global competition, deregulation, enactment of federal employment laws since 1960, erosion of state law employment-at-will doctrine,
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tors. But the hoary doctrine has become a primary target of efforts to
resuscitate the strike and organized labor.285 The escalating attack on Mackay is probably due in large part to the perception that it is a cause of
decline that can be extirpated by legislation.
In summary, employers may threaten to hire, and perhaps even actually hire, permanent replacements more often today than they did before the
1980s. Even if that is not true, it seems that labor leaders, and perhaps
employees, perceive it as so. The Mackay doctrine is thus believed to be a
cause of the declining effectiveness of strikes and declining union density.
Accordingly, many leaders and supporters of organized labor have attempted to rejuvenate the strike and the labor movement by campaigning to
overturn Mackay.
IV.

SIGNIICANT FuI'crONs OF THE DIsTINCTION BETWEEN ECONOMIC

STRIKEs AND UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE STRiKEs: REASONS EMPLOYERS
SHOULD NOT BE CATEGORICALLY PROHIBITED FROM HIRING
PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS

This Article has discussed the risks that the current state of the law
under Mackay imposes on the parties to labor disputes. Further, it has considered the argument that employers have exacerbated those risks and undermined the right to strike by increasingly'threatening to hire, and hiring,
permanent replacements. The problems sound a clarion call for modification of the current striker replacement law. Correction of these problems
does not require, however, that employers be prohibited from hiring permanent replacements under all circumstances, thus abrogating the principal
distinction between economic and ULP strikes. The distinction between the
two types of strikes performs important functions in regulating the behavior
of the parties to a labor dispute. First, the distinction between the types of
and employers' voluntary improvements in the workplace). After studying a number of factors
contributing to union decline, Goldfield selected the following as most significant: "growing offensive of U.S. capitalists" against new union organizing efforts; changes in public policy that
increasingly favor employers; and unions' inability and unwillingness to fight the losses in union
density and union influence. GOLDFmILD, supra note 283, at 231.
286. This Article does not suggest that organized labor has failed to address other causes of
declining union density. Some labor leaders, for example, have called for abandonment of the
philosophy of spending almost all of the dues collected on servicing existing members and urged
unions to embark on aggressive new organizing efforts. See SEIU Organizing DirectorCallsfor

New Strategiesfor Labor Movement, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 112, at A-I (June 14, 1993)
(discussing speech delivered by Service Employees International Union's organizing director).
Moreover, some labor leaders have sought to bolster the waning power of the strike with corporate
campaigns, see supra note 222, and in-plant strategies, such as work-to-rule tactics, see Marc J.
Bloch & Scott A. Moorman, Working to Rule and OtherAlternate Job Actions, 9 LAB. LAW. 169
passim (1993). The resounding success of some corporate campaigns, such as that of the United
Steelworkers against Ravenswood Aluminum, see supra notes 216-26 and accompanying text,
suggests that such actions may do much to revitalize organized labor.
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strikes is the most effective deterrent of ULPs by employers. Second, the
right to hire permanent replacements during an economic strike provides a
market check on the bargaining demands of the parties. These functions are
worth preserving. A proposal more narrowly tailored than an absolute ban
on the hiring of permanent replacements can both alleviate the problems
created by the Mackay doctrine and preserve the significant functions it
performs.
A.

The DistinctionBetween Economic and Unfair Labor Practice
Strikes-The Most Effective DeterrentAgainst Employers'
Unfair Labor Practices

The current law regarding replacement of strikers permits employers to
hire permanent replacements only if a strike is characterized as an economic
strike.28 7 Evidently employers do value the option of hiring permanent
replacements; one need look no further than the bitter struggle over the
Workplace Fairness Act and its predecessors to know this is true. Many
employers never exercise that option nor even threaten to exercise it, but
even these employers recognize that retention of the option gives them leverage at the bargaining table.2"'
To retain the option of hiring permanent replacements, employers must
avoid conuitting ULPs that may result in the Board's characterization of a
strike as a ULP strike either from its inception or by conversion. Determination of the type of strike is a minefield for an employer that has engaged
in any behavior which might be considered a ULP. The topography of this
minefield is briefly described in this and the next two paragraphs. 8 9 The
test applied by the Board and the courts for determining whether a strike is
a ULP strike is whether a ULP constituted a contributing cause of the
strike.29 0 The test is nebulous and labor-friendly, in that the strike is a ULP
strike, even if economic objectives predominate, as long as there is a causal
connection between the employer's ULPs and the strike.2 91
287. See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
288. Ray, supra note 74, at 365.
289. For an extensive treatment of the Board's and courts' standards for determining whether
a strike is a ULP or economic strike, see RAY & BARTLE, supra note 12, §§ 5.01-.06.
290. E.g., Northern Wire Corp. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 1313, 1319 (7th Cir. 1989) ("A strike that
is caused in whole or in part by an employer's unfair labor practices is an unfair labor practice
strike."); see also General Indus. Employees Union, Local 42, v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1308, 1311
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating that a strike is a ULP strike if employer's violations are "contributing
cause"); R & H Coal Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 28, 28 (1992) (finding that employer's commission of
ULPs was "contributing cause") (citing C-Line Express, 292 N.L.R.B. 638 (1989)). For a discussion of the types of conduct that constitute a ULP, see supra note 6.
291. Teamsters Local Union No. 515 v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 719, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert.
denied sub nom. Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 515, 498 U.S. 1053
(1991); Lapham-Hieckey Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir. 1990); NLRB v.
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Even if an employer can avoid the first "mine" by establishing that the

strike began as an economic strike, the employer still must be circumspect
in its behavior toward the union and employees and avoid committing ULPs
during the strike. Otherwise an employer still may lose the right to hire

permanent replacements, if the economic strike is converted into a ULP
strike. The test applied by the Board and courts to determine whether an
economic strike is converted into a ULP strike is no less ambiguous or

labor-friendly than the test for determining the initial characterization. A
strike is converted if a ULP is a factor-again, not necessarily the principal
or sole factor-in prolonging the strike.29 2 Although it is possible for an
employer to take actions that result in the Board's finding that a strike was
converted from a ULP strike into an economic strike, the standard applied
to such a conversion is even more ambiguous than the foregoing two standards, and the Board and courts have not often found such conversions.2 93
That standard inquires whether the employer has "cured"2'94 the ULP or
otherwise removed it as a cause of prolonging the strike.29 5
Moore Business Forms, Inc., 574 F.2d 835, 840 (5th Cir. 1978). In Northern Wire, the employer
argued that the strike should be classified as an economic strike because the employer had established that the strike would have been called even in the absence of the ULPs. Northern Wire, 887
F.2d. at 1319. The court responded that the test is "whether the employees, in deciding to go on
strike, were motivated in part by the unfair labor practices committed by their employer, not
whether, without that motivation, the employees might have struck for some other reason." Id. at
1319-20.
292. C-Line Express, 292 N.L.R.B. 638, 638 (1989). Although the Board usually states the
conversion standard as whether a ULP "prolongs" a strike, courts of appeals often state the standard as whether a ULP "aggravates or prolongs" a strike. E.g., NLRB v. Champ Corp., 933 F.2d
688, 694 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 416 (1991); NLRB v. Jarm Enters., 785 F.2d 195,204
(7th Cir. 1986); Vulcan Hart Corp. v. NLRB, 718 F.2d 269,275 (8th Cir. 1983). In Champ Corp.,
the Ninth Circuit, amending its earlier opinion, 913 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1990), explained that,
although it had in the past stated the standard as whether a strike "'is expanded to include a
protest over unfair labor practices,"' the circuit follows the "aggravate or prolong" standard.
Champ Corp., 933 F.2d at 694 (citing NLRB v. Top Mfg. Co., 594 F.2d 223, 225 (9th Cir. 1979)).
The variations in statement of the conversion standard do not seem to produce divergent results
because most courts apparently focus on prolongation.
293. General Indus. Employees Union, Local 42 v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (noting that there are fewer cases finding conversions from ULP to economic strikes than
cases finding economic to ULP), enforcing Mohawk Liqueur Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1990).
294. To cure its unlawful conduct and thus relieve itself of liability for ULPs, an employer
must repudiate the conduct, and the repudiation must be "timely," "unambiguous," "specific in
nature to the coercive conduct," "free from other.., illegal conduct," and adequately published to
the employees. Additionally, the employer must accompany the repudiation with assurances that
it will not interfere with the exercise of employees' § 7 rights and thereafter refrain from committing ULPs. Passavant Mem. Area Hosp., 237 N.L.R.B. 138, 138-39 (1978) (quoting Douglas
Division, The Scott & Fetzer Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 1016, 1024 (1977)).
295. Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1289 (1993); Chicago Beef Co., 298
N.L.R.B. 1039, 1040 (1990), enfd mem., 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991). The two foregoing cases
are examples of cases in which employers unsuccessfully argued that the strikes had been converted from ULP strikes into economic strikes. For cases in which employers prevailed on that
argument, see General Indus. Employees Union, Local 42 v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1308, 1313 (D.C.
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In determining whether a ULP is a contributing cause of a strike or
prolongation of a strike, the Board looks to both subjective evidence (how
the striking employees characterize their motivation) and objective evidence (the probable impact that the type of ULP would have on reasonable
strikers).2 96 However, the Board does not even examine the subjective evidence for some ULPs, but simply concludes that these ULPs, by their nature, interrupt or burden the bargaining process.29 7 The Board and some
courts have found that an employer's ULPs were a contributing cause of a
strike when the employees themselves knew little about the ULPs, but simply ratified the recommendation of their union to call a strike.29 8 Generally,
the Board is more likely to conclude that a strike is a ULP strike if it is
called soon after commission of the ULP.29 9 An employer cannot rest assured, however, that the Board or courts will determine that a strike called

long after the employer committed a ULP is not a ULP strike."

°

Some

commentators believe that the Board uses the initial characterization of the
strike and the conversion doctrine to protect the reinstatement rights of employees who have been permanently replaced: 'There is some feeling that

Cir. 1991); Trident Seafoods Corp., 244 N.L.R.B. 566, 569-70 (1979), enforced, 642 F.2d 1148
(9th Cir. 1981).
296. E.g., Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1080 (1st Cir. 1981); C-Line
Express, 292 N.L.R.B. 638, 638 (1989).
297. E.g., C-Line Express, 292 N.L.R.B. at 638. The Board has stated that the "most notable"
of these ULPs, which ipso facto result in characterization of a strike as a ULP strike, is unlawful
withdrawal of recognition of the employees' bargaining representative. Id. For early criticism of
the Board's expansion of per se rules regarding conversion, see Frank H. Stewart, Conversion of
Strikes: Economic to UnfairLabor Practice: 1I, 49 VA. L. REv. 1297 passim (1963).
298. Teamsters Local Union No. 515 v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 719, 725-26 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that evidence was sufficient to show that strike was a ULP strike when the union president
who recommended strike considered employer's insistence on a term in contract unreasonable,
and employees, most of whom did not know the specifics of the employer's bargaining position,
were ratifying motive for strike of union president by voting to strike), cert. denied sub nom.
Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 515, 498 U.S. 1053 (1991); R & H Coal
Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 28, 28 n.5 (1992) ("[E]vidence shows that... employees had little or no role
in the decision to strike... that the [union] controlled the decision whether and when to strike,
and that the [employer's] commission of unfair labor practices was a contributing reason in
reaching that decision.").
299. E.g., Note, The Unfair Labor Practice Strike, supra note 85, at 990 (recognizing the
importance of timing by suggesting that a strike which occurs shortly after a ULP is implemented
is probably a ULP strike, while a strike that occurs long after is probably an economic strike); see
also Bums Motor Freight, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 276, 277 (1980) (stating that timing is significant,
but not dispositive).
300. Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that
strike was ULP strike when employees went out seven-and-one-half months after employer declared impasse and implemented final offer); R & H Coal Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 28, 28 (1992) (holding that strike was ULP strike when called 13 months after employer unilaterally changed terms
and conditions of employment and explaining delay as strategic decision by union).
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when replacements occur, the NLRB may be prone to find some 3employer
directly from Mackay. 01

violation, a warping of the act stemming

Amidst the foregoing body of law, employers attempt to preserve the

option of hiring permanent replacements. To retain this option, employers
must work hard to bargain in good faith with the unions.30 2 Moreover, the
bargaining obligation continues during the strike,30 3 so that an employer

must closely monitor its bargaining conduct during a strike to avoid converting an economic strike into a ULP strike.3 4 Because the causal relationship is nebulous, if an employer commits any ULP, it may find in a
future Board decision that the strike was a ULP strike.30 5 If an employer is

pristine in its conduct toward a union and its employees, or believes it is
clairvoyant, it may predict that the Board will determine, at some time in
the future, that a strike by its employees began as an economic strike and

remained so for its duration. On the basis of that prediction, the employer
may hire permanent replacements and deny the strikers reinstatement when

they submit unconditional offers to return to work. If the employer is
wrong, it will be liable for back pay and other make-whole relief, and that
liability may be quite large.30 6
This potential liability serves as a disincentive to committing ULPs,
particularly during a strike. Yet, the remedies the Board can order for
301. ATLmON, supra note 103, at 31-32; see also Stewart, supra note 297, at 1323 ("The
Board is using the conversion sanction to give the unions an additional advantage in their economic battle with employers; it was meant to remedy unfair labor practices that prolong a
strike.").
302. Ray, supra note 74, at 372-73. Professor Ray discusses the many types of conduct that
may result in the Board's concluding that an employer violated § 8(a)(5) of the Act by failing to
bargain in good faith. Id. at 376-80; see also RAY & BAR=, supra note 12, § 3.03 (discussing
cases distinguishing between lawful "hard bargaining" and unlawful "retaliatory bargaining");
YAGER, supra note 11, at 86-87 (discussing the fine distinction between unlawful "surface bargaining" and lawful "hard bargaining").
303. E.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490-92 (1959); NLRB v.
Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 870 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576, and cert. denied,
304 U.S. 585, reh'g denied, 304 U.S. 590 (1938). The obligation continues until a union is decertified or the employer withdraws recognition and can establish either that the union no longer has
majority status or that the employer has a good faith doubt regarding majority status. For discussion of the difficulty of satisfying the good faith doubt standard, see supra notes 165-69 and
accompanying text.
304. E.g., YAGER, supra note 11, at 88-89.
305. Baird, supra note 11, at 12 ("[B]ecause of the Russian roulette nature of NLRB findings,
[employers] are very careful to avoid any appearance of unfair labor practices."); Golden, supra
note 86, at 73-76 (explaining that employers face dual risks in Board's determination-either that
strike commenced as ULP strike or that economic strike was converted into ULP strike).
306. See supra notes 183-93 and accompanying text. Professor Ray observes that, in light of
potentially large liability, it is difficult for an employer to refuse to reinstate strikers and retain
replacements unless it is sure that nothing it has done could have been a contributing cause of a
ULP strike. Ray, supra note 74, at 375.
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ULPs, other than back pay, are far from intimidating to employers.3 0 7 For
an employer's refusal to uphold its statutory duty to bargain in good faith,
the most onerous remedy that the Board can impose is ordering the employer to cease and desist from refusing to bargain.30 8 Thus, the distinction
between employers' rights to hire replacements depending on the characterization of the strike is the most effective deterrent against employers' committing ULPs.3 °9 If the distinction were removed by the overruling of
Mackay, employers would have far less incentive to bargain in good faith
with unions and otherwise avoid committing ULPs 31 0 Consequently, labor
law without Mackay might witness a more severe weakening of organized
labor than labor law with Mackay ever has.3 1 '
B.

The Option to Hire Permanent Replacements During Economic
Strikes-A Market Check on the Parties'Estimations of the
Value of the Labor Force
Some commentators argue that that employer's option to hire perma-

307. See, e.g., Ray, supra note 74, at 380 (asserting that Board's remedies for an employer's
failure to bargain in good faith are weak).
308. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988); Ray, supra note 74, at 372.
309. See Ray, supra note 74, at 365.
310. See id. at 381.; Baird, supra note 11, at 12. One response to this is that the NLRA should
be amended to provide for more effective remedies, such as punitive monetary awards. Given the
ongoing battle over striker replacement legislation, it is reasonable to predict that an amendment
providing for more onerous remedies under the Act is unlikely to be enacted. Indeed, this prediction is supported by the failure of the Labor Reform Act of 1977. S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978); H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Section 8 of that proposed legislation would
have provided for several harsher remedies: a ban, up to a maximum of three years, on government contracts for employers that willfully violated a Board order or court decree enforcing a
Board order, double back pay for employees unlawfully discharged during union organizing campaigns or during the period from recognition of the union until a first collective bargaining agreement is reached; and compensation for employees whose employer violates its bargaining duty
regarding a first contract. Section 9 would have made preliminary injunctions under § 10(1) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1988), applicable to discharges during organizing campaigns or during the period from recognition of a union until the parties enter into a first collective bargaining
agreement. The House passed the bill on October 6, 1977. 123 CONG. REc. 32,613 (1977). The
Senate bill died on the Senate floor due to filibuster. 124 CONG. REc. 18,398, 18,400 (1978).
311. One commentator speculates that a possible unintended consequence of overturning Mackay is that employers may consider locking out employees more often, rather than waiting for a
strike, when the parties cannot achieve a collective bargaining agreement. Peter G. Nash, Getting
Preparedfor the Coming Labor and Employment Law Changesin the 1990s, in THE SOuTHwESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, PROCEEDINoS OF THE TnmRTY-EIoGHm ANNUAL INsTrrUM ON LABOR
LAw DEvELoPMENTs §§ 4.05[2]-[4] (1992). One advantage of a lockout over a strike, from an
employer's perspective, is that the employer chooses the timing of a lockout. Id. § 4.05[3]. On
the other hand, a disadvantage of lockouts is that employers are permitted to hire only temporary
replacements. Harter Equip., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 597, 600 (1986), review denied, Local 825, Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 829 F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1987). If employers were absolutely
prohibited from hiring permanent replacements during all strikes, a relative disadvantage of the
lockout would be removed, and more employers might choose to lock out employees. Nash,
supra, § 4.05[3].
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nent replacements during economic strikes produces efficient results by
subjecting the bargaining demands of the parties to the market. 312 This
market check should be available when a strike is called solely to pressure
an employer to accede to the union's (and employees') economic demands. 3 13 The question presented to the market is whether the employer or

labor is more accurate in its estimation of the value of the labor force.314
An employer can seek alternative sources of labor willing to work for the
wages it is willing to pay, and the employees can seek alternative sources of
employment willing to pay the wages for which they are willing to work.3 15
The offer that an employer can safely make to replacements is the compensation package that the striking employees had or the one offered to the
union in bargaining. An employer that offers replacements better terms
than those offered the striking employees, or those offered to the union and
bargained to impasse, risks committing a ULP.316 Thus, if the employer
can attract permanent replacements sufficient in both quantity and quality,
312. Nash & Mook, supra note 86, at 319; see also Dolan, supra note 86, at 316 (stating that
relationship mirrors the marketplace); Westfall, supra note 12, at 146 (explaining that Mackay
doctrine allows parties to test market); cf. Estreicher, supra note 11, at 287 (positing that employer's attempt to withstand strike imparts information to parties about their positions and their
relative bargaining power).
313. One may object to the market check function of the Mackay doctrine based on the belief
that a purpose of the NLRA was to remove wages of organized workers from market checks. This
theory regarding the Act posits that the Act imposes a labor law regime that cartelizes labor
markets. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, in LABOR LAW AND THE
EMPLOYmENT MiARKET: FoUNDArIONS AND APPLICATIONS 44, 55, 65-67 (Richard A. Epstein &
Jeffrey Paul eds., 1985) (noting, however, that the Act has not been interpreted as fostering cartelization to the fullest extent). Many commentators contend, however, that insulating collective
bargaining and union demands from the market was not a purpose of the Act. See, e.g., Cohen &
Wachter, supra note 86, at 125 (asserting that the NLRA does not seek to insulate unions from
nonunion competition in external market); Estreicher, supra note 11, at 287 ("[W]hile the law
permits a collectivization of the employees' bargaining position, it does not displace market mechanisms for the pricing of goods and services."); Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 678 (stating
that collective bargaining enables employees to demand market value for labor); William J. Ryan,
Recent Development, LaborLaw: Rights ofStriking Employees-Trans World Airlines v. Indep.
Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 12 HIARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1098, 1106 (1989) (approving Court's
decision for not interpreting NLRA and Railway Labor Act as insulating unions from economic
risks of striking).
A second basis on which one may object to the market check is that, even if labor law does
not remove wages of organized labor from market competition, it should do so. See LeRoy, supra
note 84, at 304-06 (recognizing that the striker replacement paradigm since passage of the NLRA
has been one of combination, but advocating movement to cartelization paradigm).
314. See Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 680 ("Strikes occur when, because of informational deficiencies, labor and management differ in their estimations of what the labor force is
actually worth. Strikes are the tools envisioned by the Act to test the market and decide which
estimate is, in fact, correct.") (footnote omitted); see also Nash & Mook, supra note 86, at 319
(asserting that "free play of economic forces" determines results of strikes).
315. Westfall, supra note 12, at 146.
316. See RAY & BARTLE, supra note 12, § 3.09. Judge Posner observes that if an employer
were allowed to offer replacements a high enough wage, above the level paid to the striking

1994]

PERMANENT STRIKER REPLACEMENTS

the demands of the union are supracompetitive, and acceding to them probably would produce an inefficient result.317 Prohibiting employers from
hiring permanent replacements during economic strikes consequently would
remove, or at least significantly reduce, the market check and substantially
cartelize labor markets.
The banning of permanent replacements would not appear to affect the
market check on labor's demands because the employer would retain the
option of hiring temporary replacements. The substitute labor pool, however, could be affected; consequently, the market test could be skewed.
Professor LeRoy describes the effect on the labor pool from which the employer could hire temporary replacements: "[Iln theory employers would
be free to hire from the same pool of substitute labor as before, because the
law would place no express limitation on that labor pool. In practice, however, the legal prohibition against hiring permanent striker replacements
would sharply limit the substitute labor pool."3 1 Professor LeRoy offers,
as an example, the responses Caterpillar received to its advertisements for
striker replacements. Many of those responding were willing to relocate in
order to accept permanent positions, and, according to anecdotal accounts,
many were employed in other jobs at the time they responded.3 19 Professor
LeRoy reasonably infers that many employed persons who would have accepted a permanent position, would not have quit their jobs to take a temporary position.3 20 Thus, he posits that, if an employer were limited to hiring
temporary employees, its labor pool would be reduced to local unemployed
" ' That may be an overstatement; even employed perpeople and strikers.32
sons might accept temporary positions if the compensation far exceeded
that of their current jobs.32 2 Nonetheless, Professor LeRoy is correct that

employees, then it would not be necessary to offer "permanent" jobs to attract a sufficient number
of replacements. Posner, supra note 313, at 53.
317. Nash & Mook, supra note 86, at 319; Note, One Strike, supranote 85, at 681; cf. Cohen
& Wachter, supra note 86, at 119-20 (asserting that if union struck to obtain or preserve monopoly
wage premium, employer would be able to attract sufficient replacements).
318. LeRoy, supra note 84, at 305; see also Schatzki, supra note 11, at 384 (recognizing that,
without Mackay, employer would have less flexibility in hiring replacements because many would
not leave jobs for positions they would lose at end of strike).
319. LeRoy, supra note 84, at 305.

320. Id.
321. Id. That substitute labor pool may be limited even further because some local unemployed persons may not be willing to cross picket lines and suffer, at a minimum, verbal abuse and
sometimes even physical violence. LeRoy, supra note 276, at 849; Posner, supra note 313, at 54.
322. Cf. Posner, supra note 313, at 53 (stating that if employers could offer high enough
wages to replacements, promises of permanent status would not be necessary to attract
replacements).
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struck employers would encounter a different substitute labor pool (than
3 23
under current law) if they were limited to offering temporary positions.
Professor LeRoy, who advocates the overruling of MacKay and the
cartelization of labor, concludes that employers requiring skilled workers
would be unable to operate during strikes if they were limited to hiring
temporary replacements .3 This conclusion may exaggerate the effects of
overturning Mackay on most employers. However, Professor LeRoy's argument regarding the diminution of substitute labor pools does demonstrate
that, at a minimum, the market check on labor's demands would be substantially diluted.
Although an employer's ability to operate during a strike and the mar-

ket test of the value of labor are related issues, 32 they are not identical. An
employer that offers temporary positions is offering substantially different
jobs than those occupied by the striking employees. The employer, conse-

quently, is not subjecting its estimation of the value of its labor force to the
market test because a reduced labor pool is considering those offers. An
323. It is difficult to know how much limiting an employer to offering temporary positions
(meaning, of course, positions limited to the duration of the strike) would actually alter the substitute labor pool available to the employer. Professor Weiler points out that the best offer that an
employer can make to replacements is that it may be able to retain them beyond the duration of
the strike. Weiler, supra note 3, at 392. The employer cannot promise longer employment because the Board may determine the strike was a ULP strike, or the employer may settle the strike
with the union under an agreement requiring reinstatement of the strikers-with discharge of
replacements if necessary. Id. Thus, Professor Weiler questions how much of a recruiting advantage an employer derives from being able to offer "permanent" status to replacements. Id.
This is a difficult question because the answer depends, at least in part, on what the employer
says in its advertisement of the replacement positions and what the potential applicants understand
from the employer's statements. Some employers will have replacements sign forms using the
language from Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 503 (1983), see supra note 206, to create
conditional permanent status and to avoid civil liability if they discharge the replacements. For
example, Ravenswood Aluminum had its permanent replacements sign such forms. See supra
note 217. Such language, seemingly, would advise applicants of the precarious nature of the jobs
and reduce the substitute pool to roughly the same group that would apply for temporary positions. As Professor Westfall suggests, however, potential replacements may make a material distinction between positions that are certain to end when a strike ends and those that have "the
potential for permanency and will not automatically cease when the strike ends." Westfall, supra
note 12, at 150. Moreover, all employers do not use the Belknap language, even when they
apparently intend to do so. See supra text accompanying notes 210-15. Some employers do not
even attempt to equivocate regarding permanent status. Caterpillar, for example, ran advertisements in newspapers for "'permanent employees to replace non-returning striking workers."'
Dine, supra note 54; Franklin, supra note 54. As discussed above, Caterpillar reported that it was
inundated with calls regarding the jobs, and many, according to accounts, were persons employed
in other jobs. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. Thus, the variance between the substitute labor pool available when an employer advertises for temporary replacements and that available when it advertises for permanent replacements may depend, in part, on the extent to which
the employer dilutes the "permanent' status with qualifiers.
324. LeRoy, supra note 84, at 305-06.
325. Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 679-80.
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employer may choose not to hire from this pool, deeming the applicants to
be underqualified. Alternatively, an employer may choose to hire from this
pool rather than cease operations during the strike. Notwithstanding its
ability to hire temporary replacements from this underqualified pool, an employer may still find it necessary to accede to supracompetitive demands of
the union, rather than maintain its bargaining position, because it is unwilling to operate with an inferior substitute labor force for an extended period

of time. An employer's bargaining position may consist of terms that
would have attracted qualified replacements, which would have enabled the
employer to stand its ground on its bargaining position if it had been permitted to offer permanent status. To apply a market test accurately to the
conflicting bargaining positions, an employer must be allowed to offer its
estimation of labor's value, including jobs not limited to the duration of the
strike.

32 6

What would be the consequences of removing or diluting the market
check on labor's demands by banning the hiring of permanent replacements? As Professor LeRoy predicts, striking employees would exercise
substantial cartel power in relation to their employers. 32 7 The extreme prediction is that employees would strike often and would do so no matter how
exorbitant their demands.3 28 This argument goes too far.3 29 Even if the
employees could not be permanently replaced for engaging in economic

strikes, they would not strike routinely because they would suffer loss of
their regular paychecks and benefits while striking.3 30
It is reasonable to predict, however, that without the possibility of permanent replacement, unions would, at least, be quicker to call strikes. 33 1 To

avoid such strikes and the possibly more difficult (and in some cases impos326. See Nash & Mook, supra note 86, at 319 (arguing that, if employers are prohibited from
hiring permanent replacements, market forces will not operate freely to determine outcome of
disputes).
327. LeRoy, supra note 84, at 305.
328. Cf Westfall, supra note 12, at 146 (noting that employees could do so without risk of
losing their jobs).
329. This prediction of dire consequences from the pro-Mackay camp is similar in its hyperbole to the anti-Mackay camp's description of the effect of the current law-that employers will
not bargain in good faith because they can oust unions by hiring permanent replacements. Of
course, most employers do not ignore their duty to bargain in good faith because they would
commit a ULP. See supra Part V.A. As a consequence, they would have no right to hire permanent replacements and could be subject to substantial make-whole relief if they hired them anyway and refused to reinstate ULP strikers. See supra Part II.C.3.
330. E.g., Pollitt, supra note 11, at 310; see also WEER, supra note 84, at 129 (describing
strike as "two-edged sword" inflicting costs on both employers and employees).
331. Dolan, supra note 86, at 317. Employees generally are not "strike happy," and most
realize that their economic welfare is interwoven with that of their employer. Kamiat, supranote
84, at 43; Pollitt, supra note 11, at 310. It does not necessarily follow, however, that such realization will always provide the needed check on excessive demands and accompanying strikes.
Westfall, supra note 12, at 147.
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sible) task of hiring temporary replacements, more employers might abandon their bargaining positions and agree to unions' demands, even if the
demands are supracompetitive. 32 In the extreme, such results would cause
some employers to curtail operations, relocate assets, or perhaps eventually
go out of business 333 -harming employer and employees, 334 the community, and consumers.3 35
V.

PROPOSALS FOR MODIFYING THE MfACKAY DOCTRIE-PssIBILunES
AND PROBLEMS

There have been numerous proposals to modify the Mackay doctrine.
Many of them were born or resurrected in response to Congress's several
attempts to abrogate Mackay. This section discusses the different types of

proposals and explains the reasons why each inadequately addresses the
interests of the parties to a labor dispute.
A.

ProposalsThat Would Make It an Unfair Labor Practicefor an
Employer to Hire or Threaten to Hire Permanent Replacements
Unless It Can Prove Business Necessity

A few proposals of this variety appear in academic writings.336 One
such proposal would apply a modified version of the test of NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers,Inc. 3 3 7 to the hiring of replacements. 331 Under this proposal,

an employer would commit a ULP by hiring permanent replacements unless
it could bear the burden of proving that it was motivated by business neces332. See Nash & Mook, supra note 86, at 319-20; Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 681.
333. Nash & Mook, supra note 86, at 319-20; Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 682.
334. Nash & Mook, supra note 86, at 319; Note, One Strike, supra ilote 85, at 682 (arguing
that the burden of inefficiency ultimately is borne by employees).
335. Estreicher, supra note 11, at 288 ("[Mlanagement usually represents consumer welfare
[at the bargaining table].").
336. E.g., Gillespie, supra note 85, at 795-97; McDonald, supra note 16, at 991-94; Note, One
Strike, supra note 85, at 682-83. Professor Weiler would require such a showing at a minimum.
Weiler, supra note 3, at 391.
337. 388 U.S. 26 (1967). In Great Dane Trailers, the Court distinguished between an employer's discriminatory conduct that is "'inherently destructive"' of important employee rights,
and that which has a "'comparatively slight"' effect on employee rights. Id. at 33-34 (quoting
NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287, 289 (1965)). In cases involving both types of conduct, the
Court placed the burden of proving "that he was motivated by legitimate [business] objectives"
on the employer. Id. at 34. In cases involving "inherently destructive conduct," the plaintiff is not
required to prove antiunion animus, and the employer can be held liable for a ULP even if the
employer proves a business justification. Id. In cases involving conduct having a "comparatively
slight" impact, the plaintiff must prove antiunion motivation if the employer proves a "legitimate
and substantial" business justification. Id.
338. Gillespie, supra note 85, at 795-97. Under this version of the Great Dane Trailers test,
the hiring of temporary replacements would be categorized as having a "comparatively slight"
adverse effect on employees' rights. Id. at 795. The hiring of permanent replacements would be
categorized as having an "inherently destructive" effect. Id. at 796.
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sity-essentially, that there were no alternative methods of continuing its
operations and protecting its business. 339 Another proposal would make it
a ULP for an employer to hire permanent replacements unless it could satisfy the burden of proving that it could not hire a sufficient quantity and
quality of temporary replacements.3 40 These proposals are similar, but the
first type is more stringent from the employer's perspective; it defines "alternatives" more broadly than the second and thus narrows the circumstances under which an employer may hire permanent replacements.
One criticism of these proposals is that they add to the already vague
and difficult inquiries used to determine the type of strike and corresponding reinstatement rights of the strikers.3 4 ' Employers know only too well
that Board doctrine changes-and perhaps more importantly, Board membership changes-over time.342 Because of the time delay between the filing of a ULP charge and a final decision by the Board,3 43 an employer that
made offers of permanent status to replacements, believing that it could
satisfy the business necessity test as applied by the Board at that time, may
find its chances diminished by the time the Board decides the case.3 1 If the
employer's prediction is incorrect, it must pay potentially large sums of
345
back pay and other make-whole relief.
My principal objection to this type of proposal is that it relieves no
uncertainty regarding the rights of the parties at the critical moment-when
the employer either declares that it will hire permanent replacements or
actually begins doing so. Indeed, as other commentators have suggested,3 46
this type of proposal adds one more uncertainty: employer, employees,
union, and replacements must guess not only how the Board will characterize the strike, but also whether the Board will find that the employer has
satisfied the business necessity test. What is needed in this area of the law
is more certainty, not less.
339. Id. The proposal would not impose the full force of the Great Dane Trailers test on an
employer hiring permanent replacements, in that the Board would not be free to impose liability
even if the employer succeeded in proving business necessity. Id.
340. McDonald, supra note 16, at 992; Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 682-83.
341. Westfall, supra note 12, at 147-48 (contending that a business necessity test would raise a
"host of factual issues" and expose employers to potentially huge liability); Zifchak, supra note
86, at 65 (arguing that a business necessity test would impose another level of litigation). But see
Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 684-85 (arguing that Westfall overstates the complexity of the
inquiry and ignores that a similar inquiry is currently required in the context of sympathy strikes).
For discussion of the difficult inquiries under the current state of the law regarding classification
of the type of strike, see supra text accompanying notes 289-301.
342. Westfall, supra note 12, at 148.
343. Zifchak, supra note 86, at 65-66; see also supra note 92.
344. Westfall, supra note 12, at 148.
345. See supra notes 183-93 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 341.
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ProposalsThat Would Prohibit an Employer from Hiring Permanent

Replacements if the Union Agrees to Submit the Parties'
BargainingDifferences to Fact Finding

Senator Packwood's substitute amendment to S. 55, which was introduced in 1992 after the bill banning the hiring of permanent replacements

failed on a first cloture vote, prohibited an employer from hiring permanent
replacements under specific circumstances. 347 To activate the prohibition, a
union, seven days before striking, would be required to notify both the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the employer that it agrees to
the formation of a three-member fact-finding panel.34 8 If the employer did
not agree to formation of the panel, the union would be permitted to strike,
and the employer would be prohibited from hiring permanent replacements.
If the employer agreed to formation of the panel, the collective bargaining
agreement would remain in force and the status quo (including no strike and
no hiring of permanent replacements) would be maintained for forty-five
days, while the panel met to conduct fact finding and recommend resolutions of disputes between the parties. If the union accepted the panel's recommendations and the employer rejected them, the union could strike and
the employer would be prohibited from hiring permanent replacements. If

neither party agreed or only the employer agreed to accept the panel's recommendations, then the employer would be allowed to hire permanent
replacements.3 4 9
Labor leaders declared their support for the Packwood amendment
before the second cloture vote in the Senate.3 50 Management representa347. 138 CONG. REc. S8056-89 (daily ed. June 11, 1992) (amendments 2047-94 submitted by
Sen. Packwood); Statements and Summaries of Amendment to S. 55 by Sen. Bob Packwood and
AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland,Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 114, at E-1 (June 12, 1992); Ray,
supra note 74, at 370-71. Although Senator Packwood labeled the amendment a compromise on
the striker replacement bill, John Irving and other members of a panel assembled by the Alliance
to Keep Americans Working stated that the label was a misnomer, since no one in the business
community was consulted. Business Representatives Oppose Packwood Amendment to Striker
Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 116, at A-12 (June 16, 1992).
348. The panel would consist of one member chosen by the union, one chosen by the employer, and one jointly chosen. 138 CONG. REc. S8057 (daily ed. June 11, 1992) (amendment
2047 submitted by Sen. Packwood); Statements and Summaries of Amendment to S. 55 by Sen.
Bob Packwood and AFL-CIO PresidentLane Kirkland, supra note 347, at E-I.
349. 138 CONG. REc. S8056-89 (daily ed. June 11, 1992) (amendments 2047-94 submitted by
Sen. Packwood); Statements and Summaries of Amendment to S. 55 by Sen. Bob Packwood and
AFL-CIO PresidentLane Kirkland, supra note 347; Ray, supra note 74, at 370-71.
350. Statements and Summaries ofAmendment to S. 55 by Sen. Bob Packwood and AFL-CIO
PresidentLane Kirkland,supra note 347, at E-1. Although labor leaders supported the Packwood
amendment in 1992, they may not be willing to support such compromise legislation in the future.
Addressing the AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department's nineteenth constitutional convention, International Brotherhood of Teamsters President Ron Carey said his union would reject any such
compromise. Kirkland Lauds Clinton on Issues Vital to Labor, But Rejects NAFTA, Daily Lab,
Rep. (BNA) No. 56, at A-11 (Mar. 25, 1993). Carey described the Packwood amendment as
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fives, in contrast, announced their opposition to the Packwood amendment
for a couple of reasons. 35 ' First, the proposal would reduce the incentive
for the parties to work hard at collective bargaining and to reach agreement,
knowing that the panel eventually would resolve the dispute.3 52 Second,
the Packwood proposal would undermine the principle that labor-management disputes should be settled by the parties to the dispute.35 3
Management's first objection may be an accurate prediction of the ef-

fect of the proposed law. The concern is that the parties would become
overdependent on the fact-finding process to resolve their disputes. 354 Evidence concerning this "narcotic effect" of fact finding suggests that, over
time, parties do rely more on the fact-finding process rather than settling
their own disputes.3 55 An additional reason that fact finding might detract
from constructive collective bargaining between the parties-resulting in
overuse of the procedure-is described as the "chilling effect" of fact find-

ing; parties may become wary of making their best offers in negotiations
prior to third-party intervention because they believe that the third party
35 6
will recommend a resolution between the stated positions of the parties.
Regardless of whether the intervention of third-party fact finders
would have the foregoing effects on collective bargaining, management's
second rationale for opposing the Packwood proposal is stronger. Adjustment of the Mackay doctrine does not require infringement upon a basic

"tak[ing] the right to strike and put[ting] the faith of the members in the hands of government."
Id. UAW Secretary-Treasurer Bill Casstevens echoed Carey's opposition days later while addressing the same convention, saying Democrats made "a mistake" supporting the amendment in
1992. Unions See Striker ReplacementBill as Beginning of Wider Labor Law Reform, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 221, at A-2 (Nov. 16, 1992). Casstevens said the labor movement should make it
clear that it will accept nothing less in the 103d Congress than an absolute ban on the hiring of
permanent replacements. Id.
351. Business Representatives Oppose Packwood Amendment to Striker Bill, supra note 347.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. A variation on the Packwood proposal seeks to give the parties incentive to reach an
agreement themselves, rather than relying on third-party intervention. Roukis & Farid, supra note
85, at 89-90. That proposal would require the parties to submit their unresolved issues to advisory
arbitration when a strike or lockout occurred. Id. at 89. The incentive to avoid resort to arbitration is that mild monetary sanctions would be levied against the parties at the commencement of
the hearings-a portion of the employees' wages and the employer's profits or cash flow. Id. at
90. The funds would be placed in an interest-earning account and returned if the parties reached
an agreement. Id. If the parties did not reach an agreement as a result of the hearings, they could
resort to self help (strike and permanent replacement), but a portion of the trust fund would not be
returned. Id.
355. THOMAS A. KocHAN & HARRY C. KAT, CoLLECnIvE BARGAINING AND INDuSTRIAL RELAriONs 282 (2d ed. 1988).

356. Id. at 280.
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Although the Packwood amendment

would not require the parties to accept the panel's recommendations, it
would create strong incentives to accept them. Such a law would represent
a movement toward writing the contract, or at least some of its terms, for
the parties.3 58
C. ProposalsThat Would Prohibitan Employer from Hiring or
Threatening to Hire Permanent Replacements During a
"Cooling-Off' Periodfor the FirstEight to Ten Weeks of
a Strike
Proposals to prohibit an employer from hiring or threatening to hire
permanent replacements during a cooling-off period have enjoyed some
support in both legislative 59 and academic 360 forums. Proponents of this
type of proposal argue that the cooling-off period provides the employees

with job security, while the parties attempt to reach an agreement pursuant
to their duty to bargain in good faith.3 6 ' Such a proposal does not go far
enough, however, to alleviate the risks to the parties, and indeed may not
have any effect on many strike-and-replacement situations. In many strike

situations, employers do not resort to permanent replacements until the
strike has lasted for a few months.

Consider, for example, the

357. Cf. YAGER, supra note 11, at 141-43 (arguing that third-party resolution of disputes is
inconsistent with an underlying premise of collective bargaining). The bargaining obligation imposed on the parties by the NLRA is stated as follows:
mo bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer
and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a
written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession.
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
358. The Supreme Court has held that the Board does not have the power to order that a party
agree to a term in a collective bargaining agreement. H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99,
108 (1970). A proposal like the Packwood amendment would give a party outside the collective
bargaining process considerable input in writing terms of the contract for the parties.
359. H.R. 4552, introduced by Representative Joseph Brennan in 1988, would have prohibited
employers from hiring permanent replacements for the first ten weeks of a strike. H.R. 4552,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). In the 103d Congress, the ten-week prohibition was included in a
proposal by Representative Tom Ridge as a substitute amendment to H.R. 5 in June 1993. 139
CONG. REC. H3560 (daily ed. June 15, 1993); House Approves Bill That Would Ban Permanent
Replacement of Economic Strikers,supra note 79. The House defeated the proposed amendment,
139 CONG. REc. H3567-68 (daily ed. June 15, 1993). In the 102d Congress, an eight-week ban
was included in a substitute amendment to H.R. 5 introduced by Representative Goodling. 137
CONG. REc. H5565 (daily ed. July 17, 1991).
360. Ray, supra note 74, at 399400.
361. Id. at 400; House Panel Considers Bill to Limit Right to Permanently Replace Strikers,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 136, at A-8 (July 15, 1988).
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UAW-Caterpillar dispute, during which Caterpillar did not announce its decision to hire permanent replacements until the strike had lasted more than

five months. The cooling-off period would not appear to have much effect
on such situations. If an employer weathers the designated period, this pro-

posal leaves it free to hire permanent replacements.262
The cooling-off period may have negative effects other than mere ineffectiveness. First, there is a substantial chance that either or both of the

parties will abuse the cooling-off period. An employer may bargain during
that period without attempting to reach an agreement because, in the end, it
can still threaten, and perhaps implement, permanent replacement. Second,
when agreements are not achieved during that period, unions may file a
greater number of section 8(a)(5) ULP charges, alleging that the employer
engaged in surface bargaining or otherwise failed to bargain in good faith.
Thus, unions may use the cooling-off period as a shield to protect the reinstatement rights of employees3 63 and as a sword to gain bargaining
leverage. 3 4
The parties may reach an agreement during the cooling-off period, and

they may not. If not, the employer still may declare that it will hire permanent replacements, and the union may respond by filing ULP charges and
arguing that the strike is a ULP strike. Then the parties are back in the
same position as they would be under current law, with no one-not the
employer, the union, the striking employees, or potential replacementsknowing at that crucial time whether the law allows the employer to hire

permanent replacements.
362. YAGER, supra note 11, at 140 (arguing that employers would simply begin hiring permanent replacements with the same consequences to strikers as now exist under Mackay). Yager
also argues that the cooling-off period would seriously harm many businesses because temporary
replacements cannot be hired in most situations. Id. at 139-41. Although there undoubtedly are
businesses for which that is true (Yager gives as examples businesses that have particular times of
the year during which they conduct a disproportionate percentage of their annual business, such as
ski resorts and department stores), the problem is overstated. For further discussion of this issue,
see infra Part VI.B.3.
363. Cf. ATLEoSN, supra note 103, at 28 n.29 ("Many 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain cases ... are
fought to protect the status of replaced strikers rather than for the often minimal vindicatory value
of a cease-and-desist order.").
364. Similarly, it has been suggested that unions increasingly have used information requests
as a basis for unfair labor practices charges and for establishing the characterization of strikes as
ULP strikes. Clifford R. Oviatt, Jr., Recent Developments at the NationalLabor Relations Board,
22 STErsoN L. REv. 115, 121 (1992).
As it has become more difficult for unions to mount a successful economic strike, unions have turned to other forms of gaining bargaining leverage. One of these is to make
extdnsive information requests that, if not satisfied by the employer, result in the union's
filing unfair labor practice charges. Thus, the information request is not only a means of
understanding the other side's bargaining position and ferreting out all its nuances, but
is increasingly becoming a tactical weapon ....
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It is certainly possible that constructive bargaining and a significant
number of agreements would result from the cooling-off period. But this
type of proposal invites opportunistic behavior by the parties and does not
provide a means for the parties to ascertain, in time, the one piece of information they need-the type of strike in which the employees are engaging
and the corresponding reinstatement rights of the strikers and replacement
rights of the employer.
D. Proposalsfor Expedited Hearings and Board Decisions When an
Employer Hires PermanentReplacements or When There Is a
Strike
One legislative proposal and at least one academic proposal call for
expedited decisions when an employer hires permanent replacements or
when there is a strike. Senator Durenberger introduced the Justice for Permanently Displaced Striking Workers Act of 1993365 ("Justice Act") in the
Senate on March 17.366 Although the bill does not expressly purport to be a
compromise on the permanent replacement issue, it offers some possibility
for reaching a compromise. The bill proposes amending the NLRA to require expedited ULP proceedings when "a collective bargaining agreement
has expired and a person alleges that a party to a collective bargaining
agreement has failed to negotiate in good faith as required by the Act, and
where permanent replacements have been hired. 36 7 The Justice Act proposes expedited proceedings under the foregoing circumstances. First, an
administrative law judge (AL) has sixty days from the issuance of a complaint within which to hold a hearing; the ALJ then has sixty days from the
conclusion of the hearing within which to render a decision. 368 At that
point, the parties have thirty days to file exceptions and briefs with the
Board, and the opposing parties have fifteen days to file responsive
briefs. 369 Finally, the Board has ninety days from the filing of briefs to
render a decision and an additional thirty days if oral argument is
granted.37 ° The parties may mutually agree to extensions of these time
periods. 3 7 '
The Justice Act is important, regardless of the practicability of its
mechanics or the sufficiency of its attempt to address the risks created by
the permanent replacement of strikers. It recognizes and seeks to address
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

S. 598, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
139 CONG. REc. S3044-46 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1993).
S. 598, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(a)(2), 139 CONG. REc. S3046 (1993).
Id. § 3(b)(1), 139 CONG. Rc. at S3046.
Id. § 3(b)(2), 139 CONG. REc. at S3046.
Id. § 3(b)(3), 139 CoNG. Rac. at S3046.
Id. § 3(b)(4), 139 CONG. REc. at S3046.
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the critical problem-that delay in the adjudication of ULP charges renders
the current system ineffective.37 2 Others have sounded the message that
delay in enforcement of the NLRA results in ineffective remedies and encourages disregard for the law.37 3 The Justice Act purports, by speeding up
the determination of the strike's characterization, to benefit both permanently replaced strikers and employers who have hired permanent replacements: striking employees get reinstatement and make-whole relief and the
employer avoids further accrual of back pay liability if the strike is a ULP
strike. This is a laudable objective, but the Justice Act does not fully address the problems raised by permanent replacement.
A principal defect of the proposal, from the perspective of adjusting
the Mackay doctrine, is that it leaves the threat of permanent replacement in
the hands of employers as a strike-breaking weapon. What effect would the
Justice Act have had on the UAW-Caterpillar dispute? When Caterpillar
issued its ultimatum that it would hire permanent replacements if the strikers did not return to work, would the act have enabled the UAW to maintain
the strike? That seems unlikely. The UAW could have told its striking
members that it considered the strike a ULP strike, and if the Board agreed,
under the Justice Act, the employees would get their jobs back and receive
back pay more quickly. Would the employees have been willing to stay on
strike under those conditions? Probably not. Thus, the threat of permanent
replacement would still serve as the trump card to break a strike because the
employees risking their jobs would not know their reinstatement rights at
the critical moment.
A second proposal that calls for expedited ULP proceedings involves
amending section 10(l)"74 to require priority investigation of charges alleging certain ULPs when either a strike is in progress or a union has given
formal authorization for a strike.37 5 Under the proposed amendment, a field
examiner would conduct an investigation when such a charge is filed, and if
the Board found reasonable cause to believe that a "flagrant" ULP had occurred, it would petition a federal court for temporary injunctive relief, as
currently mandated by section 10(1) for certain alleged union ULPs. 376 If
372. 139 CONG. REc. S3045 (statement of Senator Durenberger asserting that NLRB takes too

long to vindicate rights of ULP strikers).
373. E.g., Zifchak, supra note 86, at 69; Charles J. Morris, Renaissanceat the NLRB-Opportunity and Prospectfor Non-Legislative ProceduralReform at the Labor Board, 23 STErSON L.
REv. 101, 107 (1993) (asserting that delay renders the Board a "paper tiger" in the view of
employers).
374. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1988).
375. Note, The Unfair Labor Practice Strike, supra note 85, at 1007-11.

376. Id. at 1009. Section 10(1) currently requires an officer or regional attorney to petition for
"appropriate injunctive relief' pending final adjudication by the Board if, after the investigation,
the agent has reasonable cause to believe that one of the following ULPs has been committed by a
union: secondary activity violating § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1988); hot cargo agreements
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an injunction against the employer's conduct were obtained, the employees
still would strike at their own risk with none of the protections accorded to
ULP strikers, since the Board would give priority to its final determination. 37
If the Board did not find reasonable cause to believe a flagrant
ULP had been committed, then, the proposal suggests, the employees
"might be accorded the safeguards presently accruing to unfair labor prac3 78
tice strikers."
The foregoing proposal is significant for its combination of expedited
proceedings with resort to some type of prohibition of the employer's unlawful activities. Nonetheless, it poses several problems. The principal
problem is the set of conditions triggering both the expedited proceedings
and the Board's efforts to obtain an injunction. The trigger is a strike situation when a flagrant ULP has been alleged. Rather than tolerating the
now-existing uncertainty regarding reinstatement rights, unions presumably
would invoke this procedure any time they wished to strike and reasonably
could claim that a "flagrant" ULP had occurred. Although the proponent of
this proposal acknowledges that it could involve considerable cost,3 79 it is
more accurate to predict that the cost would be prohibitive because unions
would be well advised to make use of the expedited proceedings whenever
they could do so. The second problem with this proposal is that unions
would strongly oppose the subjection of employees to permanent replacement if they struck after the Board determined that there was probable
cause to believe that the employer had committed a flagrant ULP. It would
be naive to suggest that most ULP strikes are conducted for the sole purpose of protesting the employer's ULPs, and that a strike would not be
needed under this proposal because the Board would expeditiously resolve
the ULP charge. The overwhelming majority of strikes also have economic
motivations,38 and the employees and union derive added bargaining leverage if the superior reinstatement rights of ULP strikers provide the strikers
with some measure of job security. Yet another problem with this proposal
is that employers would be equally dismayed with it because, if the Board
concluded that there was no reasonable cause to believe that a flagrant ULP
had been committed, the employees would be protected as ULP strikers if
they chose to strike. Notwithstanding these problems, this proposal suggests a couple of features that should be included in an adjustment of Macviolating § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1988); or recognitional picketing violating § 8(b)(7), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1988).
377. Note, The Unfair Labor PracticeStrike, supra note 85, at 1010.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. E.g., Stewart, supra note 1, at 1326 ("[A] llstrikes emerge from economic strife between
union and employer, and every strike is designed to make the employer give what he would not
otherwise concede.").
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kay: expedited proceedings and a prohibition of permanent replacement
until the characterization of the strike is determined.
Although he does not propose a legislative amendment limiting Mackay, one commentator offers another alternative involving expedited proceedings. He suggests that the Board, using its discretionary power to seek
injunctions under section 10(j) 3 s ' of the Act, could have employers enjoined from hiring permanent replacements after a complaint is issued when
an employer has engaged in flagrant bad faith bargaining to provoke a
strike.38 2 This suggestion offers a way to curb abuse of the permanent replacement device without amending the NLRA. Although not referring to
the prevention of the hiring of permanent replacements, another commentator recently encouraged the Board to expand its use of this "powerful instrudelays in ULP proceedings do not frustrate the
ment" to assure that
383
purposes of the Act.
There are several problems, however, with relying on increased resort
to section 10(j) injunctions to address the problems of permanent replacement. First, seeking injunctive relief under section 10(j) is discretionary.
The regional director must obtain the Board's approval to petition for 10j)
injunctive relief. 38 4 Thus, policies regarding use of 10(j) injunctions to prohibit hiring of permanent replacements might vary among the regions and
over time, depending on the composition of the Board. Second, the federal
courts apply various standards to petitions for 10() injunctions,38 5 so results
may differ among the districts and circuits. Third, because hiring permanent replacements is not itself a ULP under current law, courts might not
consistently enjoin such conduct. There should be consistent treatment of
all labor disputes involving permanent replacement or the threat of permanent replacement. Reliance on section 10(j) injunctions would not provide
that consistency.
381. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1988). As discussed below, petitioning for a § 10j) injunction is
within the Board's discretion, whereas petitioning for a § 10(1) injunction is mandatory if there is
good cause to believe a union has committed one of the ULPs enumerated in § 10(1). See infra
note 384. Also, whereas § 10(1) injunctions are limited to certain ULPs by labor organizations,
see supra note 376, § 10() injunctions can be sought to enjoin any type of ULP.
382. Zifchak, supra note 86, at 69-72. William Zifchak suggests that the increased use of
§ 10G) should be directed not only against employers; he recommends that the Board should seek
§ 10(j) injunctive relief against a union engaging in flagrant bad faith bargaining involving "threat
of a strike to extort concessions." Id. at 70.
383. Morris, supra note 373, at 115-23. In the article, Professor Morris develops procedural
reforms discussed in his earlier work, Charles J. Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House-Can an
Old BoardLearn New Tricks?, 24 SAN DMo L. REv. 9 (1987) [hereinafter Morris, The NLRB in
the Dog House].
384. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1988) ('The Board shall have power.., to petition any
United States district court... " ) with id. § 160(0) ('ITMhe officer or regional attorney... shall,
on behalf of the Board, petition any United States district court ....).
385. See 2 THE DEVELoPING LABOR LAw, supra note 44, at 1817-21.
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PROPOSAL FOR LnN~rrnG MACKAY

The permanent replacement of strikers under Mackay should be restricted. Employers should not be prohibited, however, from hiring permanent replacements under all circumstances. The proposal described below
attempts to confine Mackay in practice to its current theoretical parameters-economic strikes.
A.

The Proposal

The principal tenets of this proposal are twofold. First, employers
should not be permitted to hire permanent replacements until the characterization of the strike and the corresponding reinstatement rights of the strikers
have been determined, thereby reducing the uncertainty under which employers, employees, unions, and potential replacements must act. Second,
this determination should be made expeditiously so as to deprive the employer of the permanent replacement option for the shortest possible time,
thus minimizing the risk of injury to its business and facilitating speedy
resolution of the labor dispute. To implement these two principles, this
proposal recommends both a temporary or interim ban on the hiring of permanent replacements until it is determined that the strike is an economic
strike and expedited ULP proceedings. In addition, the NLRA should be
amended to make it a ULP for an employer to hire permanent replacements
before such a determination is made. 86 As the following paragraphs
demonstrate, there is a tension between the objectives of reducing uncertainty and determining the characterization of the strike expeditiously. To
achieve absolute certainty regarding the strikers' reinstatement rights, the
proposal would have to forsake any expeditious determination; conversely,
the earlier the determination occurs in the sequence of proceedings, the less
certain are the parties that the final decision will reach the same conclusion.
This proposal chooses among alternative approaches, at several stages,
which best accommodate these objectives.
1. Triggering the Interim Ban
Under this proposal, an employer would be required to notify the
Board that it intends to hire permanent replacements. If the union contends
386. It is not necessary to amend the Act to make premature threats to hire permanent replacements a ULP. Threats by an employer to engage in unlawful conduct, such as discriminatory
discharges and plant closings for the purpose of "chilling" organizing efforts, are considered violations of § 8(a)(1). See, e.g., 1 THE DEVELoPING LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at 108-15. The
potential in terrorem effect of threats to hire permanent replacements could be reduced if the
Board would promulgate a rule requiring all employers and labor organizations under the Board's
jurisdiction to post notices with a general description of rights and obligations under the Act. See
Morris, supra note 373, app., at 134 (letter from Professor Thomas C. Kohler).
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that the strike is a ULP strike, the employer's notification would trigger the
interim ban. If the union or the employees have filed ULP charges before
the employer's notification and contend that the strike is a ULP strike, the
ban would become effective upon the employer's notification to the Board.
The union and employees would have a short period of time after the employer's notification to file ULP charges and notify the Board that they
consider the strike a ULP strike.3 87 Requiring the employer to notify the
Board and using that as the trigger for the ban eliminates the possibility of
(lawful) unannounced hirings. Of course, employers might hire permanent
replacements without notifying the Board in violation of the law. Such unlawful conduct could be addressed through the Board's use of section 10()
petitions for injunctions. Because petitioning for an injunction under section 100) is discretionary, however, the better approach would be to amend
as a
section 10(1) to include the premature hiring of permanent replacements
38 8
ULP that requires the regional office to petition for an injunction.
An alternative approach would make the union's announcement of its
intention to strike the trigger mechanism, but this approach is unsatisfactory
for several reasons. First, it is more efficient and economical to place the
trigger mechanism in the employer's hands because threats of strikes and
actual strikes occur more often than threats of permanent replacement and
actual hiring of permanent replacements. In most strikes, the employer will
never threaten to hire replacements, so it would be overkill to invoke the
interim ban and expedited proceedings each time a strike is called. Second,
the employees are not in immediate danger of permanent replacement (if, as
under this proposal, the employer is required to notify the Board of its intention to hire permanent replacements) at the beginning of a strike, and
thus do not need to know their reinstatement rights at the inception of every
strike. Finally, knowing that it will give up the valued option to hire permanent replacements and the concomitant bargaining leverage-at least during
the interim ban and perhaps beyond-an employer will be reluctant to in387. Although allowing the filing of charges to trigger the interim ban on hiring permanent
replacements after the employer's notification may encourage spurious charges, the alternative of
not allowing a short time for post-notification filing presents a greater problem. If no
post-notification filing could trigger the interim ban, the employer might file the notification early
in the strike, before the union filed ULP charges, thus avoiding the ban and expedited
proceedings.
Additionally, unions and employees should be precluded from relying on any pre-notification
conduct of the employer as a cause of a ULP strike if they fail to file a charge regarding that
conduct either before the employer's notification or during the period allowed for post-notification
filing. Cf. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1330-31 (arguing that the Board should refuse to apply the
conversion doctrine if an employer asks a union why it is striking and the union refuses to declare
its reason). If the law were otherwise, the proposal would do little to reduce an employer's uncertainty regarding its right to hire permanent replacements.
388. For discussion of ULPs to which § 10(1) injunctions are applicable, see supra note 376.
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voke these procedures if it can operate by other means during a strike.

Thus, the interim ban on hiring permanent replacements and the expedited
ULP proceedings should be triggered by an employer's notification to the
Board that it intends to hire permanent replacements rather than by a
union's announcement of a strike.
2.

Lifting or Extending the Interim Ban

The interim ban should be accompanied by legislatively mandated expedited ULP proceedings.3 8 9 Furthermore, the ban should be lifted or extended depending on the determination of the type of strike. This aspect of
the proposal raises a question: Which determination in the proceedings re-

sults in a lifting or extension of the ban? Before addressing that issue, a
thumbnail sketch of the relevant ULP proceedings is necessary.3 90

When a ULP charge is filed with a regional office of the NLRB, a
Board agent conducts an investigation to determine whether a charge has
merit and a complaint should be issued.3 91 If the investigation reveals that
the charge is without merit, the regional director recommends that the
charge be voluntarily withdrawn by the charging party.392 If the charge is
not withdrawn by the charging party, the regional director dismisses the
charge.39 3 If, on the other hand, the investigation reveals that a charge has
merit, the regional office generally attempts to give the parties an opportunity to submit evidence, arguments, and offers of settlement, in an effort to
resolve the case without issuing a complaint.39 4 If a case is not settled, the
389. For discussion of the timetable for proceedings, see infra Part VI.A.3.
390. For a more extensive treatment of ULP proceedings, see JEFFREY A. NORRIS & MICHAEL
J. SHERSHIN, JR., How TO TAKE A CASE BE~oFE Trm NLRB pt. 3 (6th ed. 1992).

391. NLRB Statements of Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1993); NORRIS & SHERSHIN, supra
note 390, § 12.10. A major component of an investigation is the Board agents' interviews with
parties and witnesses. I NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCEED.
mas 10056 (1989) [hereinafter NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL]. For an insightful discussion

of the investigation, see Matthew M. Franckiewicz, How to Win NLRB Cases: Tips from a Former Insider, 44 LAB. L.J. 40 passim (1993).
392. NLRB Statements of Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 101.5 (1993); NORRIS & SHERSHIN, supra
note 390, § 12.11.
393. NLRB Statements of Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 101.6 (1993); NORRIS & SHERSHIN, supra
note 390, § 12.12. The charging party may appeal this decision to the General Counsel. NLRB
Statements of Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 101.6 (1993).
394. NLRB Statements of Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 101.7 (1993); NORRIS & SHERSHIN, supra
note 390, ch. 14; 1 NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 391, 10126.2 (detailing steps
that should be taken to reach settlement after determination is made to issue complaint and recognizing that experience has shown this is "critical and fruitful" stage for settlement). Although the
ultimate decision on issuance of a complaint or dismissal of a charge rests with the regional
director, the parties are first advised of the investigating agent's recommendation to the regional
director. Franckiewicz, supra note 391, at 43. The agent's supervisor authorizes the agent to
communicate to the parties the recommendation that will be made to the regional director. Id. If
the agent is not successful in obtaining a withdrawal or settlement, the case is "agendaed" and
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regional director, on behalf of the General Counsel, issues a complaint and
serves it on the parties.3 95 The respondent has fourteen days from service
of the complaint to file an answer.3 96 An ALJ then conducts a hearing and
renders a decision. 397 If the AUJ renders a decision adverse to the party
against whom the complaint was issued, that party may voluntarily comply
with the decision. 3 91 Parties may file exceptions (and cross-exceptions) to
the decision of the ALJ and supporting briefs with the NLRB; parties may
also file briefs in support of the ALJ's decision, as well as reply briefs.39 9
If exceptions are not filed within the time allowed, the decision of the ALJ
becomes the decision of the Board. 4"
In cases in which exceptions are filed, the Board typically delegates
decision-making authority to three-member panels as authorized by statute,4 ' although the full five-member Board may review cases that establish
or change policy. 40 2 The Board, in deciding a case, may adopt, reject, or
modify the findings and conclusions in an ALl's decision.40 3 Board orders
are not self-enforcing; hence, the Board may petition to have its order enforced by an appropriate United States Court of Appeals. 4 4 A party aggrieved by a Board order also may petition an appropriate court of appeals
for review of the order.40 5 Finally, decisions of the courts of appeals either
enforcing Board orders or denying enforcement are subject to review by the
Supreme Court upon certification or the granting of a writ of certiorari.40 6
Considering the framework of ULP proceedings, at what stage of the
proceedings should a decision be made to lift or extend the interim ban on
the hiring of permanent replacements under this proposal? To eliminate
wholly the parties' uncertainty regarding the characterization of the strike
and the strikers' reinstatement rights, one would propose that the ban
reviewed by the regional committee. Id. The regional director may or may not attend the agenda;
regardless, the case must be reviewed with the regional director before he issues a complaint or
dismisses the case. Id.
395. NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.15 (1993); NoRRs & SHE-RSHM, supra
note 390, at 379.
396. NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.20 (1993); NoRIS & SHERSHIN, supra
note 390, § 15.6.
397. NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.34-.45 (1993); NoRRs & SHERSmN,
supra note 390, §§ 16.1-.21.
398. NoRms & SERasm, supra note 390, § 17.2.
399. NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.46 (1993); NoRIUS & SHERSHIN, supra
note 390, §§ 17.4-.8.
400. NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(a) (1993); Nomus & SHERSHIN, supra
note 390, § 17.2.
401. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1988).
402. NoRms & SnmNsrnN, supra note 390, § 17.10.
403. Id. § 17.11.

404. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1988).
405. Id. § 160(f).
406. Id. § 160(e).
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should continue until the last tribunal to consider the case has rendered a
decision. However, such a proposal would abandon the goal of a speedy
determination for lifting or extending the ban. Furthermore, there probably
is not a meaningful distinction between a long interim ban and an absolute
prohibition on hiring permanent replacements. For some employers, such a
long ban might damage the business severely. Furthermore, some employers might abandon reasonable bargaining positions rather than attempt to
endure such a long ban. Consequently, this proposal strikes a balance between the competing objectives of speed and certainty. Under this proposal, the continuation of the ban would be determined at each of the
following stages: the regional director's decision whether to issue a complaint; the AL's decision; and the Board's decision. Additionally, if the
determination is made to lift the ban at any stage of the proceedings, the
striking employees should be given a short period of time-no longer than a
week-in which to make offers to return to work before the ban is lifted.
The recommendation that the Board's decision be determinative of the ban
is unremarkable; however, the recommendation that the two earlier stages
also be treated as determinative merits discussion.
Initially, if the regional director does not issue a complaint alleging a
ULP strike,4 07 the interim ban should be lifted; conversely, if the regional
director does issue such a complaint, the ban should be extended. One
might argue that the ban should not be lifted at this stage because a regional
director's decision not to issue a complaint can be appealed to the General
Counsel.40 8 Thus, if an appeal is filed, an alternative approach would be to
extend the ban, notwithstanding the regional director's dismissal of the
charge, until the General Counsel's office decides the appeal. That alternative should be rejected because it could result in extension of the interim
ban for a couple of months or more.4 °9 In the attempt to balance adequately
the goals of certainty and expeditious determination, this issue should be
resolved in favor of speed because little is lost in certainty. The General
407. In cases involving a strike and the filing of a ULP charge alleging a ULP strike, the
General Counsel is to "plead [in the complaint] and litigate the nature of the strike in addition to
the primary unfair labor practice issue." I NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANuAL, supra note 391, 1
10266.1. The General Counsel also must seek a Board order requiring reinstatement of strikers if
the complaint alleges that the strike began as, or was converted to, a ULP strike. Id. The complaint must contain specific details regarding the acts causing the ULP strike. Id.
408. NLRB Statements of Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 101.6 (1993).
409. The following time allowances under the appeal procedure indicate how long an appeal
may remain pending: from service of notice of a regional director's decision not to issue a complaint, a charging party has 14 days to file an appeal, NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.19(a) (1993); extensions may be granted for filing appeals, id.; oral argument may be
granted, id. § 102.19(b); and a motion for reconsideration of the General Counsel's decision may
be filed within 14 days of service of the decision, id. § 102.19(c). In addition to these time
periods, there is the time from the filing of an appeal to the General Counsel's rendering of a
decision.
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Counsel reverses the regional directors' decisions not to issue complaints in

only a small percentage of cases, so an appeal should not result in an extension of the ban.41 0
If the regional director issues a complaint alleging a ULP strike and
the interim ban is extended, few cases would advance to hearings before
ALJs because most would settle.41 1 In those cases that did proceed, if the
ALJ determines that the strike is an economic strike the ban should be
lifted; conversely, if the ALJ determines that the strike is a ULP strike, the
interim ban should be extended until the Board renders a decision. One
might argue that the ban should not be lifted at this stage because the Board

may reverse the AL's decision as to the characterization of the strike. An
alternative approach would be to extend the ban at this stage, even when the
ALJ finds the strike is economic, if the General Counsel files exceptions to
the ALJ's decision. Again, this alternative should be rejected because it
does not represent a proper balancing of the objectives of certainty and
expeditious determination. First, the delay occasioned by extending the ban
until the Board's decision would be substantial, effectively rendering the
interim ban permanent.4 12 Even if the Board were required to comply with
the timetable proposed in the Justice for Permanently Displaced Striking
410. In fiscal year 1991, the General Counsel's Office of Appeals decided 3,648 appeals and
reversed only 3.5% of the cases. NLRB General Counsel's Summary of Fiscal Year 1991 Operations, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 189, at D-1 (Sept. 29, 1992). The reversal rate in fiscal year
1990 was 2%. Id.
411. Statistics compiled by the General Counsel establish that the issuance of a'complaint,
which occurs in only a small percentage of meritorious cases, is a very reliable indicator that an
employer will be found to have committed a ULP. Regional directors determined that formal
proceedings were warranted for only 36.1% of the ULP cases in fiscal year 1991 and only 35.4%
of the cases in fiscal year 1990. NLRB General Counsel'sSummary of Fiscal Year 1991 Operations, supra note 410. This percentage, called the "merit factor," has been between 31% and 36%
over the years. Id. Regional directors actually issue complaints in only a small percentage of
cases in which they determine that the ULP charges are meritorious because most such cases
settle. For example, in fiscal year 1991, 93.2% of the meritorious cases settled, and in fiscal year
1990, 91.5% settled. Id. It is likely that even a higher percentage of cases would settle if the ban
on hiring permanent replacements were extended based on issuance of a complaint.
Arguably, employers should not have such pressure applied to them to settle cases before the
formal hearings in front of AiLJs. The General Counsel's success rate in cases before ALJs and
the Board suggests, however, that employers are well advised to settle cases in which complaints
are issued. The General Counsel won "in whole or in part" 84.8% of the Board and ALJ decisions
in fiscal year 1991, and 83.4% in fiscal year 1990. Id.; see also Franckiewicz,, supra note 391, at
41 ("[Whether a party wins or loses at the NLRB is essentially determined by whether or not the
regional director decides to issue a complaint."). Moreover, a high percentage of the Board's
decisions are enforced by the federal courts. The Appellate Court Branch of the General Counsel
won, "in whole or in part," 86.5% of the cases decided by the Courts of Appeals in fiscal year
1991 and 88.8% in fiscal year 1990. Id.
412. For discussion of the delay from the time of the AL's decision to the Board's decision,
see infra text accompanying note 424.
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Workers Act,4 13 the interim ban could extend for a year or more from the
filing of a ULP charge to the rendering of a decision by the Board. 4 14 Second, the certainty of the parties regarding the ultimate decision would not
be substantially diminished by making the AL's decision determinative of
the status of the interim ban. Decisions by ALJs are usually adopted by the
Board or adopted with some modifications. Although an AL's findings
and recommendations are not binding on the Board, and the Board bases its
findings of fact upon a de novo review of the entire record, it is rare for the
Board to overrule credibility determinations by an ALJ who listened to the
testimony and observed the witnesses.4 15
Notwithstanding the possibility of reversal if a ban is lifted at the first
stage or the second stage under this proposal, the affected parties will be in
a better position to make decisions than they are under current law. At the
first stage, if a regional director dismisses a ULP charge, the case is over
unless the General Counsel reverses the regional director's decision. The
employer is permitted to hire permanent replacements, and the striking em-

ployees know that they must either return to work or risk not being reinstated immediately in their jobs. Alternatively, if the regional director
issues a complaint, the employer continues to be prohibited from hiring
permanent replacements, and the striking employees know that they do not
risk losing their right to immediate reinstatement by continuing to strike.
At the second stage, if the ALJ determines that the strike is an economic strike, the employer is permitted to hire permanent replacements, and

the strikers know that they must return to work or risk losing their jobs.
The employer still faces the risk that, if it hires permanent replacements, the
413. S. 598, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). For discussion of the bill, see supra notes 365-73
and accompanying text.
414. The timetable in the Justice Act is not inclusive of all periods in the proceedings, but
§ 3(b) of the act does set forth the maximum periods for many of the stages. See supra notes
368-71 and accompanying text. The sum of those maximum allowances is 285 days. The median
time for issuance of complaints, a matter not regulated by the bill, was 46 days in 1991 and 45
days in 1990. NLRB General Counsel's Summary of Fiscal Year 1991 Operations, supra note
410. Additionally, the Justice Act would not regulate the number of days for the hearing or the
number of days the parties are allowed to submit post-hearing briefs to the AL. Thus, the time
from the filing of a ULP charge to Board decision under the timetable in the Justice Act could be
approximately one year.
415. Standard Dry Wall Prods., 91 N.L.R.B. 544, 545 (1950), enforced, 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir.
1951). Anyone who reads many decisions of the NLRB becomes accustomed to seeing the following footnote:
The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility findings. The Board's
established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions
unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are
incorrect. StandardDry Wall Products,91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d
Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the
findings.
E.g., Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1286 n.2 (1993).
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Board may reverse the ALJ and order the employer to reinstate the strikers
and discharge replacements if necessary. For several reasons, however, that
uncertainty should not seriously hinder an employer's ability to choose a
course of action. First, the chance that the Board will reverse the AL's
determination is small. Second, because the employer will not have hired
permanent replacements prior to this stage and the Board's decision will be
rendered according to a legislatively mandated expedited schedule, any
make-whole relief ordered by the Board (if it reverses the ALJ) will be
relatively small compared to such liabilities under current law. Third, the
employer may not find it necessary to hire many, if any, permanent replacements, because many strikers will return to work rather than risk losing
their right to immediate reinstatement. Alternatively, if the ALJ determines
that the strike is a ULP strike, the employer continues to be prohibited from
hiring permanent replacements, and the employees can remain on strike
without the fear of losing their jobs to replacements.
Thus, determining the status of the interim ban when the regional director decides whether to issue a complaint, and, if the case proceeds, when
the ALJ renders a decision, accomplishes the dual objectives of this proposal. The foregoing approach reduces uncertainty and determines the status
of the ban expeditiously.
3. Expedited Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings
An interim ban on the hiring of permanent replacements creates an
increasingly greater risk of harm to the employer's business the longer it
lasts. This proposal therefore requires expedited ULP proceedings at all
stages. The timetable for the ULP proceedings should be as fast as practicable without sacrificing the thoroughness and quality of the investigations,
hearings, and decisions. In order to require such case handling, section 10
of the Act should be amended to provide that no type of ULP case takes
priority over cases involving a strike and an employer's notification of its
intent to hire permanent replacements.4 16
Consideration of the time now required for a decision at each stage
indicates the extent to which each should be expedited. At the first stage at
which the interim ban could be lifted under this proposal, the regional of416. Under current law, ULP charges alleging union violations of §§ 8(b)(4)(A)-(C), 8(e), and
8(b)(7) are given priority over other types of charges. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1988).
Strike-and-replacement cases should be accorded the same priority. At a minimum, the Act
should be amended to give strike-and-replacement cases second priority under § 10(m), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(m) (1988). Section 10(m) currently gives § 8(a)(3) and § 8(b)(2) cases priority over other
types of ULP cases, other than those listed in § 10(1). The proposed Justice for Permanently
Displaced Striking Workers Act of 1993, S. 598, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), would amend
§ 10(m) by adding § 8(a)(5) and § 8(b)(3) ULP charges. See 139 CoNo. Rlc. S3044 (daily ed.
Mar. 17, 1993).
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fices' recent record on handling charges, from filing of the charge through
issuance of the complaint, does not seem to impose an onerous burden on

employers. The median time for issuance of complaints in fiscal year 1991
was forty-six days.4 17 Although this stage should be expedited if feasible, it

is not the stage at which a substantial lapse of time occurs.418
In contrast, the second stage at which the interim ban could be lifted,
the rendering of the ALJ's decision, must be expedited. In fiscal year 1990,

the median time from filing of a ULP charge to decision by an ALJ was 357
days, including a median of 154 days from the issuance of a complaint to
the close of a hearing and a median of 155 days from the close of a hearing
to the issuance of an ALJ's decision.4 19 One could argue that substantial
delay at this stage is not as significant as it would be at the first stage; only
a small percentage of ULP cases proceed to an ALJ decision, and a substan-

tial majority of those result in a finding that the employers committed
ULPs.42 0 In short, because most ALJ decisions would not result in lifting
of the interim ban, the long delay at the second stage is less important than
the delay at the first stage. Those facts notwithstanding, some employers
who would succeed in having the interim ban lifted as a result of an ALJ's

decision could suffer severe harm to their businesses as a result of the ban
lasting a year.

The timetable for adjudication proposed in section 3(b) of the Justice
Act provides some guidance for establishing constraints on the second stage

in expedited proceedings: a maximum of sixty days from issuance of complaint to hearing before an ALJ42 1 and a maximum of sixty days from com-

pletion of hearing and submission of posthearing briefs to the ALJ's
decision.422 Although these proposed time constraints would help expedite
proceedings for the period from issuance of the complaint to an ALl's decision, even they should be tightened if practicable.42"
417. NLRB GeneralCounsel's Summary of Fiscal Year 1991 Operations,supra note 410. In
fiscal year 1990, the median time from charge to complaint was 45 days. Id. The Board's time
goal from the filing of a charge to implementation of the regional director's decision is 45 days. 1
NLRB, CASmiANDGmO MANUAL, supra note 391, 10051.
418. Cf Morris, supra note 373, at 127. In evaluating the NLRB's published statistics for
fiscal year 1990, Professor Morris observed as follows: "[Tihe median time for obtaining an
AL's decision from the filing of the charges to the issuance of the decision is one year, or more
specifically, 357 days. Almost all of that time-309 days--occurs following the issuance of the
complaint." Id. (footnote omitted).
419. 55 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 6, at 196 tbl. 23 (1992).
420. See supra note 411.
421. This allowance exceeds the NLRB's time target of 45 days. I NLRB CAsE mNDLINa
MANuAL, supra note 391,
10051.
422. See S. 598, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(b), 139 CONG. REc. S598, S3045 (daily ed. Mar.
17, 1993) (statement by Sen. Durenberger).
423. Professor Morris has suggested a reorganization of the ALs' operations that also could
expedite this stage of the proceedings. His proposal consists of the following changes: (1) as-
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The third stage at which the ban could be lifted, the Board's decision,
also must be expedited. In fiscal year 1990, the median number of days
between the issuance of an ALJ's decision and the issuance of the Board's
decision was 314 days, making the median number of days from filing a
charge to issuance of a Board decision 671 days.424 Again, the timetable in
the Justice Act suggests time constraints at the Board stage of the proceedings: a maximum of thirty days for the filing of exceptions and briefs in
opposition to the ALJ's decision; a maximum of fifteen days for the filing
of reply briefs; and a maximum of ninety days from the filing of briefs to
the Board's decision, with a maximum of thirty additional days if oral argument is scheduled. 4' It may be difficult to impose tighter constraints on
the Board than those provided in the Justice Act. Streamlining the procedures for handling cases involving an interim ban, however, offers some
possibility for further expediting Board decisions.4 26
B.

Potential Problems With the Proposal
1. Cost

The first objection may be that implementing this proposal will be
costly. There certainly are expenses associated with establishing and utilizing the proposal described above. On this objection, for the time being, the
response of a commentator who proposed a business necessity amendment
will suffice:
Unquestionably, the administration of such a scheme would
impose costs. However, it must be remembered that employers
do not resort to hiring permanent replacement workers all that
often, and thus the number of disputes is not likely to be great.
signing ALs to cases immediately after complaints issue and having the assigned ALJ handle all
motions and rulings for each case; (2) giving ALs authority to act upon all motions, and encouraging prehearing conferences and motion practice (including discovery and summary judgment
and partial summary judgment); and (3) further decentralizing the ALJs' home-base locations by
assigning them to major metropolitan areas. Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House, supra note 383,
at 46-47; Morris, supra note 373, at 127-29.
The Acting General Counsel recently outlined some administrative changes being considered
to reduce delay, which could be implemented without statutory amendment. NLRB General
Counsel Outlines Possible Changesfor Labor Board To Better Meet Statutory Goals,Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at A-13 (Jan. 24, 1994). Among those changes is a "fast-track" proceeding
system for ULP cases in which there is a need for immediate relief. Id. This system would
represent a departure from the current "first-in, first-out" approach. Id.
424. 55 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 6, at 196 tbl. 23.
425. See 139 CONG. REc. S598, S3045 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1993).
426. One of Professor Morris's recommendations for expediting § 10(j) injunction cases might
also result in faster Board decisions in cases involving interim bans: maintaining a stand-by
three-member Board panel, with one member assigned primary responsibility for this special
docket. Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House, supranote 383, at 45-46; Morris, supranote 373, at
122.
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Furthermore, both of the extreme rules have costs of their own
...
. [T]he prudent course is to avoid the risks of either
extreme.4 27
As a final note on cost, it is reasonable to expect that resort to permanent
replacements would be even less frequent under this proposal than under
the current law.4 28
2.

Conversion of the Strike

Another potential problem with this proposal is the changing nature of
some strikes. A strike may start as an economic strike, then convert into a
ULP strike (or vice versa), and then even be reconverted. 429 How can this
proposal capture a moment in time to determine the type of strike and the
corresponding reinstatement rights of the strikers?
First, consider possible conversion after the interim ban is lifted. If it
is determined that the strike is economic and that the employer is permitted
to hire permanent replacements, that will, in many cases, end the strike, and
there will be no subsequent conversion.4 30 If the strike continues after the
interim ban is lifted, however, the employer's reliance on the characterization of the strike is unlikely to be frustrated by a subsequent conversion. If
the employer hires a full complement of permanent replacements soon after
the interim ban is lifted and the strike is converted thereafter, the striking
employees would not have a right of immediate reinstatement because they
were economic strikers when the replacements were hired.4 31
Second, consider possible conversion during the period of the interim
ban on the hiring of permanent replacements, which lasts from the employer's notification of its intention to hire permanent replacements to the
lifting of the ban. It is certainly possible that, while the ULP proceedings
are being conducted, a union may file new ULP charges, alleging that the
employer has committed ULPs during this period. These ULPs could convert the strike even if the regional director, the AL, or the Board deter427. Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 685.
428. A large majority of ULP cases settle before proceeding to a hearing before an AL. See
supra note 411. Thus, one might reason that if employers could operate their businesses by other
means, they would be reluctant to notify the Board of their intention to hire permanent replacements and thus initiate NLRB proceedings.
429. See supra notes 292-95 and accompanying text.
430. For examples of strikes that ended when employers threatened to hire permanent replacements, consider the UAW strike of Caterpillar, discussed in the Prologue supra, and the UAW
strike of Peterbilt, discussed supranote 261. For general discussion of the effect of threatening to
hire and of hiring permanent replacements on strikes, see supra Part mU.
431. E.g., C-Line Express, 292 N.L.R.B. 638, 639 (1989). If the union contends that the strike
was converted by a ULP committed between the lifting of the interim ban and the hiring of
permanent replacements, that filing should not trigger a new ban and expedited proceedings. Such
a filing should be treated in the same manner as ULP charges filed during the interim ban.
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mines that the strike was an economic strike immediately prior to the
commencement of the investigation. This possibility raises the question of
how these new charges affect the already-commenced expedited proceedings and the ban on the employer's hiring of permanent replacements. In
short, charges filed during the interim ban would not trigger a new interim
ban and a second set of expedited hearings. Such a situation would be
completely unworkable; if that were allowed, unions could frustrate employers' efforts entirely by filing new ULP charges and alleging a conversion during each set of expedited proceedings. This would achieve, in
effect, a permanent prohibition on hiring permanent replacements at considerable administrative cost.
To account for the possibility of meritorious ULP charges during the
interim ban, however, an accommodation can be made at the first stage of
the proceedings because that would be the most important stage for lifting
or extending the ban. Under some circumstances, a regional director should
be permitted to extend the interim ban once for a short period, not to exceed
twenty days, to supplement an already-conducted investigation or to hold
meetings with the parties regarding new ULP charges. This extension
should only be granted, however, upon submission of substantial evidence
supporting the contention that a strike has been converted; a mere filing of a
ULP charge including an allegation of conversion should not be sufficient.
Corresponding rules should apply to an employer's contention that a strike
was converted from ULP into economic during the interim ban; new expedited proceedings would not be commenced to determine whether a conversion occurred.
Thus, ULP charges and allegations of conversion during the interim
ban would not invoke a new ban and expedited proceedings. Consequently,
a scenario is possible in which the parties are uncertain regarding the outcome of new charges and therefore do not conclusively know the reinstatement rights of the striking employees if the interim ban is lifted. This
problem would have significance only if the ban were lifted. The union
would contend that the new ULP charges converted the strike and the strikers now had rights to immediate reinstatement, although they would not
have had such rights based on the ULP charges considered in the proceeding. This introduces some uncertainty into the scenario. Should the employer, with the interim ban being lifted, risk hiring permanent
replacements? Should striking employees remain on strike notwithstanding
the employer's freedom to hire permanent replacements, hoping that the
Board will find that the strike was converted after commencement of the
expedited proceedings?
Given the possible uncertainties even if expedited proceedings were
held regarding all pre-proceeding ULP charges, does this proposal accom-
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plish anything? Yes. It does not eliminate uncertainty, but it does substantially reduce it. Even in the scenario posed in the preceding paragraph,
based on the decision of a regional director, an ALJ, or the Board, the parties would know the nature of the strike from its inception until at least the
time the investigation was conducted. This is important information on
which all parties can base their actions, and it is much better information
regarding the employees' reinstatement rights and the employer's right to
hire permanent replacements than the parties have under the current law.
Would an employer be deterred from hiring permanent replacements when
the interim ban is lifted by the possibility of conversion based on new ULP
charges? The question would require an employer to evaluate its own conduct during a short period of time. Unless an employer knows or has good
reason to think that it has committed ULPs after commencement of the
expedited proceedings, it is not likely to be deterred. Would striking employees feel comfortable remaining on strike in the hope of a finding of
conversion based on the new ULP charges? Unless an employer has committed egregious ULPs, most would not.
In sum, the possible conversion of a strike after an employer hires
permanent replacements is not likely to reduce the value of the expedited
proceedings in clarifying the reinstatement rights of the striking employees.
Possible conversion during the interim ban may reduce the value of the
expedited proceedings, but only marginally. Although uncertainty regarding the employees' reinstatement rights and the employer's right to hire
replacements is not eliminated in that situation, it is substantially reduced,
and the parties have much better information on which to base their courses
of action than under the current law.
3.

Devastating Effect of the Interim Ban on Some Employers

Some have argued that a temporary ban on the hiring of permanent
replacements would severely harm and perhaps even destroy some businesses.4 32 Such harm is particularly likely for businesses that have seasons
in which they do a disproportionately high percentage of their annual business; if a strike begins during one of those periods of the year, these businesses could be crippled.4 33 This potential problem does not overcome,
however, the benefits of an interim ban on the hiring of permanent replacements accompanied by expedited proceedings for several reasons. First, the
strike-and-permanent-replacement situation is infrequent. Second, even for
businesses with disproportionately profitable seasons, hiring of temporary
replacements may be a viable option, depending upon several factors, in432. E.g.,

YAGER,

supra note 11, at 139-41; see supra note 362.

433. YAGER, supra note 11, at 141.
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cluding the local market and the skill level of the striking employees.
Third, many employers have other options for operating during a temporary
ban on hiring permanent replacements, which they may use instead of, or in
conjunction with, temporary replacements. These possible options include
the following: operating with employees who do not strike and nonbargaining unit employees, such as managerial and supervisory personnel; subcontracting some bargaining-unit work on a temporary basis; relying on
inventories built up in anticipation of a strike; and assigning work to other
nonstruck facilities or transferring employees from such facilities to the
struck facility.43 4 This is not to suggest that employers could easily operate
during an interim ban by implementing one or more of the foregoing options. Such operations might require careful advance planning,43 5 which
has not always been necessary for employers having the right to hire permanent replacements immediately. Additional reasons that this proposal will
not be particularly harmful to seasonal employers involve the lifting or extension of the ban. The interim ban of this proposal may be lifted at several
stages in the proceedings. If it is lifted by the regional director's decision
not to issue a complaint, the duration may be shorter than the most frequently discussed temporary ban of ten weeks. Moreover, if the ban is not
lifted at the complaint stage, it is highly likely that the employer will be
found to have committed ULPs; thus, the interim ban spares the employer
from future discharge of permanent replacements, reinstatement of strikers,
and a potentially large back pay liability.
In sum, there probably are some employers and situations in which a
temporary ban on the hiring of permanent replacements would be devastating to the employer's business. In view of the other options available for
operating during the ban, however, there are not many such situations.
Moreover, careful prestrike planning may ameliorate the difficulties of even
the few employers that otherwise would be severely harmed by the interim
ban.

43 6

434.

See, e.g., CHARLES

R. PERY

Er AL., OPERATING DURING STRIKES: CoMPANY EXPERI-

ENCE, NLRB POLICIES, AND GovRNimaEAL. REGULATIONs 51-68 (1982); Finkin, supra note 80,

at 562.
435. See, e.g., PERRY aT

., supra note 434, at 51-68.

436. An alternative approach is to provide a procedure that would exempt from the interim
ban employers who could demonstrate that the interim ban would inflict great harm on their
businesses. This approach is, of course, a version of the business necessity test. Its use in conjunction with the interim ban is objectionable for the same reasons that the business necessity test
in conjunction with a permanent ban is objectionable: it injects another difficult factual determination into the process, thereby slowing down the expedited proceedings. Moreover, employers
might attempt to invoke the emergency exception in nonemergency cases on a regular basis. In
the end, however, such an exception may be needed. For further discussion of business necessity
tests, see supra Part V.A.
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C. Beneficial Effects on Both the Partiesand the Adjudication of Unfair
Labor Practice Charges
All parties to a labor dispute would derive benefits from implementation of this proposal because the risks encountered by all parties would be
reduced. Applying this proposal to the UAW-Caterpillar dispute on April
1, when Caterpillar issued its ultimatum, demonstrates those benefits. Additionally, implementation of this proposal would facilitate the adjudication
of ULP charges.
Caterpillar's striking employees would have benefited from application of this proposal. Caterpillar would have been required to notify the
Board of its intention to hire permanent replacements. Because the UAW
filed ULP charges asserting that the strike was a ULP strike, Caterpillar
would have been prohibited from hiring permanent replacements until the
nature of the strike was determined. Accordingly, the employees, not fearing loss of their jobs, could have remained on strike. If it were determined
that the strike was economic, then it would have been necessary for them to
decide whether to risk their right to immediate reinstatement by continuing
to strike, but they would have known their reinstatement rights and had an
opportunity to offer to return to work before Caterpillar began hiring permanent replacements.4 3 7
The union also would have benefited. The UAW would not have
feared that its members would lose their jobs to replacements before their
reinstatement rights were determined. Therefore, the UAW could have advised its members to remain on strike pending a determination of whether
the interim ban should be lifted or extended. Just as the strikers' rights to
immediate reinstatement would not have been in immediate jeopardy, the
UAW's status as the collective bargaining representative would not have
been in jeopardy because of potential decertification by replacements.
Rather than announcing a decision to hire permanent replacements to
its employees and thereby causing the strike to collapse, Caterpillar would
have been required to notify the Board of its decision. Although employers
may consider it a disadvantage to be prohibited from hiring permanent
replacements until the nature of the strike is determined, the practice would
confer some obvious and some not so obvious benefits on employers. It is
apparent that employers are spared potentially large make-whole liability.
If Caterpillar had followed through on its ultimatum, it could have been
strapped with a very large back pay and make-whole liability for denying
the strikers reinstatement if the strike were determined, a year or more
437. Although many opponents of Mackay object to the inability to conduct an economic
strike free of risk, there are reasons for treating economic and ULP strikers differently. See supra
Part II.B and Part IV.
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thereafter, to be a ULP strike. Under this proposal, such liability is averted.
Caterpillar also may have faced civil lawsuits if it had been required to
discharge permanent replacements. Although the Supreme Court has suggested how employers might insulate themselves against such liability, it is
not always effective;4 3 indeed, Caterpillar's newspaper advertisements
seeking "permanent employees to replace non-returning striking workers"9439 could have made such actions viable. This proposal would avoid
such potential civil liability. Another benefit of this proposal to employers
such as Caterpillar is that, even if they have committed ULPs that are contributing causes of a strike, it affords them an opportunity to take corrective
action intended to convert a strike into an economic strike and to obtain a
determination of whether their efforts have been successful. Thus, under
this proposal, if Caterpillar had known that it would need to hire permanent
replacements, before filing its notification with the Board, it could have
attempted to cure its ULPs.44
Finally, replacements would benefit from implementation of this proposal. Even under this proposal, employers might still feel it necessary to
condition the replacements' continued employment on a final decision (by
the Board or court of appeals) or a strike settlement. Under this proposal,
however, if Caterpillar had actually hired permanent replacements, it could
have advised them that the strike had been characterized as an economic
strike. The replacements would have possessed more definite information
on their status and could then have decided whether it would be worthwhile
to leave another job or move from another part of the country, or world, to
take the replacement position.
Implementation of this proposal also would benefit the process of adjudicating ULP cases. Employers charged with committing ULPs and their
attorneys have different approaches to the initial investigation by Board
agents.44 1 Some are not very cooperative. Under the procedures described
in this Article, employers who notify the Board of their intention to hire
438. See supra notes 194-215 and accompanying text.
439. Dine, supra note 54, at IA.
440. Because an expeditious determination of the character of a strike has been unavailable,
employers have had little incentive to attempt to "cure" their ULPs. Even if they took action, they
still would be uncertain of the type of strike until a Board decision, which might not be forthcoming for a year or two. Commentators have argued that the conversion doctrine has been too
one-sided and that employers should have an opportunity to convert ULP strikes into economic
strikes. Stewart, supranote 1,at 1330-33 (arguing that unions should be required to respond to an
employer's inquiry regarding reasons for strike so that employer could attempt to remedy ULPs);
see also James M. Rabbitt, Comment, Reconversion of Unfair-Labor-PracticeStrikes to Economic Strikes, 64 GEo. LJ.1143, 1151 (1976) (proposing a procedure whereby regional NLRB
offices could certify that an employer had taken corrective measures that would relieve the employer of ULP strike liability).
441. NoRIus & SHERsmN, supra note 390, at 332.
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permanent replacements would have an incentive to cooperate in such investigations so that the interim ban could be lifted at the complaint stage.
D. Flexibility of the Proposal
The proposal outlined in this Article is malleable. As discussed, there
are alternative approaches at several stages. The precise mechanics are
open to debate. The basic principles undergirding this proposal are that
employers should not be allowed to hire permanent replacements until the
nature of the strike is determined, thus reducing the risks undertaken by all
of the parties, and that the determination should be made as quickly as possible, so that an employer's business is not harmed. At that time, the parties, equipped with knowledge of their rights, can resolve their dispute
quickly.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Under the Mackay regime of striker replacement law, employers have
been permitted to hire permanent replacements for strikers. Although the
doctrine has been limited under the substantive law to economic strikes, in
practice employers have threatened to replace permanently, and have replaced, both economic and ULP strikers. The limitation recognized by the
substantive law has provided little comfort to parties to a labor dispute
when employers have either announced that they would hire permanent
replacements or begun hiring them. None of the parties-employer, striking employees, union, or replacements-know whether the strike is economic or ULP at that critical time when they must take action.
Consequently, all of the parties encounter substantial risks, with the employees facing the greatest risk-potential loss of their right to immediate
reinstatement to their jobs. In some cases, like UAW-Caterpillar, the striking employees and union abandon the strike rather than risking the loss.
Those calling for the abrogation of Mackay are correct that the law
regarding permanent replacement of strikers should be changed. That does
not, however, require categorically prohibiting employers from hiring permanent replacements. The primary distinctions between economic and
ULP strikes are the different rights of employers to hire replacements and
the corresponding rights of striking employees to reinstatement. The distinction between the two types of strikes serves the important purposes of
deterring employers from committing ULPs and providing a market check
on the parties' bargaining positions. Accordingly, the distinction is worth
preserving.
There have been many proposals to reform striker replacement law
over the years. In the last six years, a number of bills have been introduced
in Congress, ranging from a ten-week ban on hiring permanent replace-
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ments to an absolute prohibition. Although the Mackay doctrine has survived the onslaught so far, its margin of victory has dwindled, and some
change now seems imminent.
This Article, after considering and critiquing prior proposals for reform of striker replacement law, fashions a new proposal. This proposal
would reduce the risks imposed on the parties, while preserving the useful
distinction between economic strikes and ULP strikes. The proposal accomplishes its objectives by imposing procedural constraints on the Mackay
doctrine that substantially confine its applicability in practice to economic
strikes. The fundamental principles of the proposal are that an employer
should not be allowed to hire permanent replacements until the characterization of a strike is determined, but that employers should be prohibited
from hiring permanent replacements for the shortest time possible.
The current law regarding replacement of strikers will be altered in the
near future. It should be changed, but it is important that the reasons for the
change be examined and the new law developed to accommodate those reasons. There are elements of the current law that should be preserved. The
reform advocated in this Article reduces the risks and uncertainties encountered by the parties to a labor dispute and does so without unconditionally
depriving employers of the option of hiring permanent replacements. This
approach to reform of the law on permanent replacement of strikers is a far,
far better thing than the Workplace Fairness Act.

